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Letter from the Editor
Morgantown, West Virginia
June 15, 2021
A year has passed since the inaugural edition of the West Virginia University
Historical Review, and it has been a challenging one. Higher education, like all
other aspects of life, has been radically transformed by COVID-19. Students and
faculty have had to adjust to new technologies and instructional modalities while
dealing with financial, family, and health crises related to the global pandemic.
In addition, our country’s persistent racial inequalities have once again been
laid bare, provoking sometimes painful assessments and conversations across
the country, including here at West Virginia University. Now, more than ever,
it is important for young people to understand how history has shaped our
world.
In the face of these challenges, our students have continued to show resilience
and determination. History as a discipline—with its focus on communication,
evidence-based argumentation, and critical thinking—provides a skillset with
which to navigate our rapidly changing times. Each of the authors featured
here demonstrates these skills. They tackle ambitious topics of historical inquiry,
utilize innovative research methodologies, and develop sophisticated arguments.
The award-winning capstone papers published in this volume are a remarkable
testament to the intellectual creativity and rigor of their authors. On behalf of
the History Department, I congratulate them on their accomplishments.
Sincerely,

Jennifer Thornton
Teaching Assistant Professor
WVU History Department
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“Sweep All These Pests from Our Midst”: The Anti-Chinese
Prostitution Movement, the Criminalization of Chinese
Women, and the First Federal Immigration Law
L AURA CURRY
Often forgotten in light of later pieces of anti-Chinese legislation, the Page Act of 1875 and the anti-Chinese prostitution
movement were critical in creating a legal precedent for racially exclusionary immigration laws. Religious leaders in
California aggressively campaigned against Chinese prostitution by creating rehabilitation centers for former Chinese
prostitutes, investigating Chinese women arriving at the port, and focusing media attention on the issue. Concentrated
specifically on Chinese prostitution, religious leaders created an implicit association between Chinese women and
prostitution while ignoring the larger white prostitution trade. The potential for Chinese women to give birth to Chinese
American citizens also made Chinese women a threat to America’s racial hierarchy. By branding all Chinese women as
prostitutes and Chinese men as purveyors of the trade, political leaders were able to justify racially exclusionary laws
barring Chinese people from the United States.

The anti-Chinese prostitution movement was critically important to the exclusion of Chinese
women and the creation of racially exclusionary laws. While the anti-Chinese prostitution
movement supposedly sought to end Chinese prostitution, its focus on Chinese women led to
the creation of negative stereotypes that justified the exclusion of Chinese people from America.
Although largely noted as ancillary to the sweeping Chinese Exclusion Act, recent scholarship has
begun to reposition the anti-Chinese prostitution movement as critical to both Chinese exclusion
and the history of immigration in America.1In the absence of access to California state house
debates, I have used the legislation itself, newspaper coverage, and the report of the Joint Special
Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration to reveal a pattern of using Chinese prostitution to
justify Chinese exclusion. The Joint Special Committee report was published after the passage
of the Page Act and included testimony from law enforcement, doctors, political leaders, and
religious leaders in California.
Religious leaders in California in the 1800s focused on eradicating Chinese prostitution. Their
aid and advocacy generated an implicit association between Chinese women and prostitutes. The
rhetoric surrounding the movement was laced with notions of American cultural supremacy and
the dehumanization of Chinese people. The anti-Chinese prostitution movement created the
formula for associating certain racial groups with criminality in order to pass racially exclusionary
immigration laws. The success of the Page Act of 1875 signaled that lawmakers could exclude
certain racial groups from America if done by relying on a supposedly neutral factor such as
Laura Curry graduated from West Virginia University in 2021 with a BA in history and a minor in business
administration. Her research interests include the history of immigration in the United States and East African history.
Laura Curry is entering law school in the fall of 2021 with the intention of becoming an immigration attorney specializing
in working with refugees from East Africa.
1Scholarship includes: Kerry Abrams, “Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,”
Columbia Law Review 105, no. 3 (April 2005): 641-716; Catherine Lee, “‘Where the Danger Lies’: Race, Gender, and
Chinese and Japanese Exclusion in the United States, 1870-1924,” Sociological Forum 25, no. 2 (June 2010): 248-71;
Eithne Luibhéid, “A Blueprint for Exclusion: The Page Law, Prostitution, and Discrimination against Chinese Women,”
in Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 31-54.
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criminal status. Chinese women were targeted in part because they violated American family and
gender norms. As such, Chinese women were viewed as a threat to traditional American families.
The stereotypes created by the anti-Chinese prostitution movement were used by lawmakers to
prevent the immigration of Chinese women and the birth of a class of Chinese American citizens.
By preventing the formation of families, lawmakers prevented the expansion of citizenship rights
to a large Chinese American population. Thus, the anti-Chinese prostitution movement and the
resulting legislation were critical to precluding Chinese people from acquiring political power
and maintaining America’s racial hierarchy as a country for white people.
Chinese immigrants first began traveling to California in large numbers due to the Gold
Rush in the late 1840s. The early Chinese immigrants were almost exclusively men. These
men were referred to by white Californians as “coolies.” The term coolie was first used by the
Portuguese in the sixteenth century to describe local workers in India. By the mid-nineteenth
century the term had evolved to refer to Chinese and Indian laborers who were contracted to
work on colonial plantations in the Americas and Southeast Asia.2 In the American West, coolie
was used to describe Chinese laborers who often worked in mines. According to American
cultural understanding, a coolie was defined as “a Chinese slave.”3 The term reflected the belief
that Chinese immigrants were slaves for the mining companies. Thus, opposition to Chinese
miners, similarly to opposition to Chinese prostitution, was framed as an anti-slavery issue. Most
Chinese immigrants contracted out their labor voluntarily through the “credit-ticket system.”4
According to the “credit-ticket system,” Chinese immigrants would enter a contract to repay their
debt after a certain number of years working in America.5 Scholarship has debated whether
Chinese immigrants were indeed unfree laborers and therefore coolies.6 Rather than engage
in this debate, recent historians have advocated for studying the term coolie as an “ideational
construct.”7 Members of other immigrant groups arriving at the same time as the Chinese were
similarly bound by labor systems, yet only the Chinese were labeled as coolies. Examined in
this light, the term coolie operated “as an artifice of nation and empire that helped to produce
American exceptionalism and sanitize U.S. imperial ventures in the Americas and across the
Pacific as ‘humanitarian’ projects.”8 By labeling Chinese immigrants as coolies and thus slaves,
Americans were able to justify their imperial ambitions and exclusionary immigration policies.
The large number of Chinese men immigrating to work in the mines resulted in a significant
gender imbalance. By 1855, only 2 percent of Chinese immigrants living in California were
women.9 This gender imbalance was partially due to the patriarchal nature of Chinese culture.
In China, the primary wife was expected to remain at her husband’s ancestral home and care
for his parents. Until 1911, it was even technically illegal for any Chinese woman to emigrate
from China. The prospect of racial animosity in America also contributed to the decision for
Chinese women to remain in China.10 Furthermore, Chinese men often viewed their status in
2Kornel Chang, “Coolie,” in Keywords for Asian American Studies, ed. Cathy J. Schlund-Vials, K. Scott Wong, and
Linda Trinh Võ (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 37-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15r3zv2.13.
3“Coolies,” Harper’s Weekly, August 14, 1869.
4Abrams, “Polygamy.”
5Abrams.
6Gunther Barth classified Chinese immigrants as coolies and renewed the debate in 1964. Bitter Strength: A History
of the Chinese in the United States, 1850-1870 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).
7These historians include Moon-Ho Jung, Lisa Lowe, and Mae Ngai; Chang, “Coolie,” 38.
8Chang, “Coolie,” 38.
9Judy Yung, Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco (Oakland: University of California
Press, 1995).
10William Wei, “Importing Chinese Prostitutes, Excluding Chinese Wives,” in Asians in Colorado: A History of
Persecution and Perseverance in the Centennial State (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), 97-119.

"Sweep All These Pests from Our Midst"

3

America as temporary. Chinese men traveled to America with the intention of earning wealth
and ultimately returning to China.11 The combination of these factors resulted in a small number
of Chinese families choosing to settle in America. Charles P. O’Neill, the deputy sheriff of the
Chinese section of San Francisco, stated in 1876, “It is a very unusual thing for Chinamen to
bring their families here from China, so much so that I have never even heard of such a case. In
conversation with me, they always speak as if opposed to such a thing.”12 While in the context
of the Joint Special Committee report this was clearly used as evidence of poor character, the
Chinese had an abundance of practical and cultural reasons for deciding to allow their families to
remain in China.
The gender imbalance among Chinese immigrants, like the gender imbalance of white
Americans in the West, also led to a high demand for prostitution. However, the number of
Chinese prostitutes was overcounted due to cultural differences concerning what qualified as
a legitimate marriage or family. In Chinese culture, men were able to marry multiple wives
and have concubines as well. Every marriage was considered legally binding and legitimate in
China. The offspring of all wives were considered legitimate children. However, culturally and
eventually legally, marriage in America in the 1800s was considered to be between one man and
one woman. Thus, secondary wives were often counted as prostitutes. Concubines were also
considered to be prostitutes, even though in Chinese culture they occupied a higher social status
than prostitutes. The third group of people often mistakenly labeled as prostitutes were household
workers. Household workers, known as mui tsai in China, aided with the household chores
and rearing of children.13 Due to the misidentification of these classes of women as prostitutes,
the number of Chinese prostitutes expounded by politicians and newspapers was significantly
higher than the actual number of Chinese prostitutes in America. The 1870 census noted that 70
percent of the Chinese women in America were prostitutes. However, George Anthony Peffer
estimates that the proportion of Chinese women who were prostitutes was actually closer to 50
percent.14 The testimony of Michael A. Smith, a police officer in San Francisco, demonstrates the
suspicions white Americans held toward the legitimacy of any Chinese family. While speaking of
recent campaigns to disrupt the Chinese prostitution business, Smith states, “Lately the houses
were broken up pretty well, and what they call Chinese families moved into these houses and
some of the prostitutes moved out.”15 Smith refuses to acknowledge them as legitimate families,
instead using the phrase, “what they call Chinese families.” His testimony clearly displays that
many Americans were unwilling to consider any Chinese family legitimate within the confines of
American cultural values.
In America, Chinese prostitution experienced an initial free entrepreneurial period during
which a prostitute could make her own money and move up or out of prostitution if she so desired.
One of the earliest Chinese prostitutes recorded in America was Ah Toy. Ah Toy traveled to
America at the age of twenty in 1849. Within a short period of time Ah Toy was able to become a
madam and own her own house of prostitution. Undeterred by gender norms or racial stereotypes,
Ah Toy sued people in court several times over theft or unpaid services. On one occasion, she sued
men who attempted to pay with brass filings instead of gold. Although Ah Toy was the highest
paid Chinese prostitute in San Francisco in the early 1850s, her earnings were still a fraction of
what was paid to white prostitutes. Ah Toy charged one ounce of gold, yet white prostitutes at
11Yung, Unbound Feet.
12“The Chinese Commission,” San Francisco Bulletin, May 3, 1876.
13Yung, Unbound Feet.
14Abrams, “Polygamy.”
15United States Congress, “Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration” (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1877), 197.
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the time were able to ask for up to twenty ounces of gold.16 The San Francisco Committee of
Vigilance, formed in 1851 to fight government corruption and protect public morals, launched an
investigation into Chinese prostitution. As the most visible representative of Chinese prostitution,
Ah Toy was vulnerable to deportation or a mandatory closure of her house. Yet, Ah Toy eluded
both of these risks. John A. Clarke, the lead investigator of brothels, allegedly became a lover of
Ah Toy and protected her from actions by the committee.17
As criminal organizations solidified their control over prostitution and the anti-Chinese
prostitution movement grew, Ah Toy increasingly struggled to successfully operate her business.
In December of 1855, it was reported that Ah Toy was living in poverty and had attempted to
commit suicide by overdosing on opium.18 In 1857, Ah Toy sold her house of prostitution and
returned to China. However, at some point in the intervening years Ah Toy returned to America
and was arrested in 1859 in San Francisco for operating a house of prostitution. Ah Toy later
receded from public view and died in 1928 in Santa Clara County, California.19 While Ah Toy
was able to take advantage of the initial period of independent Chinese prostitution operators,
her later years in the prostitution business were characterized by struggles stemming from the
anti-Chinese prostitution movement and Chinese criminal organizations known as tongs.
After 1854, the Chinese prostitution business was almost entirely controlled by the tongs. The
term tong was derived from the Cantonese word for “hall” or “pavilion.”20 Tongs could signify
legitimate business organizations or gangs.21 In the context of the Chinese prostitution business,
the tongs operated as gangs. The tongs used representatives in China to procure girls to bring
to America for the purpose of prostitution. Representatives of the tongs in China would often
tell the families of the girls that they would be sold in America as household workers or brides.
However, once in America they were often sold as prostitutes. The tongs were even known to
kidnap women in China. Other women voluntarily agreed to travel to America to act as prostitutes
hoping that they could better their lives once they finished their contract. However, the promise
of eventual freedom eluded most Chinese prostitutes. As Judy Yung writes, “Most Chinese
prostitutes were subjected to such physical and mental abuse that few could outlive their contract
terms of four to six years.”22 Many Chinese prostitutes died as a result of contracting venereal
diseases.23 Additionally, their contracts were often extended as a result of illness, pregnancy, and
menstruation.24
Chinese prostitutes could be sold to wealthy Chinese men, parlor houses, or cribs. Parlor
houses operated as typical houses of prostitution with a parlor room where the women would wait
and meet clients. Cribs had the worst conditions. Chinese prostitutes in cribs would serve poor
laborers for meager wages in small shacks.25 Immigration to America for Chinese prostitutes
following 1854 did not bring freedom or prosperity. Instead, Chinese prostitutes often endured
great suffering and were bound to prostitution by the tongs. The only potential allies for these
women were religious leaders in San Francisco. Religious leaders in San Francisco became
fixated on Chinese prostitution and were major leaders in the anti-Chinese prostitution movement.
16Yung, Unbound Feet.
17May Jeong, “Ah Toy, Pioneering Prostitute of Gold Rush California,” New York Book Review, June 19, 2020.
18Evening Star (Washington, DC), December 14, 1855, 2.
19Yung, Unbound Feet.
20Anne Mendelson, “The Road to Chinatown,” in Chow Chop Suey: Food and the Chinese American Journey (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 72-96.
21Mendelson, “Road to Chinatown,” 72-96.
22Yung, Unbound Feet, 28.
23Yung, 28.
24Wei, “Importing Chinese Prostitutes.”
25Yung, Unbound Feet.
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Their aid was not without strings attached, and they often sought to remake Chinese prostitutes in
the image of Victorian-era women. Their activism ignored the prostitution of white women and
helped reinforce racial stereotypes about Chinese women.
The moral reform movement in America was responsible for a shift in the perception of
prostitution. Previously, prostitution was regarded as a temporary occupation that women could
freely enter or leave. However due to the campaign of religious leaders, prostitution became a
permanent identity marker and prostitutes were increasingly excluded from American society.
The idea that women who worked in the sex industry could be permanently differentiated from
other women was a fallacy that allowed for legislation such as the Page Act of 1875. Yet as
Eithne Luibhéid writes, “The notion that prostitutes are inherently distinct in some way from
other women is a ruse of power, which upholds literal and symbolic policing strategies that have
markedly racist, sexist, and classist effects.”26 In enforcing laws that exclude prostitutes, officials
often relied on irrelevant factors such as the perceived wealth of the woman, whether she had
children, and whether she was married.
The anti-prostitution movement largely focused on the prostitution of foreign women and poor
women. The sex industry has many different tiers, yet the prostitutes most often targeted were
those who worked on the lowest tier: “streetwalkers.”27 The label of prostitute was reserved almost
solely for streetwalkers while other higher paid sex workers did not suffer from the same stigma
or persecution. Streetwalkers were largely made up of women from a low socioeconomic status
and racial minorities.28 Thus, the anti-prostitution movement was designed to disproportionately
affect immigrants and people of color.
As the anti-prostitution religious movement began to coalesce in California, it became clear
that the campaign was meant only to target Chinese prostitution. White prostitutes outnumbered
Chinese prostitutes, yet religious leaders highlighted Chinese prostitution specifically. In the
Joint Special Committee report, police officer Michael A. Smith testified, “[White prostitutes] are
brought down in a great deal larger numbers than the Chinese, because there are a great many
more of them. I think the records will show a great many more white prostitutes than Chinese
arrested for soliciting.”29
To avoid criticism of the xenophobia and racism inherent in their campaign, the anti-Chinese
prostitution movement sought to brand itself as an anti-slavery campaign. Chinese prostitutes were
repeatedly referred to as “female slaves,”30 “human cattle,”31 and “chattel.”32 The dehumanizing
language was meant to portray the brutality of the Chinese prostitution system. However, it also
helped to establish negative racial stereotypes of Chinese women. Although sometimes referred
to as victims, Chinese prostitutes were not treated as victims. Chinse prostitutes were often
blamed in some regard for their situation due to their ignorance, cultural failings, or “defective

26Luibhéid, “A Blueprint for Exclusion.”
27Luibhéid.
28Luibhéid.
29United States Congress, “Report.”
30“The Coolie Question,” Daily National Democrat (Marysville, CA), December 22, 1860, Chronicling America:
Historic American Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84038814/1860-12-22/ed1/seq-3/.
31“The Slave Trade in California,” Weekly Trinity Journal (Weaverville, CA), December 3, 1864, Chronicling America:
Historic American Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85025202/1864-12-03/ed1/seq-4/.
32“Traffic in China Women,” Daily Inter Ocean, September 1874.

6
womanhood.”33 Their “defective womanhood” was considered to be their violation of American
gender norms and their supposed complicity in allowing themselves to be sold into the sex trade.
Religious leaders in California were at the forefront of the anti-Chinese prostitution movement.
Reverend Otis Gibson, one of the most prominent religious figures in the movement, oversaw
the Methodist Chinese Mission Home. As the name implies, the Methodist Chinese Mission
home was a refuge for Chinese prostitutes seeking to escape prostitution. The Methodist Chinese
Mission Home included a school for younger Chinese women. In a newspaper article in the San
Francisco Bulletin, the students are referred to as “heathen scholars,” and much of the article is
devoted to describing the transformation in their physical appearance.34 The article mentions that
“the hair is either twisted into a knot at the back of the head and held by a metal pin or comb or is
allowed to fall behind in a single glossy braid of massive proportions. The grotesque gear of the
head worn by fashionable Celestial women is dispensed with.”35 The focus on the transformation
of their physical appearance reveals an interest in transforming the women to conform to American
cultural norms. The aid of religious organizations often came with dehumanizing rhetoric that
deemphasized the humanity of those it sought to help.
Due to his position working with former Chinese prostitutes, Reverend Gibson participated in
investigations of Chinese women conducted at the port of San Francisco. The Anti-Kidnapping
Law passed in California in 1870 mandated that port officials investigate Asian women entering
the US to ensure that they were not immigrating for the purposes of prostitution.36 Reverend
Gibson participated in the investigation of fourteen women traveling on the ship MacGregor
from Japan and China. These fourteen women were described as “parcels” and regarded with the
utmost suspicion.37 After an outline of the women’s reasons for immigrating, the author writes,
“It became apparent that each female had received the cue from some Mongol expert to matters
pertaining to the evasion of the law for the answers to questions propounded were, as a rule,
false in every respect.”38 Even the aid given to women who allegedly admitted to coming for the
purposes of prostitution was encompassed by suspicions of criminality. Eight women aboard the
MacGregor decided to go to the Methodist Chinese Mission Home. It is described that, “they
were towed up to the Mission for the purposes of reclamation, and placed under the surveillance
of the fifteen women lately reformed.”39 The language used displays that the Methodist Chinese
Mission Home was not meant to simply aid Chinese women, but that the home sought to attack a
problem it viewed as intrinsically linked to the racial and cultural inferiority of Chinese women.
The Presbyterian Church also administered a Chinese Mission Home in San Francisco known
as the Occidental Mission Home for Chinese Girls. Established in 1874, the home branded a
more aggressive approach than its Methodist neighbor.40 Upon receiving a tip from a Chinese
woman who sought to escape prostitution, the Occidental Mission Home for Chinese Girls would
coordinate with law enforcement to raid the house of prostitution. During the raid, the mission
home would locate and remove the girl seeking to escape the prostitution business. According to
33Stacey L. Smith, Freedom’s Frontier: California and the Struggle over Unfree Labor, Emancipation, and
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 168.
34“Saving Women,” San Francisco Bulletin, September 12, 1873.
35San Francisco Bulletin.
36California State Legislature, “An Act to Prevent the Kidnapping and Importation of Mongolian, Chinese and Japanese
Females, for Criminal or Demoralizing Purposes, S.B. 269,” in The Statutes of California Passed at the Eighteenth Session
of the Legislature, 1869-70 (Sacramento, CA: D. W. Gelwicks, State Printer, 1870), 330.
37California State Legislature, “Act to Prevent Kidnapping,” 330.
38California State Legislature, 330.
39“Reclamation Missionary Work among the Celestial Women Imported by the ‘MacGregor,’” San Francisco Bulletin,
September 11, 1873.
40“Mission and History,” Cameron House, https://cameronhouse.org/about-us/history/.
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Donaldina Cameron, the supervisor of the house from 1897 to 1934,41 1,500 Chinese girls were
rescued through these raids in the first thirty years after its founding.42
The focus on Chinese prostitution created the image that all Chinese women were prostitutes
and thus all Chinese women were criminals. Despite this stereotype, there were many Chinese
women immigrating to the United States as wives, daughters, students, and women seeking to earn
wealth in America.43 However, in the lead up to exclusionary laws, politicians and newspapers
consistently portrayed all Chinese women as prostitutes. The former governor of California,
Frederick Low, stated, “There may be some wives of merchants who come, but I infer that by far
the larger portion, perhaps nine-tenths, or nineteen-twentieths are prostitutes, or women brought
here for the purpose of prostitution.”44 In California in the late 1800s, Chinese prostitution
became the subject of American cultural fears.
Prior to the latter half of the 1860s, Chinese prostitution in California was not heavily
criminalized. In an 1859 article in the Weekly Trinity Journal, the existence of Chinese prostitutes
is casually noted. Concerning the construction of a new building, the author notes, “They will
be occupied by some of the sixty odd Chinese prostitutes now resident here, we suppose.”45 In
1860, it was reported that five Chinese women were arrested for inhabiting a house of prostitution.
These women were ordered to pay a fine of sixty dollars or spend eighty days in jail.46 Under the
Page Act of 1875, this would later become a deportable offense. Yet as anti-Chinese sentiment
against Chinese laborers grew, so too did the call for greater enforcement measures against
Chinese prostitutes and Chinese women seeking to immigrate to America. Population growth
and economic insecurity in the 1870s led to a shortage of jobs. Historians estimate that by 1871,
there were four workers for every one job in California.47 The economic insecurity of white
Americans was translated into anti-Chinese sentiment and legislation. The most aggressively
enforced elements of anti-Chinese legislation often targeted Chinese prostitutes and, by association,
Chinese women.
The enforcement of anti-Chinese prostitution legislation such as the California AntiKidnapping Act of 1870 focused on decreasing the number of Chinese women entering the US.
The number of Chinese women still able to enter the US was viewed as evidence of the failure of
law enforcement. One newspaper article decried “the recent arrival in San Francisco of nearly 100
Chinese women, after it had been supposed that the importation of women to this city for the vilest
of purposes had practically ceased.”48 The presence of one hundred Chinese women constituted
as evidence that prostitutes were entering the United States. Chinese women in America were
viewed as synonymous with prostitutes.
In the Joint Special Committee investigation into Chinese immigration in 1876, special
attention was given to exploring potential links between Chinese people and criminal behavior.
The chairman of the committee asked Alfred Clarke, the chief of police of San Francisco, “What
is your general observation, in the position in which you have been placed, as to crime among the
41Cameron House.
42Yung, Unbound Feet.
43Wei, “Importing Chinese Prostitutes.”
44United States Congress, “Report.”
45“China Row,” Weekly Trinity Journal (Weaverville, CA), November 26, 1859, Chronicling America: Historic
American Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85025202/1859-11-26/ed-1/seq-2/.
46Daily National Democrat (Marysville, CA), February 25, 1860, 2, Chronicling America: Historic American
Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84038814/1860-02-25/ed-1/seq-2/.
47Erika Lee, “The Chinese are Coming. How Can We Stop Them? Chinese Exclusion and the Origins of American
Gatekeeping,” in Asian American Studies Now: A Critical Reader, ed. Jean Yu-wen, Shen Wu, and Thomas C. Chen
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 143-67.
48“Traffic in China Women,” Daily Inter Ocean, September 1874.
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Chinese, its proportion as compared with the white people. . . ?”49 The chief of police responded
that the conviction rates among Chinese people were low due to the disinclination of Chinese
people to testify in an American court against other Chinese people.50 The question and the
evasive answer demonstrate a proclivity toward associating Chinese people with crime. Michael
A. Smith, a police officer of San Francisco, was also called to testify. Mr. Smith had conducted his
own investigation of Chinese women who were admitted into the United States. Of the forty-eight
Chinese women he investigated, he found twelve of them to be prostitutes. The women that Mr.
Smith arrested were not charged with prostitution but rather for residing in a house of prostitution.
A member of the committee, Mr. Bee, probed Mr. Smith as to the definition of what constitutes a
prostitute. The exchange between Mr. Bee and Mr. Smith continued as follows:
Q. They might not be prostitutes—A. Well, I do not know.
Q. You are not so sure about these houses—A. I have seen these others. [Exhibiting
photographs] Here is a woman I know you can find almost any time in Sullivan’s
alley.51
When called upon to justify his assertion that twelve of the forty-eight women were prostitutes,
Mr. Smith relies on circumstantial evidence. He claims that a certain woman is a prostitute based
solely on the fact that she has been known to be present in an alley. In later questioning, Mr. Bee
refers to the character of these women as “doubtful,” rather than labeling them as prostitutes.52
Mr. Smith’s so-called investigation displays the implicit association between Chinese women and
Chinese prostitutes among law enforcement officials.
Since the Chinese prostitution trade was largely controlled by the tongs, Chinese men were
also seen as criminals. Chinese prostitution was extremely lucrative for the tongs. Yung writes
that “the Hip Yee Tong, which reportedly started the traffic in 1852, imported six thousand women
and netted $200,000 profit from the trade between 1852 and 1873.”53 Due to the wealth involved
in the trade, Chinese prostitutes were fiercely guarded by the tongs. In 1875, it was reported that
nine people were seriously injured in a fight between the Suey Sing Tong and the Kwong Dock
Tong over one prostitute, Kum Ho.54 The women who fled to the Chinese mission homes faced
threats from the tongs. In order to retrieve them from the mission homes, some men arrived
claiming to be their husbands. Young Chow filed a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the release of
Yat Sing, who he claimed to be his wife. The judge presiding, Judge Morrison, denied the request
“with the remark that it had become a habit of the Chinese to use the processes of courts for the
purpose of trying to get possession of women and he would not encourage such proceedings.”55
While the women at the Chinese mission homes certainly faced threats from the tongs to reclaim
them, a stereotype was formed of all Chinese men as deceitful and cruel.
Newspaper articles published an abundance of stories detailing the abuse of Chinese women
by Chinese men. In an article in 1874, it was reported that a Chinese woman was beaten in an
alleyway. In graphic detail the article described that “a sack enveloped her head and shoulders,
and the brutes were beating her with cudgels.”56 The prevalence of articles of this nature made it
49United States Congress, “Report,” 144.
50United States Congress, 144.
51United States Congress, 1143.
52United States Congress, 1143.
53Yung, Unbound Feet, 30.
54Yung, 30.
55“A Dodge That Didn’t Work,” San Francisco Bulletin, March 10, 1876, 3.
56“Traffic in China Women,” Daily Inter Ocean, September 1874.
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seem as though violence against women was a distinctly Chinese practice. After eloping, one
former Chinese prostitute was charged with stealing jewelry from the house of prostitution. The
man charging her with the crime was alleged to be her brother. In the article titled “A Sad Picture
of Chinese Society,” the author notes, “Think of a brother forcing a sister to continue a life which
is worse than death. Humanity shudders at the picture.”57 While all Chinese women were branded
as prostitutes, Chinese men were branded as dangerous and violent “brutes.”58
The attention given to Chinese prostitution was instrumental in the creation of Chinese racial
stereotypes. As Luibhéid writes, “The process was not just racist but also racializing, in the
sense of helping to literally construct the Chinese as a distinct and racialized group.”59 The
presence of Chinese prostitutes and the tongs protecting the trade was used to create Chinese
racial stereotypes. In the town of Sonora, California, it was reported that a fire started at a house
of Chinese prostitution and quickly spread across the town. The author blamed all Chinese people
for their innate lack of responsibility. The author writes:
The Chinese houses have been the worst; for the inmates smoke opium and become
perfectly stupid and insensible—It is high time that the industrious, hard-working
citizens, who have made Sonora all that she is, so far as character, business and value
of property is concerned, should combine together and sweep all these pests from
our midst.60
The author extrapolates from reporting on a fire at a house of prostitution that all Chinese residents
of the town should be expelled due to their innate character flaws.
Chinese prostitutes were the target of the worst racial stereotypes, because they violated
gender norms. The sexual deviance of Chinese prostitutes was viewed as a threat to the traditional
American family, public morality, and white purity. Discussions about Chinese prostitution
and Chinese polygamy were critical to making the case for outright Chinese exclusion. As
racial stereotypes were still forming in the late nineteenth century, Japanese women were treated
differently from Chinese women. Japanese women were seen as conforming to gender norms and
acting as proper wives. Even after the passage of the Page Act in 1875, Japanese women were
still able to enter the United States. As Catherine Lee writes:
Chinese immigrants were described as racially undesirable and unassimilable, which
was supposedly illustrated by gender and sexual deviance—the women’s participation
in prostitution. However, three decades later, Japanese immigrants enjoyed a period
of favorable characterization. Political and intellectual leaders did not typify the
women as deviant, despite their links to prostitution, and highlighted the immigrants’
willingness to come and settle as families.61
The differing treatment of Chinese and Japanese women illustrates the instrumental role of gender
norms in creating racial stereotypes and immigration policy. The greater gender balance of
Japanese immigrants and the perception of Japanese women as proper wives allowed Japanese
people to continue immigrating to the United States even after laws such as the Chinese Exclusion
Act. However, the racializing process was ongoing, and eventually Japanese people were negatively
57“A Sad Picture of Chinese Society,” Daily Democratic State Journal, June 17, 1856.
58“Traffic in China Women,” Daily Inter Ocean, September 1874.
59Luibhéid, “A Blueprint for Exclusion,” 14.
60“The Fire in Sonora,” Nevada Journal, November 11, 1853, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers,
Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026884/1853-11-11/ed-1/seq-1/.
61Lee, “Where the Danger Lies,” 3.
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associated with Chinese people as part of the “Asiatic” race.62 With the National Origins Quotas
that began in 1921, Japanese people were also excluded from entering the United States.63
The practice of prostitution was promoted as being intrinsically linked to the Chinese race and
culture. The Joint Special Committee report on Chinese immigration attempted to establish the
fact that prostitution was permissible and even respected in Chinese culture. In the introduction to
the report the committee writes, “We shall show by Mr. Shaw, and by reference to his testimony,
that prostitution in China is a profession, and not a disgrace.”64 Despite this strong claim, both
Reverend Gibson and the former governor of California, Governor Law, dispute this in their
testimony. Governor Law strongly rebukes this assertion in his statement that “prostitution in
China is regarded with more aversion and disgust by respectable Chinese than it is, if possible,
by Americans or Europeans and a prostitute is more of a pariah in Chinese society than among
Americans.”65 Governor Law clearly stated that prostitution was not acceptable in Chinese culture.
Yet a committee member, Mr. Pixley, asked a follow up question in an attempt to demonstrate
that prostitution was connected to Chinese culture:
Q. Do you not infer that prostitution is a recognized profession there, in fact outranking
that of cooper, barber, and other lower pursuits.
A. No; it may be considered at the bottom.66
Politicians clearly sought to demonstrate a connection between prostitution and Chinese culture.
Chinese prostitutes were further differentiated from white prostitutes. Thus, the sexual
deviance and moral depravity of Chinese prostitutes were advocated as being inherently linked to
the Chinese race. Davis Louderback, the police judge in San Francisco, testified:
I find these Chinese prostitutes often get boys. I suppose they initiate them into the
ways of lewdness when white prostitutes would not. I have sent boys to industrial
schools that have been affected by diseases by contact with Chinese prostitutes—small
boys, fifteen or sixteen—just over the age of puberty.67
Chinese prostitutes were described as purposefully inciting the moral decay of young boys and
encouraging interracial relationships. As such, Chinese prostitutes represented a far greater
threat to the American community than white prostitutes. Chinese prostitutes were allegedly a
part of an organized campaign to ruin the moral fabric of the nation. Mob violence erupted in
Antioch, California, after “the discovery of an organized system, existing among the Asiatics
for the enticement of youths into their dens of prostitution.”68 The sons of reputable families
were allegedly tricked into entering a Chinese house of prostitution and later contracted diseases
from the Chinese prostitutes. The town was already incensed that it had been “afflicted with a
‘Chinatown.’”69 Upon learning of the organized system for seducing children, the townspeople
gathered to burn down the Chinese section of town and expel the Chinese residents. The perceived
threat of Chinese prostitutes led to the expulsion all Chinese residents.
62“The Chinese Pest,” Eureka Daily Sentinel, May 6, 1876, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers,
Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84022044/ 1876-05-06/ed-1/seq-2/.
63Lee, “Where the Danger Lies.”
64United States Congress, “Report,” 22.
65United States Congress, 67.
66United States Congress, 67.
67United States Congress, 190.
68“The Chinese Pest,” Eureka Daily Sentinel, May 6, 1876.
69Eureka Daily Sentinel.
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As the anti-Chinese prostitution movement grew, some members of American society still
advocated against the expulsion and negative characterization of Chinese people. Harper’s Weekly
reported on a growing number of legislators that opposed Chinese immigration. Yet in its article
in 1870, Harper’s Weekly notes, “We may trust American sagacity to defend American civilization
from obliteration by that of Asia, without supposing it necessary to preach hatred and horror
of one of the chief human races, as if every individual of it were a nameless sinner.”70 Despite
a negative characterization of Asia in general, Harper’s Weekly advocates against fomenting
hatred against all Asian people. Based in New York City, Harper’s Weekly and other northern
newspapers were not as quick to demonize Chinese people in the 1870s as the newspapers in
California and the western territories. Reverend Gibson also decried the growing hatred for the
Chinese. In his testimony, Reverend Gibson argued, “The charge of immorality brought against
the Chinese in this country, may be brought, with almost if not quite equal force, against most of
the European immigration, whether the specific charge be drunkenness, profanity, fighting and
quarreling, gambling, or prostitution.”71 Reverend Gibson argued passionately against attributing
the behavior of some Chinese people to the Chinese race.
Unfortunately, the idea that not only certain characteristics but certain diseases could be
attributed to race was gaining momentum in the United States. The eugenics movement sought
to prevent interracial relationships, which it saw as diminishing the white race. Furthermore,
doctors alleged as part of the germ theory that certain races could unwittingly carry diseases that
could decimate the populations of other races.72 Thus, Chinese people—specifically Chinese
prostitutes—were thought to threaten the very existence of white Americans. The disease most
commonly cited as a threat from Chinese prostitutes was syphilis. Dr. J. Marion Sims, the
president of the American Medical Association in 1876, blamed the spread of syphilis on the
“Chinese slave” in his address at its centennial jubilee.73 Sims advocated for an end to Chinese
immigration to protect the health of white Americans. A physician in California, Charles
O’Donnell, testified in the Joint Special Committee Report that “the virus of the cooly, in [his]
opinion, is almost sure death to a white man. . . . There are cases of syphilis among the whites
that originated from these Chinese prostitutes which are incurable.”74 The association between
syphilis, criminality, and Chinese prostitutes proved to be an effective combination in generating
anti-Chinese sentiment and legislation.
The anti-Chinese prostitution movement allowed lawmakers to regulate the immigration of
Chinese women and thus regulate the birth of Chinese American citizens. The potential for
Chinese people to acquire citizenship was a major political concern for lawmakers and white
citizens in the western United States. James Bassett, the editor of the Los Angeles Herald, testified,
“If the Chinaman ultimately becomes a voter, he will hold the balance of power in a very short
time, if they continue to come. Morally, I think the effect is bad.”75 The debate over the regulation
of immigration was colored by a desire to prevent Chinese people from acquiring citizenship
and political power. In 1858, when Oregon drafted a constitution for statehood, its constitution
included a clause barring black people and Chinese people from acquiring citizenship rights.76
70“Asia and America,” Harper’s Weekly, August 27, 1870.
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The focus on restricting the political rights and immigration of Chinese people, especially
following the Civil War, was in part a reaction to the cultural shift occurring in America. Following
the Civil War, African Americans were given citizenship and the right to vote. With the Fourteenth
Amendment, any person born in the United States was automatically an American citizen. A
stratum of Americans viewed the growing enfranchisement of other racial groups as “levelling
down.”77 In response to the expression of support for the political rights of African Americans
following the Colfax massacre, one California journalist wrote, “Shall the white man be asked to
bring himself down to the level of the Chinese and Negroes? The very suggestion is an insult to
him.”78 In addition to Fourteenth Amendment protections, the federal government had agreed not
to regulate Chinese immigration in the Burlingame Treaty of 1868. In Article V of the Burlingame
Treaty, it was stated: “The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize
the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual
advantage of...free migration and emigration.”79 The treaty forbade any prohibition or regulation
of Chinese immigration to the United States as well as American immigration to China.
Branded as prostitutes and criminals, Chinese women were thought to threaten public safety.
In an article titled, “The Coolie Question,” the author writes about Chinese prostitution that “the
introduction of this class of slaves into California has worked immeasurable evil as thousands
of white men can testify, and the moral health of the State requires that it be stopped.”80 The
racial implication of the article is made even more clear in a statement urging lawmakers to write
legislation to “protect all free white citizens.”81 The trade of Chinese prostitution was framed
as endangering white Americans and thus necessitating legislative action. Articles describing
the horrors and dangers of Chinese prostitution neglected to mention the prostitution of white
women. Reverend Gibson even claimed, “Indeed, it is not at all improbable that some of the chief
manipulators of this anti-Chinese excitement are themselves guilty of the very vices which they
charge against the Chinese, such as gambling, prostitution, and incapacity to hold office in this
republican government.”82 By focusing on the issue of Chinese prostitution, political figures were
able to engineer exclusionary laws and stimulate a sense of fear and urgency in the hearts of white
Americans.
On the state and local level, exclusionary policies based on race had already been passed. In
1854, the case People v. Hall upheld the prohibition on Chinese people testifying in court against
white people.83 Towns such as Gold Hill, Nevada, passed ordinances forbidding all Chinese
residents from the incorporated town boundaries.84 In 1866, San Francisco passed an ordinance
specifically excluding Chinese prostitutes from the city limits.85 In the same year, the state of

77“Tweed at Colfax,” Placer Herald (Auburn, CA). “Tweed at Colfax,” July 27, 1867, Chronicling America: Historic
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81Daily National Democrat.
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California passed a law titled “An Act for the Suppression of Chinese Houses of Ill-Fame.”86
Pursuant to this act, Chinese houses of prostitution were declared to be public nuisances. The
evidence used for finding a building to be a Chinese house of prostitution was simply “common
repute.”87 Furthermore, the determination made on the house itself was stated to reflect on “the
character of the women inhabiting it.”88 It was not until 1874, eight years later, that the word
Chinese was removed from the act in order to target all houses of prostitution.89
The California State Legislature sought to control the immigration of Chinese women to
California with a law passed in 1870. Using its state police power, California passed “An Act
to Prevent the Kidnapping and Importation of Mongolian, Chinese and Japanese Females, for
Criminal or Demoralizing Purposes”90 The act required any Asian woman entering the United
States to submit evidence to the commissioner of immigration attesting that “such female desires
voluntarily to come into this State, and is a person of correct habits and good character.”91 Thus,
California imposed a vague moral standard on Asian women seeking to enter the United States.
The law was amended in 1874 and expanded to apply to any “lewd or debauched woman.”92 In
order to circumvent the growing consensus that immigration was a matter to be regulated by the
federal government, California framed it as a law to protect the “public decency” of the state
under its state police power.93 The law was designed to establish barriers for the immigration of
Asian women to the United States.
Barriers obstructing the immigration of Asian women to the United States and antimiscegenation laws prevented the birth of a class of Chinese American citizens. Although
originally designed to prevent relationships between black and white people, anti-miscegenation
laws were revised to prevent relationships between Chinese and white people as well.94 The
naturalization process to become a United States citizen remained closed to Chinese people.95
Thus the only pathway to citizenship for Chinese people was to be born in the United States
following the Fourteenth Amendment. By restricting the immigration of Chinese women, lawmakers effectively restricted the formation of families and the birth of Chinese American citizens.
As William Wei writes, “Excluding Chinese women from the country meant breaking the link
between generations, leading to the eventual extinction of Chinese American communities.”96
Furthermore, by preventing the formation of families, lawmakers were able to maintain the
migratory nature and low wages of Chinese laborers.97
The amended 1874 California Anti-Kidnapping Law was challenged in a case that went all
the way to the Supreme Court. On August 22, 1874, twenty-two women arrived aboard the
ship Japan from Hong Kong. Upon inspection and interrogation, the twenty-two women were
86California State Legislature, “An Act for the Suppression of Chinese Houses of Ill-Fame, S.B. 352,” in The Statutes
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found to be “lewd or debauched” by the commissioner of immigration.98 This determination was
based on their lack of children and suspicions concerning their claims of marriage. The options
for the classification of Chinese women were reduced to “prostitute” or “married woman.” The
ship holder refused to pay the bond for the women, and thus they were detained aboard the ship.
Through a lawyer, the women applied for and were granted a writ of habeas corpus. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court in 1876, where in Chy Lung v. Freeman it decided that the
California law was unconstitutional on the basis that immigration was a matter to be regulated
solely by the federal government. The court declined to rule on the equal protection argument.
Even though the court struck down the discriminatory state law, it still allowed for the creation
of discriminatory federal laws. This case set an important precedent for the creation of federal
immigration laws that targeted people of certain racial categories.
When the case was decided, the Page Act had already been passed at the federal level.
The Page Act of 1875 represented the culmination of the anti-Chinese prostitution movement.
Representative Horace Page of California authored the legislation. As it was written, the law
targeted the importation of Asian prostitutes and “the labor of any cooly.”99 However, the section
of the law most rigorously enforced was the clause against Asian, and more specifically Chinese,
prostitutes. The Hong Kong consul general was mandated to either provide or deny a certificate
attesting to the moral character of Chinese women seeking to immigrate to the United States
under the act. The port collector in the United States would then interrogate and reevaluate
the determination made by the Hong Kong consul general. Unlike any other immigrant group,
Chinese women were required to obtain a certificate and submit a photograph of themselves.
Through an investigation and interrogation of the women, the Hong Kong consul general ruled
on whether the women were immigrating for “immoral purposes.”100 There was no “evidentiary
standard” for the approval or rejection of immigration certificates.101 Instead, the Page Act was
widely applied to exclude most Chinese women from entering the United States.102
The anti-Chinese prostitution movement and the Page Act were used to restrict the immigration
of Chinese women. The Page Act was the first federal immigration law and helped develop the
modern immigration enforcement apparatus. More importantly, it set a precedent for racially
exclusionary immigration policies. While supposedly targeting prostitution, the law only applied
to women traveling from China who were required to obtain certificates from the Hong Kong
consul general. The religious movement against Chinese prostitution pressured lawmakers to end
what they deemed to be a slave trade. Yet their treatment of former Chinese prostitutes revealed
their belief in the cultural and racial supremacy of white America. The press they generated
about Chinese prostitution enflamed negative stereotypes of Chinese people. While religious
leaders in San Francisco provided an important service to Chinese prostitutes, namely refuge and
a means of escape, their assistance was done to help those they saw as weak, not empower them.
The insistence of religious leaders on ending Chinese prostitution led to an implicit association
between prostitution and Chinese women.
The anti-Chinese prostitution movement was not ancillary to the anti-Chinese movement,
but central to creating stereotypes to justify wider Chinese exclusion. The stereotype that all
Chinese women were prostitutes allowed the government to pass laws treating all Chinese women
as criminals. Chinese men were portrayed as brutal and cruel in their engagement in the Chinese
98Abrams, “Polygamy.”
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prostitution trade. Thus, all Chinese people were viewed as inherently criminal. This notion
of criminality justified increasingly exclusionary legislation beginning at the local level and
eventually culminating with the federal Page Act of 1875. The stereotypes formed due to the
Chinese prostitution trade extended beyond criminality. Chinese prostitutes violated gender
norms and the sanctity of family relations, thereby establishing a stereotype of their “defective
womanhood.”103
The success of laws passed against Chinese prostitutes set the mold for later racially
exclusionary legislation. The laws themselves relied heavily on stereotypes and cultural opinions.
When Giles Gray, the surveyor of the port, declined to state his opinions as evidence for the
Joint Special Committee investigation, Mr. Pixley, the former attorney general of California,
stated, “O, no; we wander into opinions in this investigation.”104 Gray declined to answer once
more, but this exchange highlights the true motivations for the Page Act and exclusionary policies.
The campaign targeting Chinese prostitution was simply a means to justify racially exclusionary
policies that white Americans already sought due to negative stereotypes of the Chinese. The
campaign against Chinese prostitution successfully connected Chinese people with criminality,
thereby justifying policies excluding them from entering the United States. Following the Page
Act, “between 1876 and 1882, the number of Chinese women entering the United States declined
relative to the previous seven-year period by 69 percent.”105 By restricting the immigration of
Chinese women, lawmakers were able to control the formation of families and birth of Chinese
American citizens. By branding Chinese women as prostitutes, lawmakers set an important
precedent for racially exclusionary policies and prevented the expansion of citizenship to people
viewed as racially inferior.
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The Impact of French Algeria’s Participation during the First
and Second World Wars on the Algerian Nationalist Movement
R E IDE PRUNT Y
The colonial relationship between France and French Algeria reached its boiling point during the Algerian War of
Independence in 1954 after more than a century of French imperial subjugation. Before this pivotal year, French Algeria
was required to support France through two total and primarily European wars. While Algerians believed that such a
sacrifice for their imperial mother nation was cause for equality under French law, France was committed to the continued
oppression of its colony. This essay argues that French Algeria’s contribution to the French war effort during the First
and Second World Wars served as a catalyst to the rising Algerian nationalist sentiment that reached its peak in 1954.
Through an in–depth examination of the colonial legacy in French Algeria, this paper aims to establish a pattern of
exploitation, manipulation, and intransigence throughout France’s imperial administration of the region. Moreover, a
thorough analysis of the various factions and leaders of Algerian nationalism demonstrates an intensifying demand
for independence from France after the First and Second World Wars. By studying the history of Algeria’s continued
oppression under France despite attempts at compromise as the root of Algerian nationalists’ fervor, the significance of
the colonial legacy upon modern international relations and the imbalance of power within the world system becomes
evident. The present tumultuous relationship between France and Algeria is a direct result of France’s unwillingness to
relinquish its colony with an acknowledgement of French Algeria’s vital role during the First and Second World Wars,
instead mounting a violent counterinsurgency against the region’s ambition for independence.

French Algeria was colonized for 130 years, and the French colonizers profited exponentially
from its integrated relationship with the colony. This profit came at the expense of the indigenous
Berber and Arab populations that were systematically disenfranchised through land appropriation,
amplification of ethnic and religious boundaries, resource extraction, European settlement, food
insecurity, disease, state-sponsored violence, mandatory Muslim male conscription, and the
gallicization of social institutions. With the vitally supportive role served to metropolitan France
by French Algeria during the First and Second World Wars, indigenous Algerians began to demand
French citizenship in exchange for their momentous sacrifice. However, the harsh and systemically
unbalanced military tactics and administrative policies of France that prevailed before and during
the First and Second World Wars amplified the Algerians’ resolve to unite behind a unique
Algerian national identity in order to assert their self-determination and independence. In spite of
the atrocities committed against indigenous Algerians during their subjugation and exploitation,
French Algeria fulfilled its colonial responsibility to the l’Métropole (mainland France) during
two distinct and devastating total wars. However, when this sacrifice united Algerians in their
nationalist cause and strengthened their resistance against colonial rule, the French government
repelled their assertations and affirmed the resolute authority of the French Empire.
Although the Algerian nationalist movement created widespread domestic influence and
international support, the French government discounted its peaceful attempts to lessen the
disparities between the rights extended to French citizens versus those extended to indigenous
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cooperation between states. Her research interests are focused on the legacy of colonization upon global inequality,
migration, and state relations and how colonial legacy research can be implemented to design the most effective policies
for international development.

20
Algerians and continued to resist as those peaceful attempts turned into feverous demands for
national independence. Algerians maintained an unwavering resistance to French colonial rule
that eventually incorporated violence as a last resort to finally overthrow imperialism and create
an independent state. The colonial contribution of French Algeria to the French war effort during
the First and Second World Wars sparked and consolidated the Algerian nationalist movement to
pursue its ultimate goal of independence in spite of extreme French opposition and aggression.
This dichotomy would serve as the catalyst for the severe acts of state-sanctioned violence, guerilla
warfare, and terrorism that occurred during the 1954 Algerian War of Independence and that
continues to impede Franco-Algerian relations into the modern era.
Many renowned scholars within the historical community, including David Killingray, Richard
Rathbone, Martin Thomas, Neil MacMaster, and Marisa Fois, agree that nationalism surged in
popularity among the Algerian population and its political organizations after the First and Second
World Wars. Such nationalist surges occurred after French Algeria’s participation in the First and
Second World Wars because France militarized its colonies unlike any other European imperial
power.1 For instance, France was the only imperial power to implement conscription within its
colonies. According to Lizabeth Zack, who cited the supporting works of many other experts,
“the nationalist [theory of causality for the Algerian War] points to the repressive nature of French
settler colonialism and the common cultural heritage of Islam and the Arabic language in uniting
subject Arabs and Berbers in a movement for Algerian national independence.”2 As the Muslim
Algerian population was persistently oppressed and denied concessions for their contribution to
the war effort, they united in their shared nationalist identity, and Algeria’s nationalist movement
reached its strongest point.
The causality between mass war mobilization and sentiment for national independence has
been neglected by the historical record.3 This account aims to analyze the contribution of
French Algeria to the First and Second World Wars, evaluate the shift in Algerian nationalist
organizations’ goals from the post-World War One period to the post-World War Two period,
and to establish a connection between the mobilization of the French Algerian colony during the
global conflicts and the rise of the Algerian nationalist movement. To express the opinions of
the Algerian nationalist movement, this essay will utilize the firsthand perspectives of Algerian
nationalist leaders, including Ferhat Abbas, Messali Hadj, and Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis, as
well as the motivations of nationalist organizations. This essay will evaluate the contribution
of French Algeria to the First and Second World War to determine the correlation between the
lack of French appreciation for the Algerian sacrifice and the Algerian perception that they were
entitled to French citizenship. Likewise, this historical analysis will analyze the policies of French
colonial authority to examine how Algerian nationalists were denied compromise until they were
seemingly left with no other option.
The history of French colonial rule in Algeria began in 1830 with the Invasion of Algiers,
which effectively ended over three centuries of Ottoman rule. As France strengthened its authority
throughout French North Africa, it created a system of governance for the Algerian colony. For
the administration of colonial affairs, the colony was initially divided into two distinct parts: the
North and the South. The administration in the North was divided into the three civil territories
of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine in 1845—which were considered integral cities of metropolitan
1Carina Schmitt, “The Warfare-Welfare Nexus in French African Colonies in the Course of the First and Second
World War,” Historical Social Research 45 (2020): 218.
2Lizabeth Zack, “Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 16 (2002): 56.
3Schmitt, “The Warfare-Welfare Nexus,” 218.
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France—and were governed similar to that of metropolitan France, while the administration of
the South was under a régime du sabre (regime of the sword), effectively a military rule.4 This
dichotomy mirrored the differential and preferential treatment between the lands that were fertile
and populated by European settlers in the North—which was proximally closer to l’Hexagone
(mainland France) itself—and the sparsely populated, desolate Sahara Desert in the South, which
was left for the indigenous Arab and Berber populations to exist under military scrutiny. Moreover,
the Government Council was established in 1898 as the central representative body of Algeria.
It consisted of three delegations: one delegation was elected by the European settlers, one was
elected by the French colonial farmers, and the last delegation was elected by the indigenous
Algerians.5 This system of government favored the political representation of French citizens
who settled within French Algeria—the colons (colonists).
Figure 1. Algérie: Carte Administrative des Territoires du Sud (Algeria: Administrative
Map of the Southern Territories), 1927.6

75.

4Herbert J. Liebesny, The Government of French North Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943),

5Liebesny, Government of French North Africa, 80.
6Délégation générale du gouvernement en Algérie, “Algérie: Carte administrative des territoires du sud/Gouvernement
général de l’Algérie,” Algiers: Service cartographique, 1927, https://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=456
&recPointer=0&recCount=25&searchType=1&bibId=18540976.

22
By 1836, more than 14,000 European settlers had settled in and around the Algerian cities
occupied by the French military; by 1847, the settler population in the colony had risen to
more than 100,000.7 To consolidate their power, the French citizen colons received preferential
representation in the Government Council, such as the power to allocate the colonial budget
through the governing body of Délégations financières (Financial Delegation), lobbyists who
advocated for their interests within the French national government, and enabled the widespread
appropriation of land that devastated the cultures of nomadic pastoralist tribes.8 With the passage
of the Décret Crémieux in 1870, Jewish Algerians were permitted French citizenship. However,
the indigenous Muslim Algerian population was given a second-class status as French subject
and was subject to the Code de l’Indigénat (Indigenous Code), a series of laws that enshrined
the power of the colonial administration, the inferiority of colonial subjects, and the ability to
swiftly punish colonial subjects for many different crimes.9 This systematic marginalization and
disenfranchisement caused intense tensions between the indigenous Arab and Berber populations
and the European settler population that would inspire anti-French and anti-imperial sentiment
among Algerian nationals.
In accordance with its la mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission), French efforts began in
1890 to educate a select group of the indigenous Algerian population. French administrators
promoted gallicization by teaching their curriculum entirely in French rather than the indigenous
languages of Arabic and Berber, and Arabic culture was excluded. The omission of the region’s
cultural past led to the formation of an elite class of Algerians who were conscious of their distinct
Maghrebis identity and to the development of the évolués (the evolved ones).10 Members of
this group would later become the leaders of Algerian independence. The évolués were of a
French-educated, liberal, and Muslim class who believed that they could implement the European
principles of equality and freedom to promote assimilation with France and eventual indigenous
cultural promotion.11 Later, after their conscription into the French army, the experiences of the
évolués during the First World War would shape their perspective of the necessary concessions
for the French government to offer French Algeria. They believed they had proved that they
were Muslim as well as French and that they should receive the same rights as French citizens.12
However, their opinion was not so radical that such reforms should extend to all Muslim Algerians,
but that the bourgeois évolués, who were favored by the colonial administration, would receive
French citizenship.
The tension between French colonizers and the Algerian leaders continued to influence the
creation of an Algerian identity in the early twentieth century. In 1908, the French government
proposed to the Algerian colonial administration to extend mandatory conscription to Algerian
Muslims due to the threat that Germany’s surplus of available, fighting-age men posed. However,
the settler population of French Algeria opposed the militarization of Algerian Muslims, because
they feared the Algerians would turn their newly acquired military skills and armaments on
them or that they would demand French citizenship.13 However, in spite of the resistance from
the colons, the proposal was formally inducted into French Algeria’s administration in 1912.
7Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): 32.
8Fiona Barclay, Charlotte Ann Chopin, and Martin Evans, “Introduction: Settler Colonialism and French Algeria,”
Settler Colonial Studies 8, no. 2 (2018): 120.
9Gregory Mann, “What was the Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” Journal of African History
50 (2009): 333-34.
10Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Algeria: A Country Study (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 34.
11Marisa Fois, “Algerian Nationalism,” Oriente Moderno 97 (2017): 92.
12Rabeya Khatun, “Analysis of the Causes of the Independent Movement of Algeria,” Journal of Humanities and
Social Science 6 (2014): 91.
13Metz, Algeria, 121.
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Consequently, the educated, middle-class évolués were emboldened to reinvigorate the Jeunes
Algériens (Young Algerians) movement in 1913, which had existed since the 1880s. The Jeunes
Algériens advocated for greater representation within the French National Assembly, increased
suffrage, equal taxation, and an end to the Code de l’Indigénat. Leaders of the Jeunes Algériens
believed that if they—the indigenous Algerian Muslim population who were denied the rights of
full citizenship—must now surrender their lives in French military service, then they should be
granted the same inherent rights as Frenchmen who had dedicated less to France than military
service. However, participants within the Jeunes Algériens were divided in their end goals; some
supported assimilation with France, while others insisted on equal rights and limited integration
with France. Others argued for autonomy in the defense of Islam.14 While this movement was not
a formal nationalist organization, it was the beginnings of national unity against imperialism.
An important figure who would later emerge as the initial proponent of Algerian nationalism
was Khalid ibn Hashim—also known as Emir Khalid—who was the grandson of the Algerian
national military hero Abd al Qadir, or Emir Abdelkader, who was famous for his strong resistance
against the early imperial French invasion during the middle of the nineteenth century. He attained
his education in Paris and became an officer in the French Armée de Terre (Ground Army), later
fighting during the First World War. Additionally, Khalid ibn Hasim was an influential member
of the Jeunes Algériens, but later split from the movement after expressing strong disagreement
with introduction of the Jonnart Law of 1919, because it only expanded the suffrage of Algerian
Muslims and did not extend to them full French citizenship.
During World War I, French Algeria was the largest producer of manufactured resources and
supplier of manpower to the French war effort of all the colonies within French North Africa.
Notably, 173,000 Algerians served in the French army, and hundreds of thousands more were
employed in factories that supported the French military effort.15 The North African Zouaves
and Tirailleurs regiments of troupes coloniales (colonial troops) in the Forces armées françaises
(French Armed Forces) sustained weighty casualties during the first battles of 1914, because as
the war persisted and the participation of African troops increased, troupes coloniales fought
primarily during the first wave of attack as shock troops on the Western Front, contributing to all
its major battles.16 Furthermore, African troops participated in the 1915 Dardanelles expedition
and Balkans campaigns.17 While the statistics of African troop casualties are disputed and range
from 12,000 to 100,000 for Algerians, it is evident from the attitudes of French government and
military officials as well as French soldiers toward the troupes coloniales that their lives were
more expendable than the life of a Frenchman.18
In letters written by French soldiers, the opinions toward African soldiers ranged from pity to
bewilderment. Corporal Louis Barthas wrote in 1914 of the North African soldiers who were
stationed at the front immediately after their arrival in Europe: “Hardly anyone of these miserable
wretches would ever return to Algeria!”19 Furthermore, Second Lieutenant Roland Leighton wrote
in 1915, “A company of Turcos has just gone along the road, singing a weird chant punctuated
with hand clapping. They all look very Negroid, but are wellbuilt men and march well.”20 These
14Fois, “Algerian Nationalism,” 92-93.
15Metz, Algeria, 35.
16Christian Koller, “Colonial Military Participation in Europe (Africa),” in International Encyclopedia of the First
World War, ed. Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2014), https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/
article/colonial_military_participation_in_europe_africa.
17Koller, “Colonial Military Participation.”
18Koller.
19Santanu Das, ed., Race, Empire and First World War Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 134.
20Das, First World War Writing, 133.
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perspectives provide insight into the mindsets of the French officials and soldiers; the African
troops were regarded with belittlement and inferiority and were only considered for their physical
contribution, as their lives were regarded as expendable. This attitude toward the African troops
demonstrates a pattern of French underappreciation and exploitation of its indigenous colonial
populations and explains that France’s inability to negotiate with Muslim Algerians was because
of its ignorance of colonial agency.
Figure 2. Number of Africans Recruited for the French Colonial Army, 1908–1945.21

While the French viewed the colonial contribution of French Algeria as supplementary shock
troops to spare French soldiers, World War I gave rise to an “awakening of peoples” throughout
France’s colonial possessions.22 As France repatriated colonial troops to their countries of origin,
it became France’s prerogative to balance the possibility of concessions to these veterans with
respect for the ultimate authority of the colonial administration. The republican values of France
closely related service to the state through military service to the rights and responsibilities
of citizens, but efforts to naturalize African soldiers were met with resistance from French
Parliament and the colons community because of their fears of insurmountable racial and cultural
differences.23 Because Africans had given their lives in service to the l’Métropole, they believed
they were entitled to citizenship as well as equal rights and representation. An Algerian idealism
was sparked in response to the colony’s participation in the war, the wave of revolutions across
Europe, and the emergence of a pan-Arab nationalism in the Middle East, which caused Algerians
to demand concessions from France for the first time.24 However, the demand to permit limited
political rights to those men who had served France was reluctantly and begrudgingly conceded
by lawmakers, and they sought to minimize those who would be permitted such rights. It was the
21Myron J. Echenberg, “Les Migrations militaires en Afrique occidentale française, 1900-1945,” Revue Canadienne
des Études Africaines 14 (1980): 430.
22Fois, “Algerian Nationalism,” 93.
23John H. Morrow Jr., “Black Africans in World War II: The Soldiers’ Stories,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 632 (2010): 14.
24Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 45.
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indigenous male elites to whom France’s limited concessions of citizenship, suffrage, and access
to junior administrative positions were targeted.25 “The end of the First World War, the principle
of self-determination, and the Russian Revolution contributed to an increased awareness of the
cause of Algerian independence. In its essence, the nationalist current found its raison d’être in
the popular rejection of the colonial order.”26
In response to the surmounting pressure from newly emboldened nationalist organizations
and press, the Jonnart Law, which had been spearheaded by the governor general of Algeria,
Charles Jonnart, was passed in 1919. This reform program expanded male suffrage for the djemâa
election to 425,138 Algerian men, introduced reforms into the djemâa election process, and
removed those with voting status from the authority of the Code de l’Indigénat—thus inadvertently
strengthening the grassroots channels through which anti-colonial politics could be shared among
rural communities and galvanizing support for nationalistic, anti-colonial politics to a wider
audience.27 However, the Algerian nationalist leaders who had contributed to negotiations for the
reform program felt the Jonnart Law fell short of what had been discussed and bolstered their
demands. Moreover, the colons were horrified by the enfranchisement of such a large proportion
of men and sought to resist any further concessions offered to the Algerian community.
The first djemâa election after the passage of the Jonnart Law elected Emir Khaled, an
advocate for more Muslim representation in Parliament, citizenship with retention of Muslim
status, and Arabic to be employed in the Algerian school system; yet the results of this election
were annulled after fervent settler protests.28 While he remained in the political sphere and
was elected to the Algiers general council and the Muslim financial delegation, his reformist
agenda remained restricted to the participation of elite Muslims in Algerian politics.29 As the
momentum for reform inspired by Emir Khalid began to slow, a political void was evident, as
newly politicized rural communities desired a leader to rally behind.
In 1926, nationalist leader Messali Hadj capitalized upon the untapped nationalistic sentiment
through his organization, Étoile Nord-Africain (North African Star, ENA). Hadj, who had fought
during the First World War, had high expectations for Algerian independence after his personal
sacrifice and that of his fellow Algerians, yet he was disillusioned by the continued rejection of
compromise by the French and desired full Algerian independence. Hadj said:
Imperialism enrolls us by force in its army. In order to enrich a few European
failures, it doesn’t hesitate to have us massacred in fratricidal struggles, we ourselves
unconsciously contributing to the enslavement of our Moroccan and Syrian brothers
and, through a fatal repercussion, in the reinforcement of our own oppression. Unite
your efforts in order to improve our lot. For the suppression of the Code de l’Indigénat,
for the freedom of the press and assembly, for the equality of military service, for the
freedom of immigration, against the sending of native troops to foreign lands. . . !
Fight against French imperialism. . . !30

25Thomas, French Empire between the Wars, 24.
26Fois, “Algerian Nationalism,” 92.
27Neil MacMaster, War in the Mountains: Peasant Society and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 1918-1958 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2020), 131-132.
28Thomas, French Empire between the Wars, 247-248.
29Thomas, 248.
30Messali Hadj, Fight Against French Imperialism, 1928, https://www.marxists.org/archive/messali-hadj/1928/fightfrench.htm.
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This quote explains the connection that Hadj had made between French Algeria’s participation in
the First World War and Algerians’ right to an independent and fair country that would focus on
the interests of the indigenous Algerian populace.
The ENA, which was initially organized among the émigrés (Algerian workers who lived in
France), was strongly nationalistic and proletarian, which allowed it to draw upon the nationalistic
support that had fermented among the radicalized and disenfranchised rural poor who did not
benefit from any of France’s concessions. The ENA was the first nationalist organization to
demand Algerian independence from France as well as the withdrawal of the French military
presence; creation of a national army; confiscation of large, settler estates; and freedom of the press
instead of accepting limited concessions to the favored social groups of Algerian society—the
colons and the évolués.31 However, the ENA was dissolved by the French government in 1929
due to its concerns that the organization was spreading dissent throughout Algeria.
Another significant leader of Algerian independence later in his career, Ferhat Abbas, initially
supported equal rights and improved integration with metropolitan France after serving in Forces
armées françaises during World War I. He and his fellow members of the Jeunes Algériens
who had become eligible to hold public office established the Fédération des Élus Musulmans
(Federation of Elected Muslims, FEM) in 1927, which advocated for the assimilation of Algeria
into France through reforms such as equal pay and electoral reform during the 1920s and 1930s.32
However, because of its majority évolués membership, the goals of the FEM were obstructed by
elitist prerogatives to advocate for full citizenship rights to be afforded to the évolués without
renouncing their Muslim identity as well as the integration of Algeria as a permanent French
province.33
Another sect of Algerian nationalism that was gaining popularity during this period was
led by the Islamic nationalist leaders who were inspired by the modernist reforms of Egypt’s
Muhammad Abduh. The primary nationalist organization of Muslim reformers, Association Des
Uléma Musulmans Algériens or the Association des Oulémas Réformistes (Association of the
Algerian Muslim Ulama or Association of Reformist Ulama, AUMA), was established in 1931
and was led by Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis. At the start of the interwar period, Ben Badis believed
that while Muslims must defend their distinct Algerian identity, assimilation with France was in
Algeria’s best interest; however, after AUMA and its periodicals, al-Muntaquid and al-Shihab,
were censored by the French government, Ben Badis adopted Hadj’s rejection of French colonial
rule.34 Ben Badis expressed the distinctiveness of the Algerian nation and thus its incompatibility
with French suzerainty:
The Algerian Muslim nation has its own history, marked by great deeds; it has its
religious and linguistic unit; it has its own culture, its traditions and its specific
characteristics. . . . [We] affirm that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be
France and does not want to be France. It is impossible that it will be France, even if
it wanted to assimilate.35

31Thomas, French Empire between the Wars, 258.
32Peter Krause, “The Algerian National Movement: The Long, Bloody March to Hegemony,” in Rebel Power: Why
National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win, ed. Peter Krause (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 103.
33Khatun, “Analysis of the Causes,” 92.
34Khatun, 251.
35Claude Collot and Jean-Robert Henry, “1936 Extract of the Magazine Edited by Ben Badis, al-Shihab,” Le
Mouvement national algérien: textes, 1912-1954 (Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1978), 67-69.
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This quote conveys Ben Badis’s key arguments for Algerian independence from France—that
because Algerians possessed a distinct religion, language, and homeland they should exist
independently from France as their own unique country.
After the Popular Front Party gained control of the government and Léon Blum was appointed
prime minister in 1936, the Blum-Violette proposal was introduced into the Parliament. This
law would have extended citizenship to 25,000 Algerian Muslim men along with forcing them to
renounce their statut personnel (personal Islamic identity).36 However, this law did not reach
the French Chamber of Deputies to be voted upon because of the outrage and backlash from the
colons. Because the French had once again reneged on their promised concessions and permitted
the interests of the colons to take precedent, the Algerian nationalists became disillusioned at
the prospect of negotiation with France. Ferhat Abbas’s opinion shifted from assimilation with
the metropole to instead the call for an autonomous state federated with France.37 Messali Hadj
mobilized Algerian urban workers and peasant farmers to improve Algeria’s political situation
through the Parti du Peuple Algérien (Algerian People’s Party, PPA) in 1937. This organization,
the successor to ENA, completely rejected assimilation with France and demanded an autonomous
Algerian state.
By the threshold of the Second World War, the political atmosphere within Algeria, spurred
by the colony’s participation in the First World War, had intensified to a level that had never
been experienced by the colony, and a collective of nationalistic and anti-colonial sentiment
against France had emerged. Algerians were already uniting in their shared national identity and
demanding their independence from France because of its continued denial of rights to Muslim
veterans after serving in the First World War. French Algeria’s contribution to the Second World
War and its vital support of France would push these political tensions to a boiling point.
The Second World War caused a pivotal transition from the attempts of Algerian nationalists
for compromise with France to their demands for independence.38 After France was defeated and
occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940, a new Vichy regime was installed by the French-German
Armistice to govern France and its colonies. The role of the French colonies during World War II
became imperative during this period of occupation. Under the Vichy regime, French Algeria
experienced the repeal of the Décret Crémieux of 1870, which permitted French citizenship
to the indigenous Jewish community of Algeria, and a series of other anti-Semitic legislation
that reduced the rights afforded to the Algerian Jewish community.39 Moreover, the PPA was
banned in 1939, and in 1941, Messali Hadj and the other leaders of the PPA were sentenced to
prison terms ranging from ten to sixteen years for conspiracy against the sovereignty of France.40
While Algerians might have considered the installation of the Vichy regime a new opportunity
for independence, the introduction of oppressive legislation, weighty export requirements, and
the annulment of rights revealed that the Vichy regime was not concerned with improving the
Algerian condition but extracting its resources to support France. However the Algerian nationalist
movement had regarded the downfall of France and its capitulation to a foreign power, their
efforts for independence were emboldened.41 Conversely, the settler community felt secured
36Khatun, “Analysis of the Causes,” 88.
37Khatun, 88.
38Mohamed Khenouf and Michael Brett, “Algerian Nationalism and the Allied Military Strategy and Propaganda
during the Second World War: The Background to Sétif,” in Africa and the Second World War, ed. David Killingray and
Richard Rathbone (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 258.
39Michael M. Laskier, “Between Vichy Antisemitism and German Harassment: The Jews of North Africa during the
Early 1940s,” Modern Judaism (1991): 343.
40Khenouf and Brett, “Algerian Nationalism,” 261.
41Haley Brown, “French Colonialism in Algeria: War, Legacy, and Memory” (honors thesis, Bucknell University,
2018), 43, https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/honors_theses/456.
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from the retaliation of the indigenous Algerian Muslim population under the Vichy regime’s
strict, authoritarian governance.42 Two years after the establishment of the Vichy regime, the
Allies launched the 1942 Operation TORCH, which was the strategic invasion of French North
Africa intended to liberate the colonies from Vichy France. The Allied occupation of Algeria
brought reinvigorated and international support for the anti-colonialist movement, as President
Franklin Roosevelt spread the ideals of the Atlantic Charter and ordered leaflets be distributed
throughout Morocco and Algeria that read: “We come to your country to free you from the grip
of conquerors who seek to deprive you of your sovereign rights, your religious freedom and the
right to lead your way of life in peace.”43
After the liberation of French North Africa, Algiers served as the headquarters for General
Charles de Gaulle’s Free France resistance in 1943. Soldiers from French North Africa were the
most appealing to de Gaulle because they had the lightest skin of all the troupes coloniales, and
they best fit the French army’s policy of blanchissement (the intentional “whitening” of the French
army by replacing troupes coloniales with white French soldiers).44 On the side of the Allies,
approximately 290,000 Algerian soldiers fought in the French Expeditionary Corps between
1943 and 1945, participating in the Italian campaign of 1943 and the invasion of southern France
in 1944.45 French Algeria directly contributed to the liberation of its mother country from the
occupation of Germany. While the feat would be widely celebrated by indigenous Algerians,
France would be slow to recognize its colony’s contribution.
After the end of the Second World War, the nationalist movement within French Algeria had
become more militant after experiencing independence under Allied occupation and contributing
to the liberation of France; Algerian nationalists were prepared to fight the colons who refused
reform.46 In 1942, Ferhat Abbas began negotiations with the French administration for improved
political and economic rights in exchange for Algerians’ contributions to the Second World
War. After his experience in the French medical corps during World War Two, Abbas’s views
on independence had become more radical. To clearly articulate the nationalists’ demands
during these negotiations, Abbas authored the Manifeste du Peuple Algérien (Manifesto of the
Algerian People), which was signed by fifty-six Algerian nationalist and international leaders and
condemned French colonial rule, called for the application of the principle of self-determination,
and demanded an Algerian constitution that granted equality to all inhabitants of Algeria.47
Abbas clearly renounces French colonialism and declares the independence of the country in the
Manifeste du Peuple Algérien:
The Peace of 1918 was dearly acquired. The sacrifice of combatants, of all
nationalities and all religions, was in vain. The lusts of strong peoples and the
injustice they engender have survived the supreme sacrifice of the dead. . . . Faced
with these responsibilities, the Algerian people, in their desire to serve both peace
and freedom, raise their voice to denounce the colonial regime imposed on them,
recall their previous protests, and claim their right to life.48
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Yet, the French administration did not heed the demands of the Algerian Manifesto, but enacted a
reform program that was founded upon the 1936 Blum-Viollette Plan’s proposition of granting
French citizenship to 60,000 “meritorious” Algerian Muslims—one percent of the Algerian
population in 1943.49
The publication of the Manifeste du Peuple Algérien represents the final shift in Abbas’s
perspective toward cooperation with France. His initial 1920s view of assimilation with France,
which shifted to the desire for Algerian autonomy with loose federation with the metropole during
the 1930s, was finally dashed in the 1940s after the Second World War and France’s refusal to
extend citizenship to all colonial veterans. In 1944, Abbas formed the Amis du Manifeste et da la
Liberté (Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty, AML) after the reforms were instated in order to
defend the Manifesto and its demands; this political organization garnered widespread support,
from the Ulama to the Jeunes Algériens to the PPA and even the Parti Communiste Algérien
(Algerian Communist Party).50 While the Algerian nationalist movement was at the height of its
unification, a violent uprising would halt the momentum of the movement, and nationalist fervor
would descend into violent insurgency against French imperialism.
After the Algerian people had witnessed the occupation of France and experienced more
independence during the Allies’ occupation, nationalist sentiment and unity were at their height.
The tensions between Algerian nationalism and French hegemony reached their peak in 1945.
During the widespread celebrations of May 8, 1945 (V-E Day), Algerians, too, celebrated
their crucial contribution to World War II and the successful end of the war. In the cities of
Sétif and Guelma, demonstrators waved newly-created red, white, and green nationalist flags
with the symbol of Emir Abdelkader—a red star and a crescent.51 The police fired upon the
demonstrators to quell the nationalist sentiment and harm those who would support revolution
within French Algeria. In response, the Algerian protesters then began rioting throughout the
city and attacked the colons. Responding to an attack on its sovereignty, France authorized the
colonial administration to enact a vicious repression campaign of collective punishment. Entire
villages were punished for the revolts in Sétif and Guelma through extreme measures including
heavy artillery, the use of aircraft, and naval bombardment.52 It is estimated that 45,000 Algerians
were killed by the police as opposed to 100 Europeans who were killed by protesters.53 However,
the French government only accepted responsibility for 1,340 “rebellious nationalists” who were
killed by justified police action.54 France’s rapid escalation to state-sponsored counterinsurgency
and a campaign of ratissage (“raking over” suspected locations of dissidence) to suppress Algerian
rebellion initiated a violent pattern of escalated retaliation as the Algerian War of Independence
began.
The public unrest before and during the Sétif and Guelma massacres was used as a pretext
to dissolve the AML and to arrest its leader, Ferhat Abbas, as well as AML members. A year
after its disbandment in 1945, Abbas organized a successor organization to the AML, the Union
Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto, UDMA),
that would advocate for the independence of Algeria through peaceful means. Moreover, Messali
Hadj persisted in his efforts to lead nationalist efforts for independence despite his imprisonment.
49Metz, Algeria, 4.
50Khenouf and Brett, “Algerian Nationalism,” 263.
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While the PPA continued to operate clandestinely regardless of its disbandment, Hadj created
the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph
of Democratic Liberties, MTLD), as well as its secret sister paramilitary organization, the
Organisation Spéciale (Special Organization, OS), in 1946 to achieve Algerian independence by
any means.55 Although they pursued similar goals, the UDMA and the MTLD competed to solely
represent the Algerian nationalist movement in the political sphere. In the 1946 elections, UDMA
controlled eleven of the thirteen seats allotted for nationalist parties in the French Constituent
Assembly; yet in 1947, MTLD won the majority of the Muslim electorate, garnering 31 percent
of the vote, while UDMA won 27 percent.56
France’s refusal to recognize the mounting nationalism within the Algerian populace and
to compromise its stringent and divisive administrative policies with the integration proposals
of early nationalist organizations forced Algerians to pursue increasingly radical means for
independence. For instance, the transition from offers of assimilation to demands for autonomy
to organized and violent attacks against French institutions and settlers is an apparent escalation
after continued oppression. After the violence in Sétif and Guelma, many Muslim Algerians
began to feel that organized violence was the only option, as all peaceful means for resolving
the problems of colonial rule had been denied while all the interests of the settler population
remained paramount, which resulted in the severely violent 1954 Algerian War of Independence.
The Algerian War was one of the longest and bloodiest wars of decolonization because of
France’s refusal to accept the compromise advocated by Algerian nationalists after they believed
they had demonstrated their right to French citizenship through their participation in the First and
Second World Wars. The First World War offered Algerians a chance to earn their citizenship
through duty to the mother country, whereas the Second World War served to reinforce the ideas
of a distinct Algerian identity and national independence that had developed during the interwar
period. While the republican philosophies of France attributed citizenship to military service,
the service of the Algerian Muslims was met the perpetuation of a second-class French subject
status and with small concessions of citizenship to limited groups of évolués, which reinforced
the class hierarchies within French Algeria. In response to the continued oppression and denial
of citizenship, the Algerian nationalist movement gained popularity and support by rallying
disenfranchised rural communities, and a pursuit of a distinct and autonomous Algerian state
emerged. Instead, the colonial administration within French Algeria ramped up its effort to quell
rebellion through the collective punishment of suspected insurgent communities.
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Beyond a Border Conflict: Indigenous Involvement in the
Mexican-American War
RIL EY BOW ER S
Settled squarely in the heartlands of many Indigenous Americans’ ancestral territories, the disputed area between the
United States and Mexico fought over during the Mexican-American War is often solely conceptualized as the latter
definition. The Indigenous peoples of these lands themselves are often just as ignored in the historical narrative of this
period as are their ties to the lands. The research presented in this article aims to bring to light this often understudied
part of the Mexican-American War, being Indigenous involvement in the war itself and the lasting effects that it had
upon Indigenous groups. This article focuses on Apache, Comanche, and Navajo perspectives leading up to, during, and
following the war. By centering these groups in the narrative, it is clear they were not sidelined or forgotten during
the conflict, but rather were active players in the overall struggle for power in the region, engaging in both warfare and
diplomacy. As such, equal attention should be given to these Indigenous participants in the war in further studies of the
conflict.

The Mexican-American War is often studied as a border conflict between Mexico and the United
States of America. Following the United States’ annexation of Texas, the dispute over the border
of Mexico and the United States’ newly acquired territory resulted in the declaration of war
between the two nations. What is often understudied, or completely overlooked, however, are the
Indigenous peoples of what became this disputed border region and the roles that they played in
this conflict. Indigenous peoples had been living in this region since time immemorial, and the
incursion of colonial powers meant that this war was not only a border dispute for the Apache, the
Comanche, the Navajo, and many other Indigenous groups, as it was for the United States and
Mexico, but also a war to preserve their way of life against American and Mexican governmental
persecution.
In this paper, I will analyze the roles that Indigenous groups played in the Mexican-American
War as well as their political, personal, and material motivations for participating. By placing
their experiences at the center of the conflict, as opposed to the sidelines, I argue that Indigenous
groups that participated in the war should not be considered inconsequential agitators, but rather
active combatants and political players. The motivations, engagements, and diplomatic pursuits
of these Indigenous groups, as well as the lasting effects that the war had upon them, should be
given equal attention in studies as is given to the United States and Mexico, respectively.
Whereas the United States and Mexico were concerned with disputed territory, the Indigenous
populations had much more at stake. With the incursion of settlers and soldiers from both the
United States and Mexico, Indigenous groups faced loss of land, detrimental threats to their
population through warfare, potential destabilization of their way of life, and the loss of culture.
The outcome of the war between the United States and Mexico would determine the future of
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the border region, and Indigenous peoples planned accordingly. Some took advantage of the
opportunity of war by engaging in raids to increase wealth or even to bolster dwindling numbers.
Others, such as Mangas Coloradas of the Apache, sought to secure peace and the survival of his
people’s way of life through diplomacy with the United States.1 Regardless of how individuals or
groups felt the future was going to pan out, what was certain was that this was a time of action
and that it was upon these actions that the future depended.
During the period leading up to and throughout the Mexican-American War, both American
and Mexican politicians held negative attitudes toward the Indigenous populations. The United
States was well into the Indian Removal Era by the start of the war, and the rhetoric among
American politicians toward Indigenous peoples had long been that they were “uncivilized.” Many
American politicians of this era forced treaties through various means on Indigenous groups of
what became the American Southeast under the notion that their peoples and the white American
population could never coexist so close to one another. “These untutored sons of the forest,
cannot exist in a state of Independence, in the vicinity of the white man. If they will persist in
remaining where they are, they may begin to dig their graves and prepare to die.”2 This letter,
written to President Andrew Jackson by a friend of his at the beginning of the Indian Removal Era,
exemplifies the European-American attitude of superiority and willingness to resort to violence
to achieve political goals present throughout this era, including the Mexican-American War.
This American rhetoric, which painted all Indigenous groups as primitive and lesser peoples,
had further implications beyond the already damaging dehumanization. It provided justification
for American expansionism into Indigenous lands. President Andrew Jackson argued this position
in his message to Congress on Indian Removal: “And is it supposed that the wandering savage
has a stronger attachment to his home than the settled, civilized Christian? Is it more afflicting
to him to leave the graves of his fathers than it is to our brothers and children?”3 Jackson’s
point was simple: Indigenous peoples could hold no legitimate claim to land, and therefore
Christians (Americans) could freely annex lands occupied by the “wandering savages.” This
outlook remained prominent through the Mexican-American War, as American forces laid claim
to lands within la Apachería or la Comanchería, disregarding Indigenous sovereignty.
Whereas American politicians had for some time viewed the Indigenous population as a
temporary concern whose resistance to American expansionism would eventually fizzle out,
Mexican politicians such as Mariano Otero viewed the Indigenous population as a serious
hinderance to the advancement of Mexico as a nation. Otero, a liberal politician of his era,
concerned himself with how the people of Mexico affected the prosperity of the nation. Indigenous
groups were no exception to this critique. Otero described the Indigenous way of life as “brutalized”
and “differ[ing] little or not at all from what it was when they were subjects of the great emperor
Montezuma.”4 Indigenous groups like the Apache also made it difficult for settlers to populate
the border region with their “devastating efficiency” in warfare, thus rendering a great deal of
northern Mexico out of the control of the Mexican government.5 These negative effects, from the
1John Upton Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing Company, 1972), 177-180.
2Alfred Balch to Andrew Jackson, January 8, 1830, https://www.loc.gov/item/maj011860/.
3Andrew Jackson, “On Indian Removal,” December 6, 1830, Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate,
1789-1990, National Archive, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=25.
4Mariano Otero, “Considerations Relating to the Political and Social Situation of the Mexican Republic in the Year
1847,” in The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2002), 227.
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perspective of Mexican politicians like Otero, extended to Mexico’s struggles in the war with the
United States.
By the start of the Mexican-American War, the Indigenous groups of the Great Plains region
grew accustomed to raiding as a commonplace means of obtaining essential resources as well as
making a profit. Such was the case that raiding had come to produce more lucrative results than if
their attention was focused solely on hunting buffalo.6 This proved to be of significant concern to
the US government, especially regarding its control of the border region. “The mischievous habits
of these Indians. . . as well as a proper regard for the security of our own citizens, who have already
suffered so much from their predatory and marauding excursions, will commend this subject
to the attention and early consideration of Congress,” reads a report from the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated November 30, 1846.7
The incursion of settlers into Indigenous lands was not the sole motivation for an increase in
raiding on behalf of the Indigenous population. Indigenous soldiers who volunteered to serve
in the Mexican army were often treated poorly by commanding officers who would “abandon
[Indigenous volunteers] at the moment of danger.”8 Following their service, which had taken from
them a harvest season and livestock, many Indigenous volunteers for the American army were
improperly compensated. A spike in raiding resulted from this, as many Indigenous volunteer
soldiers sought payment through other means.9
Population loss among tribes such as the Comanche was also a factor in the increasing number
of raids. Following a severe decline in population beginning with an epidemic in 1780, the
Comanche diversified their tribe and bolstered their numbers by taking captives and assimilating
them into the tribe.10 Having faced this population decline for decades by the middle of the
19th century, the Comanche adopted a systematic form of captive indoctrination, allowing for
the supplementation of their population to the best of their ability. The Mexican-American War
provided further opportunity for captive-taking, and the captive experience of Macario Leal,
which will be analyzed later in this work, demonstrates the process of assimilation that the
Comanche employed and how captives participated within Comanche society, including during
warfare.11
Traditional rivalries and grudges also contributed to the bloodshed between Indigenous
groups and colonial forces, particularly Mexican soldiers. In the case of the Luiseño, who lived
predominantly near San Diego, tension had long existed between the group and Spaniards, and
this tension was inherited by Mexicans. Missionaries were known for committing acts of violence
like whipping in their conversion attempts, and Mexican soldiers regularly took supplies and
livestock from the Luiseño as they traveled through Luiseño territory. These tensions came to a
boiling point in December of 1846, after United States General Kearney routed Mexican forces
who were laying siege to San Diego. Mexican rangers dispersed the siege, and eleven of them
were attacked and killed by the Luiseño, who recognized them as Mexicans as they traveled
through Luiseño land. The Luiseño, who had long feuded with Mexican soldiers, felt encouraged
6Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 356-357, Apple Books.
7W. L. Marcy and W. Medill, “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” Daily Union (Washington, DC), December 28, 1846, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.
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by the advance of American soldiers against Mexico and were likely further motivated by this to
engage the group of eleven Mexican rangers.12 This incident, which became known as the Pauma
Massacre, named after the Pauma ranchería of the Luiseño, demonstrates Indigenous military
engagement against colonial powers despite not having the capacity to field large armies in battle.
Lastly, Indigenous groups of the borderlands stood to benefit from engagements and raids in
the Mexican-American War simply due to the fact that it promised the accumulation of wealth,
often through livestock. Indigenous groups of the Southern Plains, such as the Comanche, the
Kiowa, and the Kiowa Apache, highly valued horses, as the animals granted wider access to
buffalo, further range to trade and raid, and many other benefits. While horses could be acquired
through breeding or the capture of wild horses, the preferred method of many Southern Plains
Indigenous groups was to obtain horses through raiding.13 Comanche raids and the acquisition of
goods from them allowed the tribe to profit significantly off of trade with other groups, including
Indigenous groups from the East who had been moved to Indian Territory, such as the Choctaw
and the Cherokee. This trade could be facilitated between the tribes face-to-face or through
Comanche allies such as the Wichita or the Caddo.14 While one could argue in favor of the
positives achieved through the increased profitability of raiding and hunting that was granted by
the acquisition of horses and livestock, this ultimately created a cycle of violence that devolved
into further reliance on raiding to obtain resources. Increased numbers of livestock gained through
raiding competed with buffalo for grazing land, and the numbers of buffalo steadily decreased at
the hands of capable hunters with access to horses.15
Despite sharing some similar motivations and concerns, Indigenous groups of the border
region did not act homogeneously. Differing opinions regarding how to act in this tumultuous
period existed within and across these Southern Plains societies. Some groups were motivated to
raid by the potential for economic gain or perhaps even for the sake of revenge.16 Others sought
peace with one side or another, recognizing the strategic value of creating an alliance to face a
common enemy.
The invasion of American soldiers into New Mexico, and thus la Apachería, was of natural
concern to the Apache as much as it was to Mexico. The aim of the United States was to
acquire much of the border territory shared by the United States and Mexico, which included
la Apachería. General Stephen Kearney had promised New Mexicans on behalf of the United
States to “forthwith halt all Indian depredations,” referencing Indigenous raids.17 The Apache
recognized that this policy posed an imminent threat to their existence, as they often relied on
their ability to acquire resources and goods through raiding in this vast territory. In accordance
with their concerns about a future under American rule, some Apache sought to make peace with
the invading Americans.
An Apache group under the leadership of Mangas Coloradas exemplified an attempt at
diplomacy with the United States. In October of 1846, Mangas Coloradas led a delegation to
speak with General Kearney. During this conference of leaders, Mangas Coloradas made his
case to General Kearny that the Apache and the Americans should become allies and combine
their military efforts against a common enemy: Mexico. In this conference, the Apache leader’s
primary objective was to ensure that the United States would not interfere with the Apache’s
12Millard F. Hudson, “The Pauma Massacre,” Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California 7,
no. 1 (1906): 13-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41168601.
13DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 148-149.
14DeLay, 338-340.
15DeLay, 647-648.
16DeLay, 386-387.
17Terrell, Apache Chronicle, 174-175.
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practice of raiding Mexican settlements, while establishing peaceful relations with Americans.
The American general would not budge on his position that any individual living within United
States’ territory must abide by the laws of the land. This included Mexicans who lived in the
newly acquired territory, who were then to be considered Americans, as well as Indigenous
peoples like the Apache. This meant the Apache must cease their raiding.18 Although the leaders
could not reach an agreement, this demonstrates the active role that Indigenous groups such as the
Apache played in the war, participating in negotiations as independent sovereignties with their
own political motivations.
Despite the breakdown of negotiations between Mangas Coloradas and General Kearney, the
Apache and the Americans remained on relatively peaceful terms throughout the course of the war.
Recognizing that American forces were focusing their primary attention toward their Mexican
adversaries, the Apache in large part avoided altercation with the Americans as they passed
through la Apachería. However, some Apache did take advantage of their position as Americans
passed through, avoiding large-scale engagements but raiding supplies and livestock when the
moment was right. That is not to say that Apache involvement and implications regarding the
Mexican-American War were insignificant by any means, however, as the disputed border region
to which both Mexico and the United States staked claim laid across la Apachería, the homeland
of the Apache, the outcome of the war would determine in large part the fate of the Apache.19
As the leader Mangas Coloradas had come to understand, American policy and relations with
the Indigenous population of the border region was to differ quite significantly from those of the
Mexican government.
This significant difference was highlighted as the United States began to adopt the role of
“savior” to the northern Mexicans. This meant that they intended to put a stop to raiding on behalf
of the Indigenous population and defend against it whenever possible, something the government
of Mexico had not been able to effectively accomplish. Some Apache, while largely avoiding
raids against Americans, continued their campaign against Mexican settlements. American forces,
then viewing the occupied border region as American soil and subsequently viewing the Mexican
inhabitants as American citizens (though excluding the Indigenous population from this rule),
sought to repel the Apache attacks. One such situation occurred in May of 1847 in Coahuila,
where Apaches inflicted a number of raids against the Mexican population within. United States’
forces under the leadership of Captain John Reid intercepted the group of supposedly Lipan
Apaches. A battle ensued, and in the aftermath thereof captives and livestock were recovered.20
Diplomatic negotiations between the Navajo and the Americans came about a bit differently
in comparison to the delegation led by Mangas Coloradas of the Apache. Whereas Mangas
Coloradas sought out the Americans to negotiate, it was the Americans who called upon the
Navajo to meet in response to the large number of Navajo raids in the region of New Mexico.
Zarcillos Largos, a young Navajo headman, expressed at this delegation the sentiments of the
Navajo:
Americans! you [sic] have a strange cause of war against the Navajos. We have waged
war against the New Mexicans for several years. . . . You have lately commenced a
war against the same people. . . . This is our war. We have more right to complain of
you for interfering in our war, than you have to quarrel with us for continuing a war
18Terrell, 178-180.
19Terrell, 180-181.
20DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 788-789.
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we had begun long before you got here. If you will act justly, you will allow us to
settle our own differences.21
This perspective of the Navajo gives a larger insight into the other perspectives of the Indigenous
participants in the war. Not only did the Navajo see themselves as active participants in the
war, but also that Americans interrupted the Navajo’s war with New Mexicans. The American
response to this was ever consistent, stating that the Americans had defeated the New Mexicans,
and in accordance with treating them kindly, these New Mexicans were now Americans and thus
were to be protected as Americans from raiding parties. This group of Navajo resolved to make
peace with the Americans and the New Mexicans following the discussion, thus exemplifying
successful peace talks during the Mexican-American War between an Indigenous nation and a
colonial power.22
A Comanche delegation under the leadership of Pia Kusa made a similar attempt to the
Apache at a cooperative peace with the United States in September of 1846. Pia Kusa encountered
US General John Wool in Texas and seized the opportunity to seek council with him. Pia Kusa,
seeing Mexico as a potential common enemy with the United States, aimed to negotiate a deal
with General Wool. Pia Kusa’s proposal was that, in exchange for weapons and ammunition, the
Comanche would kill many Mexicans. The Comanche leader, however, was not only met with a
denial from the general, but also the promise of corporal punishment to anyone caught attacking
Mexicans unprovoked.23 Although unsuccessful in their attempt at an agreement with the United
States, the Comanche clearly viewed themselves as active participants in the war and, despite
American forewarning, acted as such.
Captive-taking remained an integral aspect of the warfare that the Comanche waged against
the Mexican settlements. The account of Macario Leal, a young farmhand at the time of his
capture by the Comanche in 1847, details a story shared by many captives of his time. The
Comanche attacked his family’s settlement, killed some of his relatives, and took Macario back to a
ranchería. Not long after his capture, he and his captors encountered American smugglers, whom
the Comanche then killed. After a year of serving the Comanche by tending to a herd of horses,
he had learned the language. They subsequently brought him on a raid against American forces
in which the Comanche were successful in killing their enemy and seizing goods.24 This account
from the captive himself details the captive-taking process that the Comanche utilized, with
which they attempted to assimilate their captives and make them into functioning members within
Comanche society, including participating in war campaigns against Mexicans and Americans
alike.
Raiding continued in the border region, specifically targeting Mexican settlements. United
States’ forces made efforts to defend these Mexican populations, seemingly acting in accordance
with the statements from Generals Kearney and Wool, adopting the position of “savior” to the
northern Mexicans. As it was paramount to incorporate into the United States the northern
territories of Mexico, such as New Mexico, US forces felt obligated to ensure the safety of
soon-to-be citizens, as the Mexican government’s ineptitude in defending the citizens of its
northern territories was one of the justifications for war that the US listed. With the assumption
of the role of protector of this newly acquired territory came the further incrimination of the
21John Taylor Hughes et al., Doniphan’s Expedition and the Conquest of New Mexico and California (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1906), 306, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Doniphan_s_Expedition
_and_the_Conquest_o/4Ztz5znHbVAC?hl=en&gbpv=1.
22Hughes et al., Doniphan’s Expedition, 306-308.
23DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 769-770.
24Rivaya-Martínez et al., “Captivity of Macario Leal,” 394-397.
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Indigenous populations as enemies that needed to be subdued.25 The citizens of the newly
acquired territories came to be viewed as Americans, no longer as Mexicans, and thus the common
enemy referenced by Indigenous leaders and diplomats such as Pia Kusa, Zarcillos Largos, and
Mangas Coloradas ceased to exist. In other words, American forces in the region now had their
sights trained on Indigenous groups such as the Comanche, the Navajo, and the Apache.
Warfare and raiding, which affected all peoples of the border region regardless of allegiance
or origin, did much to shape the public opinion of Indigenous populations. Many citizens of
Mexico and the United States shared similar but distinct prejudices and dispositions toward the
Indigenous population, particularly regarding the peoples of the border region. The rhetoric
employed varied in its method of depicting these peoples, but what can be derived is that many
feared Indigenous groups as legitimate threats and forces to be reckoned with.
In Mexico, where a large portion of the population was of Indigenous or of mixed-Indigenous
descent, efforts were made to differentiate between sedentary and nomadic peoples, or, more
specifically, civilized indios and los bárbaros. Much of the general population of Mexico,
especially those in close contact with Indigenous groups considered los bárbaros, viewed these
peoples as mindless killers whose only purpose was to spill blood and to steal.26 Although the
raiding committed by these peoples was largely the result of generations of warfare between
them and colonial entities and the processes of colonialism, which depleted resources to the
Indigenous population, their motivations were veiled by the lack of formal declarations. Thus, to
their enemies, los bárbaros acted without purpose, and had therefore earned their epithet.27
In the case of the American public, race was often at the center of the discussion regarding
the differences between themselves, being European-Americans, and the Indigenous populations.
By viewing Indigenous groups of the border region unanimously as other than themselves yet
indistinct from each other, European-Americans successfully portrayed these Indigenous groups
as a dangerous and otherworldly enemy whose retaliation to their own acts of violence served as
further incrimination of their people.28 American frontiersmen were celebrated for their exploits
and heroism against Indigenous peoples. “An incarnate devil in Indian fight. . . had raised more
hair from heads of Redskins than any two men in the Western country,” reads the description
of Lieutenant Kit Carson that appeared in a Maryland newspaper in 1848.29 The American
public had made an enemy of the Indigenous population of the Americas and, in the course of the
Mexican-American War, needed no further justification to wage war against this enemy.
The Mexican-American War concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
on February 2, 1848. With the signing of this treaty, Mexico ceded over half of its territory to
the United States. In doing this, the United States received large parts of what would become
the American Southwest. The ramifications of this treaty regarding the Indigenous groups of
the border region were monumental. This is particularly true for Article XI of the treaty, which
outlines how the US government will proceed in relations concerning the “savage tribes.”30
Article XI outlines four principal provisions agreed upon by the governments of the United
States and Mexico, each of which significantly impacted the future of the region that became
25DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 779-782.
26DeLay, 639.
27DeLay, 639-640.
28DeLay, 616-617.
29“Kit Carson in Europe,” Cecil Whig (Elkins, MD), October 28, 1848, Chronicling America: Historic American
Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83016348/1848-10-28/ed-1/seq-2/.
30“Article XI,” Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, Perfected Treaties, 1778-1945, Record Group 11,
General Records of the United States Government, 1778-1992, National Archives, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?flash=false&doc=26&page=transcript.

Beyond a Border Conflict

41

the American Southwest and the lives of Indigenous peoples who lived there. The first and
second of these provisions committed the United States government to the prevention of and the
punishment for Indigenous incursions and raiding across the border into Mexico. In situations
when punishment for raiding across the border was required, the United States would do so “with
equal diligence and energy, as if the same incursions were meditated or committed within its own
territory, against its own citizens.”31 Whereas prior to the war and the signing of this treaty, the
government of Mexico was largely responsible for this duty and largely ineffective in enforcing it,
the end of the war meant that this responsibility transferred to the US.
The third and fourth provisions prohibited American citizens from purchasing captives or any
stolen goods from Mexico and ensured that the United States would work to “rescue and return”
any captives. This meant that Indigenous groups who profited from their ability to acquire goods,
captives, and livestock through raiding Mexican settlements and selling them elsewhere would
have greater difficulty in finding someone willing to purchase from them. This also guaranteed
that the United States would be the primary enforcement for the rescue of captives. Economically,
this was a significant obstacle that stood in the way of these groups, as it significantly decreased
resource pools.32 These developments led some Indigenous groups to search for new methods to
preserve their system of resource acquisition.
American settlers were encouraged to migrate westward with the expansion of territory
claimed by the United States and the discovery of gold in California in 1849. This resulted in
increased conflict in the American Southwest between Indigenous groups, such as the Apache,
and the Americans. Some of the Apache, who had long been accustomed to raiding Mexican
settlements and as a result of the treaty between the United States and Mexico had greater difficulty
doing so, turned their attention to the American settlers and prospectors who were passing through
la Apachería. Throughout the years immediately following the end of the war, Apache raids often
targeted American travelers who passed through the region. Mangas Coloradas explained the
situation accordingly, “You tell us we must not rob the Mexicans south of the border. If we cannot
do that, we must steal from the Americans.”33
Conflict with the Apache continued for many decades following the war, as multiple Apache
groups continued to sustain themselves off of raiding both Americans and Mexicans. Many
Apache groups came to resist the Peace Policy of President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration, of
which one of the objectives was to require “roving” Indigenous groups, such as the Apache, to
relocate to a reservation, where they must remain. This further exacerbated the period of violence
between Apache groups that resisted forced relocation and continued to live nomadically and
the United States and Mexico.34 Apache leaders, such as Geronimo, and their followers became
skilled at evading capture for many years, only surrendering for the final time in 1886.35 Though
these conflicts extended beyond the timeline of the Mexican-American War, they came about in
many ways as a direct result of the war, stemming from American incursion into la Apachería
and federal policy toward the Indigenous population.
The Comanche, too, faced a similar period of violence with the United States. Following
the end of the Mexican-American War, Comanche groups continued to raid in Texas and in
Indian Territory and hunt on the Great Plains during the warmer months, returning to reservation
grounds when the weather turned cold. The increase in commercial buffalo hunting further
31“Article XI,” Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
32“Article XI.”
33Terrell, Apache Chronicle, 180-185.
34Terrell, 289-292.
35Edward K. Faison, “Lieutenant Faison’s Account of the Geronimo Campaign,” Journal of the Southwest 54, no. 3
(Autumn 2012): 537-538, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24394880.
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thinned the buffalo population, as Comanche groups struggled to acquire resources necessary to
continue living as they had. This resulted in the outbreak of war between the United States and
the Comanche, who had attacked a group of buffalo hunters at an outpost known as Adobe Walls
in June of 1874. This open warfare came to an end in 1875, as many of the remaining groups
of Comanche resolved to stay on the reservation, thus forfeiting their ability to continue living
openly on the Great Plains.36
Navajos were no exception to the pattern. Warfare and raiding between Navajos and Americans
became commonplace after the Mexican-American War, referred to as the Navajo Wars. The
ultimate goal of the United States was to acquire much of the territory upon which the Navajo (and
other groups) dwelled and confine them to smaller reservations where they would refrain from
older traditions of raiding and focus primarily on agricultural means of sustenance.37 Beginning
in 1864, American forces under the command of Kit Carson attacked Navajos and their resources
with the intent of forcing them into compliance and to have them relocate to a reservation that
had been assigned to them. This forceful relocation became known as the Long Walk, when the
Navajo were taken to the Bosque Redondo Reservation, an undesirable piece of land that could
not properly support the growth of crops due to poor soil and insufficient water. Navajos and their
livestock suffered a great deal in this land, and it was not until 1868 that a treaty was agreed upon
in which the Navajo were assigned new reservation grounds that contained some of the lands that
the Navajo recognized as their ancestral homes.38
The implications of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo combined with the influx of American
traffic through the new American Southwest, and thus Indigenous lands, set into motion the
series of events that ended with numerous Indigenous groups surrendering on the Great Plains.
This surrender would be accompanied with one-sided agreements in which Indigenous groups
were often required to give up their practices of living mobile and open in the region. In the
case of the Apache, the Comanche, and the Navajo, periods of violence stemming from the
Mexican-American War that depleted the natural resources available to the Indigenous groups
ultimately resulted in lopsided treaties with the United States in which traditional homelands and
practices were often stripped away in favor of sedentary lifestyles limited to reservation grounds.
The lasting effects of the war and the conflicts that arose from it seeped into media portrayal
of Indigenous groups, as western films soared in popularity in the 20th century. The formula to
the creation of these films often situated Indigenous groups, like the Apache, as standing in the
way of American expansionism or as “obstacles to civilization.” Popular films, such as the movie
Stagecoach (1939), neglected to portray Apache culture or political motivations, instead using
the Indigenous group as a violent force that exists simply to oppose American newcomers to the
region. This perception of the Apache is rooted in the period following the Mexican-American
War, when Apache groups clashed with American settlers and soldiers who participated in the
incursion into la Apachería.39 This 20th-century American perception of the Apache is similar to
the northern Mexican perception of los bárbaros throughout the period leading up to and during
the Mexican-American War, in that they were viewed as bloodthirsty killers standing in the way
of progress. While an indirect consequence of the Mexican-American War, portrayals such as
36Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 337-341, https://www.
jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1njn13.
37John L. Kessell, “General Sherman and the Navajo Treaty of 1868: A Basic and Expedient Misunderstanding,”
Western Historical Quarterly 12, no. 3 (July 1981): 253-254, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3556587.
38Traci Brynn Voyles, Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2015), 33-37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt155jmrg.5.
39Janne Lahti, “Silver Screen Savages: Images of Apaches in Motion Pictures,” Journal of Arizona History 54, no. 1
(Spring 2013): 54, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24459198.
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these continue to contribute to negative stereotypes of savagery, ignoring the political motivations
of the complex societies Indigenous to what became the American Southwest.
In researching this subject, as is often the case when studying the history of Indigenous
American populations, many of the accessible primary sources came from non-Native sources.
There are numerous reasons as to why this is the case. Lack of written language is one of the
most prominent factors in this drawback. Nomadic groups, like the Comanche, did not make
formal declarations of war in the same style that Mexican and American citizens alike were most
accustomed to.40 Because of this lack of penned intentions, much of what can be understood and
studied about these groups during this period comes from the observations of outsiders who had
often not grown up within the culture or society that they observed.
Biases must be considered when reading primary sources, especially if they fall under the
aforementioned category, in which they are written by outside observers. In the case of the
Mexican-American War, many of the primary sources are written by Mexican or American
soldiers and politicians who had many reasons to consider Indigenous groups as enemies or
inherently other from the observers. American reports from the BIA praise Indigenous groups
and peoples that are taking steps toward “civilization” in the same document that denounces
“roving and unstable” Indigenous groups within Texas as “the most barbarous and least civilized
portions of the Indian race.”41 This separation of Indigenous groups into categories of “civilized”
and “barbarous” was commonplace in both the United States and Mexico. In the United States,
this rhetoric was an integral aspect of the Indian Removal Era, during which Indigenous groups
were not only encouraged through various means, e.g., through violence or coercion, to live on
reservations, but also to conform to the American concept of civilization and society.
This negative descriptive language toward the Indigenous population is prevalent in primary
sources and can even be found in secondary sources written much later. In the Mexican historian
Luis González y González’s writing about liberal Mexican politicians and their difficulties
governing during the period of the Mexican-American War, descriptors such as “superstitions”
and “incompatible with scientific progress” are used when glossing over religions of Indigenous
groups and why said Indigenous groups were a prime concern for liberal politicians of the
period.42 This language fails to pay respect to Indigenous civilizations, cultures, and belief
systems, and must be analyzed and utilized with caution so as not to make similar prejudiced
claims.
To truly encompass a proper study of the Mexican-American War, including its catalysts,
happenings, and its results, one must analyze each of the groups that participated and were affected
by the war. Without proper consideration of the relationship between Indigenous groups and the
government of Mexico and the northern settlements of Mexico, one cannot truly understand the
struggles that Mexican politicians, like Mariano Otero, placed at the center of their grievances.
These same struggles of maintaining order across the nation of Mexico provided the United
States with justification to position itself as the savior of Mexico’s northern frontier, doing the
settler inhabitants a great service in defending them from the Indigenous population. In order
to comprehend the wars in this region that occurred between the United States and Indigenous
groups like the Apache, Comanche, and the Navajo, one must look to the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and the end of the Mexican-American War when the United States acquired the vast
territory that became the American Southwest, leading to a large influx of American settlers
through the region.
40DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 639.
41Marcy and Medill, “Report of the Commissioner.”
42González y González, “Liberals and the Land,” 245.
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Indigenous groups are situated in both the causal and geographic heart of the MexicanAmerican War, yet in spite of this receive little to no attention in academic discussion of the war.
Indigenous groups played active roles in the fighting of the war as well as participating as political
actors in negotiations and were viewed by Americans and Mexicans as belligerents. The region
ceded to the United States by Mexico, and upon which much of the early fighting of the war took
place, was the homeland of the Apache, the Comanche, and the Navajo, as well as many other
Indigenous groups. The invasion of American and Mexican soldiers into the region, however, is
not often portrayed as an invasion of Indigenous lands rather than Mexican or American lands.
The notion that Indigenous groups had no legitimate claims to land, as American politicians like
President Andrew Jackson would have one believe, is rooted in prejudice and ignorance. When
scholars perpetuate this mindset without paying respect to Indigenous inhabitants of the region,
they do a disservice not only to the Indigenous groups that they are actively ignoring, but also
to the historical record. Much like the United States and Mexico, whose results by the end of
the war consisted of substantial geographic and political gains and losses, respectively, so too do
the Indigenous groups today exist under the conditions that came about as a direct result of the
war. Further studies of the Mexican-American War must pay closer consideration to the roles that
Indigenous groups played in the war, so as to understand the whole picture of such a monumental
historical event and the outcomes that it produced.
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Chemical Warfare in WWI: The Psychological Corrosion of
Soldiers via Chemical Warfare and the 1925 Geneva
Convention’s Involvement in Eradicating Future Gaseous
Afflictions
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The discourse surrounding mental health awareness has progressed throughout decades of research, stigma breaking, and
connectedness; however, this trend of growth regarding mental illnesses was not as forgiving over a century ago, during
and directly after the Great War. Natural elements of war alone caused tumultuous suffering for soldiers within the Triple
Entente and the Central Powers. Yet, it was the man-made technologies of World War I that caused the deepest traumas,
particularly the chemical variants created by Fritz Haber. By examining this history through a psychological lens, the
British soldiers exposed to chemical warfare from Ypres to Verdun are given a better diagnosis than the broad term of
“shell shock.” In addressing the origins of gaseous agents like sulfur mustard and phosgene, this paper finally recognizes
the men that fought to preserve the world order for the war they were fighting on the inside post-gas attack.

Situated northeast in the Belgian municipality of West Flanders lies a town built and rebuilt from
centuries of conquest and war. Known record indicates the town, named by the Germanic Frisian
locals around the first century, was built to encompass a grand palace market and St. Martin
Cathedral, all near the river Ipre. Subsequently, the settlement was called Ieper; however, it was
later renamed to “Ypra” after the invasion of Julius Caesar and his Roman army not half a century
after its settlement.1
From the Roman invasion onward, the settlement developed with little interference hindering
the cultural expansion of its inhabitants. Through adopting architectural concepts from the
Romans, the people of Ypra built Romanesque buildings, Gothic cathedrals, and public halls.
Half-a-dozen gate entrances encircled the growing town with cobblestone roads connecting Ypra
to nearby settlements. Benefiting from location and geography, the community became one of
industry, creating wool textiles that were soon traded with the English. Industry remained the
city’s largest source of income until and beyond French conquest in the seventeenth century. With
French influence now dominating the growing town and surrounding settlements, former Ieper
was once again renamed to appease the mother tongue of the conquerors and became what is
modern-day Ypres.2
The Gothic and Roman architecture and the people within survived the complete removal of
the French after Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. The territory of modern-day Belgium gained
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its sovereignty from the Dutch in 1830, and for the next eighty-four years, Ypres remained an
industrial powerhouse and even made successful networking expansions into fishing.3
Although events in Ypres stayed relatively mundane under King Leopold I, one of the largest
conflicts in world history was looming over every inhabitant of Ypres and beyond. The German
Empire and the other actors of the Central Powers would soon devastate Ypres’s architecture and
civilians beyond recognition.
Initiated by one bullet intended for the Archduke of Austria, Franz Ferdinand, World War
I broke a near century-long period of peace in Europe. Beginning in the summer of 1914, the
Central Powers and the Triple Entente fought tirelessly in battles all across Europe, particularly
sending hardships and death across the Western Front, the main theater of the war. Here, nestled
in bliss until the spring of 1915, laid Ypres. Where geography once launched the growth of the
town, it soon doomed everything in the area. Sought by the German Empire for invasion because
of its location, Ypres became one the most infamous battlegrounds in World War I.
Led by a Polish chemist, German soldiers initiated the first use of synthetic chemicals that
caused extreme damage to the health of soldiers—so much physical and mental carnage that
ethical concerns regarding what should be permitted in war arose after the conclusion of the
Great War. Therefore, this introduction of chemical warfare as an offensive battle tactic depleted
the psychological health of soldiers during and post-World War I. Because of synthetic agents
like phosgene and sulfur mustard gas that damaged soldiers far beyond physical mutilation,
the political actors during the 1925 Geneva Convention called for their banishment in future
international and domestic afflictions.
One of the main catalysts in this global event, however, started years prior to that fateful
June day in 1914. Surprisingly, a large portion of the ghastly war machine began in modern-day
Poland. Factory owner Siegfried Haber and his wife, Paula, anticipated the birth of their child in
the winter of 1868. Upon his arrival, Haber’s life immediately started with death, as his mother
passed away due to childbirth complications. Despite the loss of his biological mother, Haber
was untroubled in his youth and had strong connections with his aunts, and soon, his stepmother.
Additionally, Haber had good relationships with his siblings and, despite their age gap, shared
with them a deep passion for the Greek language and poetry. While Haber held this interest in
literature all his life, he did not find a passion for chemistry until an experimental class in college
when he realized his lifelong interest in fire was more than an unhealthy obsession; rather, it
was a fascination that he could explore further through collegiate studies. After one semester at
the University of Berlin, Haber transferred to Heidelberg University and then to Charlottenburg
Institution, with chemistry being his main focus in both schools.
Toward the end of Haber’s collegiate career, he studied under the renowned chemist Robert
Bunsen and eventually worked as a professor himself at the Karlshurhe Institute of Technology.
The culmination of his knowledge in chemistry led him to develop an effective way to convert
the nitrogen gas found naturally in the Earth’s atmosphere into a compound suitable enough to
fertilize the depleting crops of the twentieth century.4 Up to this point in his career, Haber’s
contributions to science served to assist the greater good of humanity; however, the beginnings
of the Great War served as the main stage for Haber to demonstrate his true wit in science. So,
he started working to aid the German army in developing a weapon that he believed would help
them achieve victory in the Great War. Yet, unbeknownst to him, World War I would expose a
dichotomy within Haber’s life: his life was marked with the curse of death.
3Greatwar.co.uk, “Origins.”
4Gilbert King, “Fritz Haber’s Experiments in Life and Death,” Smithsonian Magazine, June 6, 2012,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/fritz-habers-experiments-in-life-and-death-114161301/.
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Despite Haber understanding that large amounts of chlorine and phosgene gas would greatly
impact opposing combatants, the chemist found resistance to the use of the chemical tactic from
his spouse and several German military officers. Clara, his first wife and equal in the study of
chemistry, warned him of the dangers that chemical fumes could cause; nevertheless, Haber told
her and others that “in German hands, the weapon could bring quick victory.”5 The scientist
continued to present his weapon with high esteem because he believed in its tactical strength.
Unlike Haber, Clara viewed the destructive possibilities of the gaseous agents to be a downfall
and an element of science that was meant to stay undiscovered. Unfortunately, Haber’s mind
was set on the use of gas in warfare, and the night after their disagreement, he left for Ypres to
aid the German army. Not even the existence of their young son could stop Clara Haber from
committing suicide. Feeling guilty by association, the mastermind’s wife became the first death
of invention—the psychological impact of chemical warfare claimed a life before it even made it
to the battlefield.
Set in his beliefs, Haber considered that the best strategy toward victory, in warfare, was
surprise. This philosophy was not an original thought of Haber’s, as similar teachings can be
found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Within one of his lectures, Haber stated:
Every new weapon is capable of winning a war. Every war is a war against the
soul of the soldier, not the body. New weapons break his morale because they are
something new, something he has not experienced, and therefore, something that he
fears. We were used to shell fire. The artillery did not do much harm to morale, but
the smell of gas upset everybody.6
Despite his confidence, Haber still could not convince the German army to use the lethal gas on a
larger scale. Instead, military generals at Ypres chose that particular town as the experimental
grounds for the mechanized gas, where they used below Haber’s recommended amount. Ironically,
the chlorine gas deployed at Ypres was not the strongest gas used over the four-year course of the
war. Instead, phosgene and sulfur mustard gas caused the most injuries and fatalities among those
affected by Haber’s standardization of chemically-based warfare.
Though the introduction of chlorine gas changed the course of the war, sulfur mustard acted in
a grander, more lethal way. Before being known as the “King Gas,” sulfur mustard was historically
used to treat psoriasis; however, Haber found a way to alter this antidote into a militarized agent
of torment.7 Physical effects of exposure would start within twenty-four hours of contact and
would irritate the eyes, skin, and lungs to cause enough discomfort and pain that soldiers were
rendered futile in the line of defense. With enough exposure, some soldiers would experience
light sensitivity, coughing fits, blistering of the skin, and complications within the digestive tract.
Deeper in the interior of the body, bone marrow would become affected, as a decreased formation
of blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets would lead a soldier weak and prone to infection.8
Symptoms like these and more led to deaths in the thousands and left an even greater amount of
soldiers in military hospitals.
Unfortunately, the long-term effects of this yellow-tinted compound were just as vile in
comparison. Surviving soldiers exposed to sulfur mustard were marked with physical and
5Morris Goran, The Story of Fritz Haber (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 71.
6Fritz Haber, Fünf Vorträge Aus Den Jahren 1920-1923 (Berlin: Verlag Von Julius Springer, 1924),
https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783662335895.
7World Health Organization, “Mustard Gas,” Press Archive, 2011, https://www.emro.who.int/press-releases/2011
/mustard-gas.html.
8Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Facts About Sulfur Mustard,” Emergency Preparedness and Response,
page last reviewed April 4, 2018, https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/sulfurmustard/basics/facts.asp.
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psychological reminders of their exposure. First, those that lived through an optical encounter
of mustard gas were at risk of developing permanent blindness after the attack or later on in
life. Chronic respiratory disease and other infections could deteriorate the body and chances of
developing lung cancer increased.9 These physical damages, among the wartime atmosphere and
other ordeals, were bound to generate psychological terror within the psyche of soldiers. The
detrimental impact of seeing scarring on the skin or never being able to see again at all may
have negatively impacted the self-esteem and overall condition of a soldier’s mind. According
to the World Health Organization’s Internationally Peer Reviewed Chemical Safety Information
(INCHEM) division, soldiers exposed to mustard gas during the Great War could experience
apathy issues, mental disturbances, and heightened anxiety. In more chronic cases, all of these
symptoms were said to “persist for some time.”10 While these mental conditions could have
developed due to other gruesome happenings during the war, soldiers in Ypres and other battles
close to the war’s beginning were unprepared for gas attacks, not even being provided a chance to
fight or flee, leaving their minds more susceptible to trauma in these instances.
To the modern mind, a fear of gas attacks is distant and incomprehensible, although a century
ago they were once a nightmarish reality for soldiers in the trenches of European soil. S. J.
M. Auld, a member of the of the British Military Mission to the United States, described the
bewilderment of soldiers who first saw a cloud of mustard gas creeping toward them in his writing,
Gas and Flame in Modern Warfare: “first wonder, then fear; then, as the first fringes of the
cloud enveloped them and left them choking and agonized in the fight for breath—panic.”11
In his writing, Auld continued by describing how soldiers thought to protect themselves from
inhaling the gas in the opening minutes of the first attack. A majority of men buried their heads
in the soil or stuffed handkerchiefs in their mouths but “many of these men were saved by their
presence of mind.”12 The amygdala is known to be the fear processing center of the brain, and,
when stimulated, this almond-shaped panic room sends signals to the prefrontal cortex, or the
decision-making center, to fight or flight. In the first moments of introduction to this new weapon,
the clarity of a soldier’s brain would have saved him from additional damage; however, as the war
continued, the trauma would linger, which may be a root of the anxiety noted by INCHEM.
The strategy of soldiers being gassed needed to be entirely defensive in addition to being
adaptable to any environment. Buried heads in the earth and cloth handkerchiefs, with the help
of British industry, evolved into respiratory masks that could be used in haste to ward off any
gas cloud within a large vicinity. While these masks came with complications in their infancy
of development, their existence alone helped discipline the soldiers in a reactionary way: “For
destructive effects gas must depend on surprise, on poor discipline or on defective appliances.
Consequently, gas casualties are preventable if the solider is trained continually to exercise
vigilance.”13 Yet despite the purpose the masks served in maintaining health and discipline, the
appearance of one mask used by the British army felt like a fault in its design. An excerpt from a
solider, cited by Dennis Winter in his book, Death’s Men, elaborated on that sentiment: “We
gaze[d] at one another like goggle-eyed, imbecile frogs. The mask makes you feel only half a
man. . . . A man doesn’t live on what passes through the filter—he merely exists. He gets the
9Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Sulfur Mustard.”
10Perharic Walton, R. L. Maynard, and V. S. G. Murray, “Mustard Gas,” 9.4.3 Neurological, International Peer Reviewed
Chemical Safety Information, IPCS, September 1996. http://www.inchem.org/documents/pims/chemical/mustardg.htm.
11S. J. M. Auld, Gas and Flame in Modern Warfare (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), chap. I,
http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/gasflamewwi.html.
12Auld, Gas and Flame, chap. I.
13Auld, chap. I.
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mentality of a wide-awake vegetable.”14 Although these defensive measures reduced the number
of causalities directly caused by gas, a solider needing to remain alert at all times trains the brain
to constantly assume a threat is present.
When considering the basic environment of war, there are a plethora of things that could
cause a panic disorder in a solider; however, just by being acutely aware of a gaseous threat at all
times, soldiers could have developed a number of anxieties that could permanently warp the brain.
The fifth edition of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) would
call for a panic disorder diagnosis when one experiences recurrent and unexpected panic attacks,
physical feelings of discomfort like chest pain, sweating, and a pounding heart, and if any attack
has been followed by at least one month of persistent worry or change in behavior.15 These issues
would generally become a concern in the months following the war’s conclusion, because in the
moments of war, the body is only doing what it needs in order to ensure survival.
Effectiveness of the terror that gases caused did not stop at the initial release of the toxins.
The duality of mustard gas was that it was heavier than water as a liquid and heavier than air as a
vapor, meaning it had the ability to corrupt puddles of water and settle in trenches and valleys.
Lancaster, England, native Joe Taylor shared with the Worcester Telegram and Gazette for the
diamond anniversary of the Battle of Somme that: “there were huge shell holes along the Somme
Valley that had been filled with water by rain. Some Canadians tried to escape from the mustard
gas by jumping into the water. But the water was already poisoned.”16 The way the mustard gas
settled in these puddles acted as an unexpected second exposure to the synthetic agent, leaving
soldiers with no escape from the physical or psychological effects of the gas. If gas is all around
them, that begs the question: where, if anywhere, is safe? Many of the Canadian soldiers that
Taylor recalled at Somme could find no answer to the question and were feared for in terms of
their mental health. A number of medical personnel on and around the battlefield worried that
“the psychological effects of gas would lead to further mental problems and perhaps even to shell
shock.”17 Mustard gas was deteriorating soldiers from the outside in—with blisters budding on
the skin and heavy lungs, the soldiers were gaining apathy when they needed optimism most.
Woefully, sulfur mustard was only one half of the deadliest gases that spilled on the Western
Front. More notorious than mustard gas was the gaseous compound nicknamed the “White Star,”
a compound deadlier than the chlorine gas used by Haber and the Germans at Ypres. Where
mustard gas brought terror, phosgene brought it tenfold. Even worse, both of these gases were in
commission at the same time, meaning whatever gas he was dealt, a soldier still needed to be
ready for anything and use logic to discern between the gaseous agents being used.
Origins of phosgene gas were widely attributed to a group of French scientists led by Victor
Grignard, a French scientist most notable for receiving the Nobel Prize in 1912 for his work in
chemistry. Although, at nearly identical times in WWI, Germany deployed a phosgene compound
identical to that of the French, with all signs pointing to Fritz Haber as the mastermind behind the
chemical. The exact root of the gas is no concern when the result is the same: at room temperature
(and enough gas in concentration), phosgene can blister the skin, induce vomiting, create skin
lesions, and provoke irritation within the eyes and throat. Phosgene was a useful offensive tactic
on both sides of the war because of the fluid that would build up in the victim’s lungs after
approximately forty-eight hours. This fluid, foreign to the respiratory system, would leave a
14Denis Winter, Death’s Men: Soldiers in the Great War (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 124.
15American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed. (Washington,
DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013), 209.
16Richard Duckett, “Horror of WWI Still Vivid,” Worcester Telegram and Gazette, 1991.
17Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 1999), ProQuest Ebook Central.
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solider feeling as if he were drowning without being anywhere near water.18 Heart failure and
low blood pressure had the potential of appearing as symptoms as well, and if an exposed soldier
was not dead by two days, he would pray he was. Unlike mustard gas, the long-term physiological
effects of phosgene were less severe; nevertheless, cases of bronchitis and emphysema were
reported.19 It is no surprise that, of the major gases used in World War I, phosgene produced the
most casualties.
Relying heavily on wind patterns to accurately spread the gas, phosgene could reach more
places and push soldiers out of their trench sanctuaries. Unlike mustard gas’s density, phosgene
was not dense enough to settle in trenches nor did it stick as easily to clothing. Instead, the force
was in the gas’s initial release and the lethal entity it became when mixed with chlorine. Phosgene
worked as a trickster, giving soldiers brief peace at initial exposure compared to mustard gas but
leaving them dead in infirmaries or trenches after choking on the fluid that overwhelmed their
lungs hours later. A Higher Form of Killing by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman mentioned the
pleasant feelings that some soldiers felt after a phosgene exposure: “A victim who has just inhaled
a lethal dose at first feels nothing more than a mild irritation of the eyes and throat that quickly
passes off; for up to two days afterwards a man might actually feel mildly euphoric. Throughout
this period his lungs are filling with liquid.”20 Phosgene created a maleficent paradox in which
each breath that maintained life, in turn, contributed to one’s death.
At the Battle of Somme, British soldiers died by the hundreds, and bodies became too
numerous for individual burial. Here, stories were shared of army generals being in relatively
perfect health, then dying less than twenty-four hours later. The way soldiers and their leaders
turned on a dime in less than a span of hours left the living in a state of confusion: “men [were]
caught unaware, panicking, and spreading the terror and confusion that enabled the gas to do its
work.”21 But how could soldiers remain calm? A force once unknown to them soon became the
center of combat in a war half of the combatants were too young to fight. No training could have
prepared their minds or bodies for the horrors of synthetic agents, especially the unsuspecting
terror found within phosgene and chlorine as a devilish duo.
Psychologically, soldiers in the Great War were experiencing hardships undealt with up to this
point in the recorded history of human warfare. The spontaneity of gas attacks overstimulated the
amygdala and prefrontal cortex, keeping men on edge despite the alternative wear these attacks
had on their morale to fight. The mind of the soldier hung in a balance of willingness to fight for
one’s country and wanting to die for one’s peace, and the architect of gas warfare anticipated
this breakdown at the beginning of the war. Master Mind by Daniel Charles examines the life,
chemical genius, and downfall of Fritz Haber and, most importantly, highlights his deviousness
behind crippling the spirit of soldiers:
[Y]et soldiers seemed more terrified of gas than bullets; perhaps they’d come to
accept the gunfire as an inevitable part of war’s grim lottery. Facing flying steel went
hand in hand with bravery, heroism, and manliness. Gas allowed for none of that. It
turned a soldier’s instincts upside down.22
18Winchester Hospital, “Phosgene Exposure,” Health Library, accessed March 30, 2021, https://www.winchester
hospital.org/health-library/article?id=965339.
19Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Facts About Phosgene,” Emergency Preparedness and Response, page
last reviewed April 4, 2018, https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/phosgene/basics/facts.asp.
20Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological
Warfare (New York: Random House, 2002), 20.
21Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 26.
22Daniel Charles, Master Mind: The Rise and Fall of Fritz Haber, the Nobel Laureate Who Launched the Age of
Chemical Warfare (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 171.

Chemical Warfare in WWI

53

Depletion of esteem seen with mustard gas and phosgene may be a contributing factor for the
push of awareness and education of soldiers regarding all elements of the war.
Although, preparations alone could barely save these men, as fear was now rooted in every
breath they took. No soldier was safe from the panic, not even the ones chosen by destiny. A
German soldier was exposed to mustard gas near the French community of Marcoing that left him
temporarily blinded. The fear that this affliction caused built a sense of empathy with him, one
that would last as he played a leading role in the Second World War. Adolf Hitler, a symbol of
terror himself, was so frightened by his brief blindness that he did not allow his armies to use the
same gases on his enemies once used on him decades earlier.23 Irony appears to have meddled in
many affairs related to the Great War.
A similar irony lies within the question of whether or not WWI was a total wear, meaning that
everyone and everything was given to support the war effort. The relevancy of this answer is in
the minds of the soldiers, who at one point, disconnected themselves from what was going on
around them. Disassociation is a trauma response that one can experience during or in the course
of a traumatic event. Symptoms of dissociative disorders, as characterized by the DSM-5, include
memory issues, feelings of warped reality and sense of self, and difficulty in remembering one’s
identity. With this, a person can start becoming unaware of consequences to the body, much like
Fritz Meese describes in an account of life in the trenches: “life here isn’t worth a damn, one
thinks nothing of losing it.”24 In a situation where a person cannot adjust to his surroundings
before they change again, disassociation is a defense strategy of the individual soldier to remain
distant from the war despite his obvious proximity. History and science alike prove that human
nature has adapted over millennia; yet the synthetic weapons of WWI allowed soldiers mere
seconds to learn the mechanisms needed for their survival. Of course, this knowledge came at the
price of souls that tried to protect their lungs seconds too late.
An instance of detachment in a solider that was exposed to phosgene is documented from the
Battle of Messines. Here, in the summer of 1917, gunner William Pressey of the Royal Artillery
awoke to a German gas attack on his quarters. The roof caved in; although, he was saved in time
and given a mask to subdue some of the effects caused by phosgene. Unfortunately, he still inhaled
enough that he had to be taken to the infirmary, where he slipped in and out of consciousness
for some time. There is a dissociative element in the tone of his letter, one that suggests he’s
describing a story he witnessed rather than experienced. Aside from the passage: “I was always
surprised when I found myself awake, for I felt sure that I would die in my sleep,” there is little
emotion described in this event. Based entirely on context, the author of this passage describes
an event he experienced and offers nothing more—a robotic way of describing a near-death
experience. Is there a man left within those pages?
The soldiers lost, physically and mentally, to poisonous gases like phosgene were brothers,
friends, and husbands. They were men once walking the world suddenly stripped of it entirely,
though the dead had more peace than the living. Honest accounts of soldiers from a variety
of battles hold no reserve in sharing the gruesomeness of battle and what those moments did
to accelerate the gut-wrenching feelings in their minds. One of these accounts comes from
Lieutenant Henry Desagneaux, a member of the French Second Infantry Regiment at the Battle
of Verdun. Desagneaux describes that he is stuck in a hole along with two other men from his
infantry while they cover themselves from a total bombardment by the German offensive: “numb
23History.com, “British Solider Allegedly Spares the Life of an Injured Adolf Hitler,” last updated September 25,
2020, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/british-soldier-allegedly-spares-the-life-of-an-injured-adolf-hitler.
24Jon E. Lewis, A Brief History of World War I: Eyewitness Accounts of the Great War (Philadelphia: Running Press
Books, 2014), 69.
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and dazed, without saying a word, and with our hearts pounding, we await the gas shell that will
destroy us.”25 Accounts like these are not limited to one soldier in one battle. It is easy to forget
the minuscule details of such a large-scale war, as the small details make the big picture. Each
soldier was fighting against fate, either losing his battle or living long enough to wish he did. The
experiences of these men are individual interpretations; yet there are too many accounts of them
making similar psychological connections to the events and near godless weaponry they were
experiencing.
Drawing connections to the bewilderment described by S. J. M Auld in Gas and Flame, a
similar sense of speechlessness can be found in an account by Anthony R. Hossack of the Queen
Victoria Rifles. Hossack describes a personal account of the First Battle of Ypres, in which he
and his fellow soldiers witness a large group of French African soldiers shredding materials off
their backs in order to run faster from a terror still unseen. Like out of a twenty-first-century
horror movie, one of the Zouave soldiers falls to the feet of Hossack’s officer. Holding his
revolver, the officer shouts: “What’s the matter, you bloody lot of cowards?” Upon turning
the body over, Hossack describes that the soldier was “frothing at the mouth, his eyes started
from their sockets.”26 The National Institute for the Clinical Application of Behavior Medicine
(NICABM) considers memory and trauma to be connected in four different ways: semantic,
episodic, emotional, and procedural memory.27 From this group, episodic and emotional memory
are the most relevant when considering WWI soldiers and their recollections of gaseous attacks
upon their comrades or other combatants. Episodic memory is the individual experience one has
with an event and all of the details they remember about that experience including who, what,
and where. According to NICABM, episodic memory is reliant on the hippocampus. This lobe,
fixed deep within the center of the brain, is responsible for creating and recalling memories.
In a study published by the US National Library of Medicine’s National Institutes of Health,
the hippocampus is the center of the brain prone to developing psychological disorders like
schizophrenia; however, the study also notes that post-traumatic stress disorders can also be
attributed to “hippocampal atrophy.”28
On the other hand, emotional memory is controlled by the amygdala. Another component in
the dissection of psychological ailments in soldiers comes from the emotions that they associate
with events. In the case of Hassock and the officer, both emotional and episodic memory link
their trauma to the sight of the wounded Zouave soldier. If either man lived post-WWI, any time
they saw a man struggling for air or with reddened eyes, they have the potential of thinking back
on that moment and reliving those exact emotions—all as if they were living the war experience
for the first time.
Alternatively, one could argue that traumatic memories could increase the chances of survival.
In the book Memory, War, and Trauma, Nigel Hunt proposes that a traumatic memory could be a
positive element of evolution—that if someone lives through war and has trauma after, given the
same instance, that person should have a better chance of survival if he does everything as he did
before. Yet, at what point is physiological preservation more important than psychological? At
what point is too far in terms of offering the psyche to save the body? Shell shock was a term
used for many ailments felt by soldiers during the war, although in more modern settings it is
more commonly attributed to just describing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Though war
25Lewis, Brief History, 218.
26Lewis, 90.
27National Institute for the Clinical Application of Behavioral Medicine, “How Trauma Impacts Four Different Types
of Memory,” 2017, https://www.naadac.org/assets/2416/2019NWRC_ Michael_Bricker_Handout4.pdf.
28Kuljeet Singh Anand and Vikas Dhikav, “Hippocampus in Health and Disease: An Overview,” Annals of Indian
Academy of Neurology 15, no. 4 (2012): 239-246, https://www.annalsofian.org/text.asp?2012/15/4/239/104323.
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trauma could be connected to PTSD, they are not entirely synonymous. War trauma only crosses
into a medical diagnosis of PTSD when the events of the traumatic past begin to affect the social
or domestic functioning of the patient. Though no documentation is tied to his whereabouts after
the breakdown, Arthur Osborne, a soldier in the British army, details the loss of his officer to
shell shock:
It was a case of complete loss of nerve and self-control. Driven mad with terror,
slobbering and moaning, he clawed and scrabbled violently in the mud, his head
under the chair. It was like a terrified and overrun fox going to ground, trying to
dig his way back to safety through the very bowels of this Earth. His behavior was
simply less than human. Extreme terror had driven him back through a thousand
generations to some pre-human form of life.29
Based on the description above, one could ascribe the beginnings of PTSD to the symptoms of this
sergeant; however, there is no indication that the officer even survived, let alone if he experienced
these symptoms outside of the war. There is no way to consider which event dismantled his mind:
the effects gas, rapid-fire bullets, or becoming so accustomed to death that it felt like second
nature. The instance is an important one to note, however, because as one man is lost within
himself and the horrors of war, another is desensitized to all of it.
Painstakingly so, there were soldiers who did not realize the value and potential their lives
still had until it was too late. Confirmation of this revival of life can be accredited to the journal
of Arthur Lapointe of the 22nd French-Canadian Battalion. In his words, preserved now for the
remembrance of the horrors of war, Lapointe describes zero hour at Passchendale in the summer
of 1917. Through inconsolable fear, Lapointe wrote: “Yesterday, I believed I could die with
something approaching indifference. Now I am aware of intense desire to live. I would give
anything to know beyond doubt that I had even two whole days ahead of me.”30 The horror of
living second-by-second, entirely unsure of one’s fate, is enough to create an incredible amount
of stress in the brain that has the potential of permanent deterioration. A study conducted by
the Canadian Academy of Geriatric Psychiatry suggests that chronic stress can lead to a later
development of neuropsychiatric disorders like depression and dementia.31 Of course these
ailments would arise post-war or further in the span of one’s life, so a solider unfortunate enough
to experience these neurological illnesses was somehow lucky enough to survive one of the most
gruesome afflictions in modern world history.
Whether the scars of survival are attributed to luck or another otherworldly force, the same
cannot be said of the gaseous agents that were created by Fritz Haber to aid the German war effort.
The brutalities the men of the Great War faced are some of the most complex, horrendous acts
of man. Tom Cook cites in his book, No Place to Run, that the New York Herald for some time
after the war was filled with columnists expressing their fears of more dangerous gases being
produced to succeed phosgene and mustard gas. One of these columnists proclaimed: “if this be
a chemist’s idea of humane warfare, God deliver the world from chemists.”32 Numerous groups
and individuals were in a similar state of opposition after the conclusion of the war. Government
officials from every country within the Alliance combined forces to ensure that the use of chemical
agents such as sulfur mustard and phosgene were never again used to the inhumane degree seen
in World War I.
29Lewis, Brief History, 383.
30Lewis, 383.
31Linda Mah, Clauida Szabuniewicz, and Alexandra J. Fiocco, “Can Anxiety Damage the Brain?” Current Opinion in
Psychiatry 29, no. 1 (January 2016): 56-63.
32Cook, No Place to Run.
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Activism against the use of gas started on a political level a year after the conclusion of the
war. The United States, inspired by the Treaty of Versailles that forbid German production and
importation of gases, implemented similar language restrictions in the Washington Disarmament
Conference of 1922. This conference aimed to limit the use of submarine warfare and noxious
gases in warfare. The United States’ Senate gave consent for the ratification of the treaty;
however, a dissenting vote was never given, so it never entered into force for the United States
or France. Little movement was made after this disarmament attempt by the United States until
the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms. Here,
the United States suggested forbidding the exportation of gaseous weapons, while France and
Poland suggested creating a protocol banning poisonous gas use and bacteriological weapons,
respectively. This Swiss town, a quarter into the twentieth century, marked the banishment of
poisonous gases in warfare. While the treaties before it contained language similar to what the
final protocol document presented, those treaties did not forbid bacteriological weapons or have
the ability of international ratification.
In total, there are a few key reasons to ban chemical weapons in war. First are the tactical
considerations for gas in warfare, and considering how uncontrollable gas is once released, there
could be instances when the gas worked counterproductively. An example of this could be the
movement of phosgene, which depends on the air to spread the gas; therefore, a change in the
predicted wind pattern could harm the offense rather than the target, resulting in a greater number
of casualties. Additionally, a large quantity of gas needs to be deployed in order to be effective in
terms of those impaired by the gas and killed. Haber’s theories about the gaseous agents being
used in mass quantities were supported through the lack of fatalities at the attack of Ypres. Gas
on a large scale ended up harming civilians and innocent bystanders, which became an issue of
ethics on top of mass attacks being expensive and hard to orchestrate.
Largely, some sections of the protocol suggest that the use of gas warfare is unethical on
participants. John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, stated during
a report in 1922 that “chemical warfare should be abolished among nations, as abhorrent to
civilization. It is a cruel, unfair, and improper use of science. It is fraught with the gravest
danger to noncombatants and demoralizes the better instincts of humanity.”33 This widespread
belief that gas warfare was unethical may have been the influence for the Geneva Protocol, as
government officials felt responsible for presenting change to the public against this unnecessary
danger. The protocol itself addresses this worldwide distaste by society: “Whereas the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices,
has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world. . . .”34 This willingness
to address the violence on combatants shows a surface-level sympathy toward those that were
injured—psychologically and physiologically—by gas warfare.
Although accountability was taken indirectly by foreign states and their governments, there
was no unified agreement to the conditions of controlling gas warfare post-WWI. The Geneva
Protocol was the only agreement that ever came close, and while France and other European
nations were quick to ratify, the United States had no intentions of doing so. The protocol passed
with ease through the landscape where the gas spread; yet the reality of the dangers had not
scarred the United States into agreement, leaving the protocol abandoned by the Senate.35
33Christopher A. Warren, “Gas, Gas, Gas! The Debate over Chemical Warfare Between the World Wars,” Federal
History 4 (January 2012): 44-60.
34Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva,
June 17, 1925, https://fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/text/geneva1.htm.
35Warren, “Gas, Gas, Gas!”
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Regarding the influence and action of the 1925 Geneva Convention, other historians believe
that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was not implemented because of the soldiers, but rather that it was
done just to satisfy the public rage. This theory could be hypothesized because of the actions
of the United States, as the nation did not ratify the protocol or the later revisions until 1975.
However, the response to the convention for the majority of the European sovereignties was
positive despite discrepancies. Modern hindsight is more concerned with the mental health of
soldiers than ever, and shell shock is a term of the past with the discoveries and stigmatization of
post-traumatic stress disorder.
Ultimately, Haber’s 180-degree turn from crop hero to mad scientist left the ethics of the
political, civil, and militarized world in a cloud of yellow. As some soldiers succumbed to the
physical illness of chemical gas, others were morphed into shells of their former selves, locked
away in inescapable nightmares. The conclusion of the war brought little peace; however, it did
initiate the taboo conversation of gas warfare on a global level. Influenced by the outraged public,
nations came together in numerous attempts to agree on dissolving the use of gas from future
wars. Of the three attempts, the 1925 Geneva Protocol was the only agreement remotely close to
success. Although several world powers held reservations for swift ratification, the governments
of the tarnished land where gas walked wasted no time in declaring their distaste for chemical
warfare. May the scars over Ypres and the rest of Europe remind humanity of the unfortunate
harm we are capable of causing one another, so history does not shake its head, again, in shame.

58
R
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 5th
ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013.
Anand, Kuljeet Singh and Vikas Dhikav. “Hippocampus in Health and Disease: An Overview.” Annals of Indian Academy of Neurology 15, no. 4 (2012): 239-246. https://www.annalsofian.org/
text.asp?2012/15/4/239/104323.
Auld, S. J. M. Gas and Flame in Modern Warfare. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918.
http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/gasflamewwi.html.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Facts About Phosgene.” Emergency Preparedness
and Response. Page last reviewed April 4, 2018. https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/phosgene/
basics/facts.asp.
———. “Facts About Sulfur Mustard.” Emergency Preparedness and Response. Page last
reviewed April 4, 2018. https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/sulfurmustard/basics/facts.asp.
Charles, Daniel. Master Mind: The Rise and Fall of Fritz Haber, the Nobel Laureate Who
Launched the Age of Chemical Warfare. New York: HarperCollins, 2005.
Cook, Tim. No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War.
Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999. ProQuest Ebook Central.
Duckett, Richard. “Horror of WWI Still Vivid.” Worcester Telegram and Gazette, 1991.
Goran, Morris. The Story of Fritz Haber. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967.
Greatwar.co.uk. “A History of Ypres (Ieper): A Fortified City.” A Guide to the Western
Front WW1 Battlefields and History of the First World War. Accessed March 29, 2021.
http://www.greatwar.co.uk/ypres-salient/town-ieper-history-fortified.htm.
———. “A History of Ypres (Ieper): Origins.” A Guide to the Western Front WW1 Battlefields and
History of the First World War. Accessed March 29, 2021. http://www.greatwar.co.uk/ypressalient/town-ieper-history.htm.
Haber, Fritz. Fünf Vorträge Aus Den Jahren 1920-1923. Berlin: Verlag Von Julius Springer,
1924. https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783662335895.
Harris, Robert and Jeremy Paxman. A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical
and Biological Warfare. New York: Random House, 2002.
History.com. “British Solider Allegedly Spares the Life of an Injured Adolf Hitler.” Last updated
September 25, 2020. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/british-soldier-allegedlyspares-the-life-of-an-injured-adolf-hitler.
King, Gilbert. “Fritz Haber’s Experiments in Life and Death.” Smithsonian Magazine, June 6,
2012. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/fritz-habers-experiments-in-life-and-death114161301/.
Lewis, Jon. E. A Brief History of World War I: Eyewitness Accounts of the Great War. Philadelphia:
Running Press Books, 2014.
Mah, Linda, Clauida Szabuniewicz, and Alexandra J. Fiocco. “Can Anxiety Damage the Brain?”
Current Opinion in Psychiatry 29, no. 1 (January 2016): 56-63.
National Institute for the Clinical Application of Behavioral Medicine. “How Trauma Impacts
Four Different Types of Memory,” 2017. https://www.naadac.org/assets/2416/2019NWRC_
Michael_Bricker_Handout4.pdf.
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare. Geneva, June 17, 1925. https://fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/text/geneva1.htm.

Chemical Warfare in WWI

59

Walton, Perharic, R. L. Maynard, and V. S. G. Murray. “Mustard Gas.” 9.4.3 Neurological. International Peer Reviewed Chemical Safety Information. IPCS, September 1996.
http://www.inchem.org/documents/pims/chemical/mustardg.htm.
Warren, Christopher A. “Gas, Gas, Gas! The Debate over Chemical Warfare Between the World
Wars.” Federal History 4 (January 2012): 44-60.
Winchester Hospital. “Phosgene Exposure.” Health Library. Accessed March 30, 2021.
https://www.winchesterhospital.org/health-library/article?id=965339.
Winter, Denis. Death’s Men: Soldiers in the Great War. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.
World Health Organization. “Mustard Gas.” Press Archive, 2011. https://www.emro.who.int/pressreleases/2011/mustard-gas.html.

West Virginia University Historical Review Vol. 2, Maxwell Prize Winner, 2021

Lincoln and the Copperheads: The War for the North
A NT HONY K E LLAR
This work focuses on the role that Peace Democrats, also known as “Copperheads,” played in Northern dissent during the
Civil War. This is done by analyzing public newspapers and journals from the time period that reveal the strategies used
by the Copperheads to undermine the war effort in the North. It also compares the works of other notable historians, in
particular Jennifer Weber and Mark Neely, to help determine how effective the Copperheads were in threatening Lincoln’s
efforts to hold the Union together.

The Civil War is most commonly remembered as the time in American history when fellow
countrymen took up arms against each other. “Brother against brother” is typically the way I
hear it most often described. Abraham Lincoln was greeted with the task of reunifying a broken
country, a task that no one would envy. Those remembered as the greatest opponents that stood in
the way of him accomplishing this task are typically notorious Confederates: Jefferson Davis,
Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and so on. However, Lincoln had another great opponent
that threatened his goal of winning the war and restoring the Union, but this opponent hailed
from the North. The Peace Democrats, also known as “Copperheads,” proved to be one of
Lincoln’s greatest threats during the war and undoubtedly his greatest threat in the Union. These
Copperheads have aptly been described by Lincoln as the “fire in the rear” that undermined his
war effort.1 The Copperheads used antiwar, anti-Lincoln, and nearly treasonous rhetoric to create
social unrest and distrust of the government in certain regions of the Union. Also, their peace
platform had gained a considerable amount of steam in 1864 and gave the Democratic Party
significant momentum heading into the presidential election.
The conversation surrounding the very complicated topic of Northern dissent generally
produces two different schools of thought. Historians opposed to my assertion that Copperheads
were a viable threat to the Union would argue that the peace wing of the Democratic Party
was little more than a loud minority. Mark E. Neely Jr. argues that the actual power of the
Copperheads was greatly exaggerated through “Republican fear-mongering and partly through
Democratic missteps and misjudgments.”2 Others, such as Richard O. Curry, believe that the
term “Copperhead” was used as a political strategy by Lincoln’s followers to “cast doubt upon the
loyalty of Democrats who opposed the war policies of the Lincoln Administration” and views
the term as a “blanket indictment” of all Northern Democrats.3 Essentially what these scholars
are arguing is that the Democratic Party should be viewed as Lincoln’s loyal opposition, not
a subversive entity that threatened the state of the Union. While I do not disagree that most
Democrats were loyal, the party certainly gave strength to the Peace Democrats. I also believe
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that their peace platform had enough support and momentum at one point in 1864 that Lincoln’s
reelection seemed in jeopardy. This, combined with their willingness to encourage disorder and
obstruction by the American public, is enough to consider the Copperheads a viable threat during
the Civil War.
Before I can discuss their strategies and impact on the Union during the war, it is important to
define what it actually meant to be a Copperhead. The term “Copperhead” was used to describe
those affiliated with or in support of the peace wing of the Democratic Party. These Peace
Democrats ardently opposed the war and demanded that the Union reach a peace settlement
with the Confederacy, regardless of whether the Confederates rejoined the Union. The historical
representation of the Copperheads is often steeped in white supremacy and conspiracies about
secret societies that sought to overthrow the federal government. These aspects, while certainly
interesting, are not relevant to evaluating the threat the Copperheads posed to Lincoln. What
is relevant about these Copperheads is the impact they had on the public image of the war
and Lincoln’s administration, as well as the strides they made politically in 1864. They were
undoubtedly Lincoln’s harshest critics in the press, and they were easily the most outspoken faction
of their party. When it came to Lincoln and the war effort, Copperhead rhetoric consistently toed
the line of treason.
The first thing to consider when discussing the Copperheads is the rhetoric with which they
described Lincoln, the federal government, and the war in general. The most popular Copperhead
talking point was to accuse Lincoln of being a tyrant who abused and expanded the power of the
federal government. More specifically, they believed that Lincoln betrayed the principles set forth
in the Constitution by suspending habeas corpus in the northern states and using the military to
intrude on the sovereignty of state governments. The following excerpt from The Old Guard is a
great example of the Copperheads’ attitude toward Lincoln:
There is not a single northern State in which Mr. Lincoln may not be arrested and
tried for treason; for having overthrown the Constitution and laws of the State by
military power. His whole system of provost marshals and military commissions,
backed by armed force in these otherwise peaceful States, is an overthrow of the
government of these States. It is an accomplished war upon the sovereignty of those
States; just as much so as if the same crime were committed by Great Britain or
France.4
Another important position held by the Copperheads was that the war was being fought for the
advancement of African Americans and not the reunification of the states. They placed the blame
for the war squarely on the shoulders of abolitionists. This is indicated in the Age, a popular
Copperhead newspaper in Philadelphia: “[The United States] had lived in peace and prosperity,
aye, such prosperity as the world had never seen, until the spoiler of Abolitionism entered our
Eden and drove us from it.”5 Besides accusing Lincoln’s administration of being tyrannical and
corrupt, publications that were either sympathetic to or controlled by Copperheads never shied
away from attacking what they believed to be Lincoln’s true motivations for the war. Newspapers
such as the Metropolitan Record, which was the official Catholic newspaper in New York City
during the time period, not only insinuated that Lincoln was determined to slowly strip the
American public of its constitutional rights, but they also accused Lincoln of wanting to establish
4“Difference Between Government and Administration,” in The Old Guard: A Monthly Journal Devoted to the
Principles of 1776 and 1787, vol. 3, by Thomas Dunn English and Chauncey Burr (New York: Van Evrie, Horton Co.,
1865).
5Age (Philadelphia), August 5, 1864.
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a dictatorial regime that elevated and valued former slaves above working-class whites. This is
evident in an excerpt from an article titled “What the War is Carried on For”:
For the furtherance of Abolition designs...For the overthrow of the State sovereignty,
and the consolidation and conversion of the Republic into a military empire...For
the criminal purpose of emancipating over three millions of slaves and placing them
in a social condition...For the impoverishment of the laboring classes, and the final
overthrow of universal suffrage by military force.6
The reason this type of rhetoric is significant is because it led to many Northerners to distrust
their government and the Republican Party in general. What’s more, it caused them to question
the very motives behind the war. However, the most dangerous effect Copperhead publications
had on the state of the American public was the incitement of violence. To find evidence of this,
one need only look to the New York City Draft Riots of 1863 and the Toledo Riot of 1862.
When evaluating the severity of the threat the Copperheads posed to the Union’s war effort,
one of the most significant aspects to consider was their ability to incite civil unrest among
American citizens. The New York City Draft Riots that occurred in the summer of 1863 are
a clear example of how the Copperheads encouraged violence against the government. Many
historians would argue that pre-existing factors such as the socio-economic status of draftees as
poor white laborers and their aggressively racist attitude toward blacks were the most significant
causes of the violent response to the draft. It is perfectly valid to acknowledge that poor whites
would be very resentful of a government that would force them into service to fight for those that
they not only believed to be inferior, but also feared having to compete against for work should
they be freed. However, while it is reasonable to believe that these factors were the wood to the
fire in New York City, there is no denying that Copperhead rhetoric acted as an accelerant. New
Jersey congressman Chauncey Burr, a proud Peace Democrat, made a speech just days prior to
the draft where he stated the following:
The act is very simple - it is merely a highwayman’s call on every American citizen
for $300. . . . Leave no means to avoid compliance. . . . They say we live by the
clemency of the Government. Why, it is by your clemency that Abe Lincoln and all
his satraps were not upon the gallows eighteen months ago.7
Not only is Burr attempting to paint the government as an oppressive force, but he is suggesting that
Lincoln and his administration are at the mercy of the American people’s inaction. What’s more,
referencing Lincoln and the gallows is a serious implication of violence toward the government.
What is significant about these riots is that they not only led to Lincoln having to divert
troops from the war effort, but they also indicated that the Copperheads knew just how to take the
racial tension and frustration of the lower classes and target it at the Republicans. Jennifer Weber
supports this assertion in her book, Copperheads. Weber states:
The peace wing’s opposition to the administration damaged the army’s ability to
prosecute the conflict efficiently. Dissidents’ resistance to conscription and their
encouragement of less ideologically minded Americans to dodge the draft or to
desert the army forced the military to divide its attention and at times to send troops
home to keep order there.8
6“What the War is Carried on For,” Metropolitan Record, May 2, 1868.
7Barnet Schecter, The Devil’s Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to Reconstruct America (New
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University Press, 2006), 2.
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The riots that took place in New York City resulted in roughly 120 deaths, and military forces
would have to intervene to quell them. Unfortunately, the events that took place in New York
City during the summer of 1863 were not an isolated incident. Just a year prior, a riot on a much
smaller scale took place in Toledo, Ohio. Just like in New York, the Copperheads were able to
take advantage of racial tensions of the lower classes and manipulate them into taking extreme
measures.
Much like in New York, it can be argued that the most significant factors for the Toledo Riot
were racial tensions and labor strikes. While these factors certainly contributed to the violence
that eventually broke out, it is also true that Democratic newspapers enflamed tensions with
exaggerated claims of blacks taking jobs from white laborers in droves. What’s more, a local
Copperhead newspaper, the West Union Democrat, reacted to these labor disputes by blaming
the Republicans’ agenda of abolition: “Better far for the negro that he had remained a slave, and
better far for the whites of the unhappy North that every Abolitionist had been hung years ago.
Truly, the signs of the times are of ominous evil.”9 Two days after this was published, a race riot
between black and white laborers broke out in Toledo. Once again, there is a reference of hanging
abolitionists being used in Copperhead rhetoric. However, I believe the last statement, where the
editor states there is an “ominous evil,” is the more significant example of how the Copperheads
manipulated people into taking extreme measures. The “ominous evil” refers to the current state
of the Union under Lincoln. By depicting Lincoln and the Republicans as a force of evil, this
type of rhetoric was attempting to get Democratic citizens to view abolitionists as enemies of
the state, rather than just those with a different political ideology. With this in mind, I believe it
is reasonable to conclude that these Copperhead talking points contributed to racial hostilities,
political obstructionism, and violent outbursts, such as the riots that occurred in both New York
and Toledo.
While their rhetoric could be dangerous in its encouragement of obstruction by the American
people, attempts to silence the Copperheads would inadvertently strengthen their cause. In 1863,
General Ambrose Burnside issued General Order 38, which made it illegal to criticize the war
within the Department of the Ohio. The order stated:
Hereafter all persons found within our lines who commit acts for the benefit of the
enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer
death. . . . Persons committing such offences will be at once arrested, with a view to
being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends.10
Clement Vallandigham, perhaps the most notorious Copperhead of the Civil War, would be
arrested as a result of this order. In a speech he made at Mount Vernon, Ohio, Vallandigham
publicly accused the federal government of fighting for “the liberation of the blacks and the
enslavement of the whites.”11 The next morning, Vallandigham was arrested by a company of
soldiers and taken to Cincinnati where he was put on trial. Unknowingly, Ambrose Burnside was
creating a martyr in Vallandigham.
Vallandigham’s arrest raised serious questions about the constitutionality of Lincoln’s
wartime policies, and it ultimately vindicated the Copperheads in their accusations against his
administration. Conservative voters, even if they did not identify with the politics of the Peace
Democrats, were alarmed at the government’s refusal to recognize Vallandigham’s right to free
speech. Because of this, the Copperheads were able to champion the cause of individual rights
9West Union Democrat, June 6, 1862.
10George Henry Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911), 159.
11Porter, Ohio Politics, 161.
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and civil liberties. This is significant because it not only damaged the public’s view of Lincoln’s
administration, but it enhanced the status of Vallandigham within the Democratic Party. Mark
E. Neely Jr. points out that Vallandigham’s main reason for being nominated for governor of
Ohio in 1863 was because of what he represented as a victim of government oppression: “He had
peace credentials. . . but that is not why he was nominated for governor. He gained the nomination
because Democrats across the whole nation saw him as a martyr to liberty.”12 His nomination for
governor meant that the Copperheads were becoming more significant within their own party.
However, it was only the beginning of their political momentum. In 1864, the peace platform of
the Copperheads started to pick up steam.
The times when the Copperheads were the greatest threat to Lincoln most often followed
military failures. The popularity of the Peace Democrats hinged on the direction of the war.
When Sherman had made his March to the Sea and burned straight through the South in 1864,
the Copperhead movement had been crippled. However, in the years prior, significant military
defeats caused the public’s support for Lincoln and the Republicans to wane. Many who had
enthusiastically supported the war began to question the worthiness of its cause. Because of this,
Copperhead claims of radical abolitionism being the primary motivation behind the war began to
carry more weight. What’s more, their “peace at any cost” stance on the war became much more
widely accepted. Weber explains this effectively in Copperheads:
Confronted by Union armies that seemed to have stalled on all fronts and by
casualties that stagger the imagination—sixty thousand in six weeks from Grant’s
army alone—thousands of Northerners were clamoring for peace. The Copperheads,
with their antiwar stance and harsh criticisms of the president, offered an appealing
alternative to Lincoln’s stubborn determination to stay the course.13
While the strength of the Copperheads was tied directly to the failures of the war, the same can
be said of Lincoln’s popularity in relation to the war’s successes. This was evident to Lincoln,
who was quoted as saying, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events
have controlled me.”14 The reason this is significant is because it shows that Lincoln realized the
American public was distressed by the lack of progress in the war. Because of this, it is reasonable
to conclude that Lincoln recognized that the peace platform of the Democrats represented a
legitimate threat to his reelection in 1864. Something else that is important to remember is that
the morale of the public can contribute to the actual war effort itself. If support for the war is low,
then it is likely that morale will drop among soldiers. What’s more, an army is largely dependent
on the public for mobilization in terms of supplying food, weapons, ammunition, and other
necessities that ensure the functionality of the army. So the Copperheads not only threatened
Lincoln’s chances for reelection due to their peace platform, but they also threatened the very war
effort itself by damaging citizen morale through their degradation of the abolitionist motivations
that contributed to the war.
The idea that abolitionism was the greatest motivation behind the war rather than restoring
the Union became a legitimate issue among the public. As conflicts costing the lives of thousands
of Union soldiers at a time began to pile up, there was a growing restlessness to end the war.
Although many were still hopeful that the Union could be restored, the pursuit of the abolition
of slavery was not something that was a priority for many pro-war voters. After a bloody battle
12Neely, Lincoln and the Democrats, 148.
13Weber, Copperheads, 8.
14Roy P. Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 7 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
1953), 281-282.
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fought at Spotsylvania saw a death toll of roughly 6,800 for the Army of the Potomac in May
of 1864, the Chicago Times urged the Union to seek peace on the terms of the Crittenden
Compromise. The Crittenden Plan was a proposal from Kentucky senator John J. Crittenden
that sought to establish slavery as a constitutional amendment and to make it unconstitutional
for future Congresses to abolish slavery. This plan was proposed as a possible resolution to the
secession crisis in 1861, but the compromise ultimately failed. The Chicago Times calling for
peace on these terms raised the issue of Unionists versus abolitionists. The newspaper declared
that any Northerners unwilling to take this proposal seriously were not true Unionists. Rather, it
referred to them as being “Garrison and Whiting Unionists,” who were known abolitionists. The
editor then concluded that these “Garrison and Whiting Unionists” were not most concerned with
restoring the Union and that their “‘loyalty’ [was] not to the Union but to the theories of these
men.”15
Although the majority of Northerners had opposed the South’s secession from the Union and
was in favor of fighting to restore it, there were clearly varying stances on the issue of abolition.
Even those who were not ardently opposed to the idea of abolition began to worry that Lincoln
and the Republicans were blinded in their pursuit of it. This was especially true during periods
when the Union armies were suffering humiliating defeats or lacked in making progress to end the
war. For the Copperheads, their accusations against Lincoln that his greatest motivation behind
the war was abolition seemed to be proven true in the eyes of many Democrats. This quote from
Sabin Hough reflects a view on the war that was being more widely accepted in the party: “This
war is murder, and nothing else. Every man who gives a dollar or moves his finger to aid is an
aider and abettor of murder.”16
While it might be expected that an opposition party would question Lincoln’s motivations
behind the war and his ability to restore the Union, there is some historical evidence that suggests
there were Republicans who had lost faith in Lincoln’s administration. One Republican leader
that had his doubts about Lincoln’s leadership was Salmon P. Chase, Lincoln’s Secretary of the
Treasury. Chase once expressed his concerns in a letter he wrote to his son-in-law: “I think a
man of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years.”17
Ironically, there would be rumblings within the party to urge Chase’s nomination for president.
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, wrote, “There are indications that Chase intends to press
his pretensions as a candidate and much of the Treasury machinery and special agencies have that
end in view.”18
Although a nomination for Chase never materialized, this was not the only example of
Republicans pushing for a different presidential candidate. In May of 1864, a group of Radical
Republicans had organized in Cleveland to nominate General John C. Fremont for president.
Although Fremont would drop out of the presidential race in September, he did represent a
growing split within the Republican Party. As he announced his withdrawal, Fremont stated,
“In respect to Mr. Lincoln I continue to hold exactly the sentiments contained in my letter of
acceptance. I consider that his Administration has been politically, militarily, and financially a
failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret for the country.”19 For there to
be Republicans, especially those working within his own cabinet, who were doubting Lincoln’s
15Chicago Times, May 17, 1864, quoted in Weber, Copperheads.
16Sabin Hough to Thomas H. Seymour, May 15, 1864, Thomas H. Seymour Papers, box 7, folder 5, quoted in Weber,
Copperheads.
17J. W. Shuckers, Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874),
494.
18Harold M. Dudley, “The Election of 1864,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 18, no. 4 (March 1932): 502.
19Dudley, “Election of 1864,” 504.
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leadership is very significant when you consider the growing popularity of the Peace Democrats
heading into the election. Some were defecting from the party due to the enormous loss of life
in the war and simply sought an end by any means necessary. The Radical Republicans that
nominated Fremont likely wanted to continue the war in pursuit of the abolishment of slavery, but
they just no longer felt that Lincoln would be able to lead the Union to victory. This division that
was slowly developing within the Republican Party only made the position of the Democrats that
much stronger heading into the election.
When you consider the issues that were working against Lincoln leading up to the election,
many of them worked to the advantage of the Copperheads in terms of backing up their rhetoric
about Lincoln’s administration. Up to this point, there had been riots in response to the draft,
questions about the constitutionality of suspending habeas corpus, and growing discontent for the
military failures and the lack of progress being made in the war. This was now being compounded
by division within the Republican Party. While I believe all the evidence I’ve provided so
far demonstrates that Lincoln’s presidency was in jeopardy, it is still unclear as to whether or
not the Copperheads were major players in the Democratic Party—that is until you consider
the nomination of George Pendleton for vice president of the United States at the Democratic
Convention in August of 1864.
While providing evidence of when Copperhead publications and politicians encouraged and
incited violence demonstrates that the Copperheads’ rhetoric resonated with many American
citizens, the nomination of George Pendleton for vice president at the Democratic National
Convention in 1864 shows just how relevant they were politically. This is where I believe the
argument that the Copperheads were just a loud minority within the Democratic Party falls short.
It is reasonable to say that, at the beginning of the war, Peace Democrats did not have significant
representation within the party. Also, the Democratic nominee for president, George McClellan,
was far from a Copperhead. However, as the Union armies seemed to be lacking in making
progress to end the war and the death tolls reached staggering levels, the platform of the Peace
Democrats was growing in strength. So, considering Pendleton’s nomination at the convention in
1864, it is reasonable to conclude that the Democrats saw the Copperheads as an important voting
bloc. Some historians may argue that this was a misjudgment by the party and that Democratic
leaders overestimated the relevance of Copperheads heading into the election. However, whether
or not they made a misjudgment is irrelevant to evaluating whether or not the Copperheads had
significant influence within the party. The fact is that they did nominate a known Peace Democrat
for vice president, and this undoubtedly made their wing very relevant within the Democratic
Party. According to Weber, “Their input was more than just a sop that mainstream Democrats
threw them; it was a necessary political concession to the conservatives’ broad appeal within the
party. They were so strong now that they posed a real challenge to the war wing of the Democratic
Party.”20
Although Pendleton’s nomination does signify that the Copperheads were major players in
the Democratic Party, the accusation that Republicans exaggerated the presence of the Peace
Democrats within the party does have some validity. Throughout the war, Republicans consistently
painted the entire Democratic Party as being made up of disloyal Copperheads. This led them to
mischaracterize several Democratic candidates in an attempt to win elections. A prime example of
this is George W. Woodward, who ran as the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in Pennsylvania
in 1863. Woodward had spent his entire political career as a judge and had no public record of
being a Peace Democrat, but Republicans insisted he was running on a peace platform. The New
York Herald recognized this by stating, “The Republicans, for political purposes, have insisted
20Weber, Copperheads, 172.
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that Judge Woodward is a Copperhead; but such is not the fact.”21 In a letter, Woodward expressed
the disdain he had for the manner in which Republicans had portrayed him. The accusations of
disloyalty had left him dumbfounded as he stated, “If I have not paid my taxes, contributed money
and sons to fight our battles, and in general performed the duties of a humble but loyal citizen
then testify against me.”22
While it is clear that Republicans exaggerated the number of Peace Democrats within the
party, it does not mean that the Copperheads did not have significant political influence. The
Republicans were not wrong in acknowledging that there was a legitimate peace platform in the
Democratic Party, but they failed to acknowledge the presence of War Democrats whatsoever.
This was undoubtedly intentional, and it was a part of a Republican strategy to cement themselves
as the pro-Union party and the Democrats as the party of traitors and Confederate sympathizers.
According to Mark E. Neely Jr., “They ran against all Democrats—including General McClellan,
in 1864—as though they were Clement L. Vallandigham.”23 To find the Republicans guilty of
exaggeration and fearmongering is not an entirely baseless claim, but to suggest that it means that
the Peace Democrats were not a powerful wing of the party is not historically accurate. Not only
because of George Pendleton’s nomination for vice president, but also because of the political
momentum the peace movement had gained in 1864.
The summer of 1864 was when the Copperheads posed their greatest threat to Lincoln
politically. There were even some Confederate leaders who recognized the importance of the
Peace Democrats and how they could impact the war. Robert E. Lee once wrote to Jefferson Davis
that one of the most effective ways of weakening the Union was, “to give all the encouragement we
can, consistently with the truth, to the rising peace party of the North.”24 While their accusations
of tyranny and corruption against Lincoln may have swayed some in their favor, their peace
platform was easily their greatest strength due to the uncertainty of the war. When you consider
the fact that the presidential election was merely a month or two away, there was legitimate
concern over Lincoln’s reelection. However, a surge of Union success in late August and early
September devastated the Copperheads’ position. General William Tecumseh Sherman led his
army into Atlanta and captured the city on September 2, which served as a massive boost to
morale within the Union. It can be argued that this was the pivotal moment that ensured Lincoln’s
reelection. Then, in a series of victories over the course of September and October, General Philip
Sheridan effectively wiped out General Jubal Early’s army in Virginia.25 At this point, the Peace
Democrats who remained steadfast in declaring the war a failure came across as unreasonable
men and possible Confederate sympathizers. Something else that hurt the Democrats’ chances of
winning in November was that McClellan and Pendleton made for a strange combination.
The biggest problem with having McClellan and Pendleton on the same ticket together was
that they represented two different types of Democrats. McClellan, having been commander of the
Army of the Potomac just two years prior, was representative of the War Democrats. Pendleton, a
Peace Democrat, was not a satisfactory choice for vice president in the eyes of the War Democrats.
Weber states, “War Democrats disapproved of Pendleton’s presence on the ticket and resented
the fact that the platform denounced neither the rebellion nor the rebels. Given their moderate
21New York Herald, October 9, 1863, quoted in Neely, Lincoln and the Democrats.
22“A Pennsylvania Judge Views the Rebellion: The Civil War Letters of George Washington Woodward,” in
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, quoted in Neely, Lincoln and the Democrats.
23Neely, Lincoln and the Democrats, 155.
24Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961),
507-9, quoted in Weber, Copperheads.
25“American Civil War Timeline 1864,” HistoryOfWar.org, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/timeline_acw
_1864.html.
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tendencies, though, the disgruntled War Democrats refused to do anything that might undercut
the party.”26 Hard-line Peace Democrats were equally displeased with McClellan’s nomination
for president.
In an attempt to satisfy both wings of the Democratic Party by including a War and a Peace
Democrat on the same ticket, the Democrats appeared to be unsure and unwilling to commit to a
direction. Not only might this have caused some confusion for voters, it caused some disunity
within the party. Alexander Long and William M. Corry, two Copperheads who were dissatisfied
with McClellan’s nomination, believed McClellan’s policies would be similar to Lincoln’s. In a
convention for Peace Democrats organized by Long and Corry in Cincinnati, they exclaimed, “We
have before us two candidates, but no choice.”27 If the party thought the Peace Democrats were
significant enough that it felt the need to include one on its presidential ticket, then it may have
been better off committing to them fully and making the presidential nominee a Peace Democrat
as well. While this may have alienated War Democrats, it is not unreasonable to assume that they
would have supported a Peace Democrat for president. The War Democrats were much more
moderate than the outspoken Copperheads of their party, and they likely would have acted in
the interest of party unity. Conversely, had the Peace Democrats been excluded from the ticket
altogether, it is likely they would have split the party in half and siphoned the strength of whatever
candidate was running.
The Copperheads were essentially buried after Lincoln’s victory in the 1864 election. The
popularity of their peace platform had diminished greatly by late in the year, and the idea that
cessation of all hostilities was the best course of action seemed laughable after Sherman completed
his March to the Sea. However, many Copperheads that remained in office would continue to
obstruct where and whenever possible. Their stance that Lincoln usurped his constitutional
authority was something they never relinquished, and their accusations that Lincoln was beholden
to the ideas of the most radical abolitionists never ceased. This was evident in their role in
attempting to prevent the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, with Peace Democrats such as
Fernando Wood and George Pendleton leading the way for the Democratic Party.
True to their nature, Wood and Pendleton accused Republicans of trying to elevate former
slaves above whites. They attempted to sway centrist Democrats and conservative Republicans
into believing that Lincoln had avoided concluding peace with the Confederacy in order to
give him time to pass the amendment. However, it had become nearly impossible for these
Copperheads to shake anyone’s faith in Lincoln. Lincoln’s popularity was at an all-time high
given the direction of the war. In the end, the Copperheads were not wrong about the Union’s
goal to abolish slavery. However, by 1865, their extreme views and rhetoric about the war made
them a greater concern to the public than any radical abolitionist.
In what would end up being their final major battle with Lincoln on a political stage, the
Copperheads were unsuccessful in their attempts to block passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.
This final struggle was indicative of how far they had come in their own party, but it also showed
just how powerless the Democrats had become in the House and Senate. The fact that men like
Fernando Wood and George Pendleton were the leading voices of the Democratic opposition to the
amendment shows that the Copperheads had a very significant role within the party. However, in
the waning months of the war, the Democratic Party had shrunk considerably in its representation.
In 1865, Republicans had increased their total seats within the House of Representatives by about
forty seats, while the Democrats lost just under forty. The Republicans had enjoyed a majority
26Weber, Copperheads, 174.
27Cincinnati Convention, October 18, 1864, for the Organization of a Peace Party (1864: Cincinnati, Ohio), 16,
quoted in Weber, Copperheads.
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in the House and Senate throughout the war, but it had become completely lopsided by the end
of the war. Part of this is because of the increased role of the Peace Democrats, and part of it
is because the Republicans swayed the public into believing all Democrats supported a peace
platform. The Copperheads had been heavily disgraced by Lincoln’s victory in 1864, and the
surge of military success in that same year had severely damaged much of their credibility. All of
the sudden, the Republicans’ painting of the Democrats as a party of traitors began to be a more
accepted view. Since the Democrats had given such a large platform to the Copperheads, it was
easy for Republicans to dismiss the entire party in 1865.
The legacy of the Copperheads has very much become the legacy of the Democratic Party
during the Civil War. There is a legitimate question as to whether or not this is the correct way to
view the Civil War Democrats. There are historians who believe the image of the party during this
era has been tainted by the Copperheads, and that War Democrats have been unfairly associated
with what they believe was a fringe group. I do agree that the presence of the War Democrats has
been overlooked, and I also do not think it is accurate to view the party as being disloyal to the
Union. However, too many historians try to defend Democrats by downplaying the significance
of the Copperheads. They played a huge role in the party’s advocation for the defense of civil
liberties, as evidenced by Clement Vallandigham, and their peace platform was recognized as
being significant enough to include George Pendleton on the Democratic ticket for the presidential
election in 1864.
Although the Copperheads were unable to defeat Lincoln in 1864, there is no denying that
they came very close to having one of their own in the White House as the second most powerful
man in the country. To speculate as to what course McClellan and Pendleton would have chosen
had they been elected would be an exercise in futility, but it is fair to say that the conclusion of
the war, the abolition of slavery, and the restoration of Union would have been very much in
question. It is also fair to say that the Copperhead rhetoric that circulated in the public discourse
had influence in the Northeast and Midwest, which is evidenced by the New York City and
Toledo riots. When all of this is considered, it is hard to come to any conclusion that does not
recognize the Copperheads as a reasonable threat to Lincoln and the Union. While I do not
believe their intent was to jeopardize the Union or to side with the Confederacy, their actions were
unquestionably damaging to Lincoln’s cause. The best summarization of the Copperheads and
their legacy comes from Weber: “They were sincere in their belief that the Lincoln administration
and the Republican Congress were overstepping their constitutional bounds. They did not want
the Confederacy to win or the Union to split. They just wanted the nation to return to the status
quo ante bellum.”28

28Weber, Copperheads, 6.
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The Experiences of Black Soldiers During the Civil War: A
Microhistorical Case Study of the Demus Family
TO RA UE LAN D
As with most researchable source material, the voices of minorities and marginalized groups are often unavailable,
nonexistent, or heavily obscured by the voices of their more privileged counterparts. The Civil War, for instance, is
studied through a predominantly white lens, despite the importance of African American soldiers, civilians, and enslaved
individuals enveloped in this conflict. This paper aims to analyze the African American perspective on the Civil War
(1861-1865) and early antebellum period through the words of these individuals and the experiences of David Demus, an
infantryman in the all-black 54th Massachusetts Regiment, and his family. Utilizing correspondence, letters, military and
pension records, and individual black testimonials, the following is an attempt to more fully understand life on both the
battlefield and home front for African Americans during an era plagued by war, slavery, and systematic racism, as well as
how these individuals ultimately contributed to the evolution of societal ideals and behaviors within the scope of race, still
pertinent today.

On July 17, 1862, after facing well over a year of bitter combat losses to the Confederate Army,
Union President Abraham Lincoln signed Congress’s Second Confiscation and Militia Acts.1 The
passage of these acts not only emphasized how urgently enervated and desperate the preexisting
Union forces were, but would solidify Lincoln’s switch from the rejection of black soldiers
joining Union forces in fear of losing the support of border states to allowing and, eventually,
fully supporting the inclusion of black troops.2 While the act itself was not a conscriptive call
to arms, it authorized Lincoln “to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem
necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion. . . in such manner as he may judge
best for the public welfare” as well as inspired blacks and “Southern contraband individuals” to
join the fight for unity and freedom.3 Serving as one of the first all-black regiments, the 54th
Massachusetts Infantry led by Colonel Robert Gould Shaw set a precedent and an inspiration for
minority participation during the war. As noted by James Henry Gooding, a free black man living
in New Bedford, Massachusetts, “Does it not behoove every black man to consider. . . whether he
cannot be one of the glorious 54th? . . . There is more dignity in carrying a musket in defense of
liberty and right than there is in shaving a man’s face, or waiting on somebody’s table.”4 Despite
the bravery and strength millions of black soldiers and their families had shown during this period,
the voices of these individuals are often unheard or obscured by white men’s voices:
Additionally, it also depended on whether there was an audience that was willing
to both listen and document the lives of USCT (United States Colored Troops)
Tora Ueland is a senior from Salem, Massachusetts. She is currently pursuing her BA in history with minors in
forensic science and English. Her research interests include the Civil War and the history of criminal behavior.
1United States Congress, “An Act to Amend the Act Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union,
Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions,” in Thirty-Seventh Congress, Session II, Chapter 201 (Washington, DC: July
17, 1862), 597-600, https://iowaculture.gov/history/education/educator-resources/primary-source-sets/african-americansand-civil-war/militia-act.
2“Black Civil War Soldiers,” History.com, Updated January 25, 2021, https://www.history.com/topics/americancivil-war/black-civil-war-soldiers.
3“Black Civil War Soldiers,” History.com.
4Quoted in Glenn David Brasher, “Creating ‘The Glorious 54th,’” New York Times, April 11, 2013, https://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/11/creating-the-glorious-54th/.
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veterans and/or their kin. However, it does not mean that their lived experiences are
non-existent. It also does not suggest that the families and communities connected to
their soldiers are lost.5
Evidently, black individuals during the Civil War faced innumerable impediments on the home
front and even within their own ranks. To further investigate these impediments and experiences,
one must consult the words of the individuals themselves through correspondence and oral histories,
and, in particular, notes historian Holly Pinheiro, “when discussing the various aspects of military
service—enlistment, training, combat, disabilities, pay, military disobedience, veteranhood, and
other issues—their families are critical to understanding the Civil War and its lasting impact.”6
Though these sources are difficult to locate, and often even more difficult to fully comprehend, one
such individual, David Demus, a private in the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, provides a wealth of
familial correspondence, letters, records, and relatives with which a relatively thorough baseline
can be built for the experiences of black people and soldiers during the war.
Demus and his family were one of many families that made up the large portion of black
Americans who inhabited Franklin County, Pennsylvania, which hovers just above the MasonDixon line. He and many other black men seized the opportunity to join the 54th in 1863, leaving
behind their families.7 However, by 1862, Confederate forces had advanced into Pennsylvania
and begun raiding southern counties for supplies as well as approximately 1,000 free blacks
as human contraband—sent to the deep South to be enslaved.8 With painstakingly slow letter
communications, individuals such as David Demus and his wife, Mary Jane, could only hope that
the other had not perished in battle or been murdered, assaulted, or kidnapped and taken into
slavery. Luckily for the Demus family, the Confederate raid did not harm or kidnap any members
of the family. The relief and hopelessness are noted in a letter from Demus to his wife. “i had
heard that the rebels Was in the but it please me very much to hear that I Was not so for i just now
how the people is Scared about home but i am sorry that i ain’t there for i have saw so many that
a rebel is no more then one of our one men.”9 Through this emotional and physical insecurity
also came economic insecurity, relocation, and gender-role subversion, which both black and
white families were faced with. The written experiences of the Demus family demonstrate the
exacerbation of already tumultuous conditions for families during the Civil War when the subjects
were black.
Born in approximately 1838 in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, David Demus worked as a farm
laborer until age twenty-five, when he volunteered to enlist into the Union Army on May 6,
1863. Demus was subsequently assigned the role of a private in the Massachusetts 54th Infantry,
Company K.10 Throughout his service, Demus kept in consistent contact with his wife, Mary
Jane Demus—formerly Mary Jane Christy—as well as with his extended family and enlisted
5Holly Pinheiro Jr., “Black Families Unending Fight for Equality: Teaching Civil War Pension Records,” Journal of
the Civil War Era (February 16, 2021), https://www.journalofthecivilwarera.org/2021/02/black-families-unending-fightfor-equality-teaching-civil-war-pension-records/.
6Pinheiro, “Black Families Unending Fight.”
7Edward Ayers, William G. Thomas III, and Anne Sarah Rubin, “Black and on the Border,” University of Nebraska –
Lincoln, Digital Commons, 2007, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historyfacpub/46/.
8Frank Reeves, “Confederates’ ‘Slave Hunt’ in North a Military Disgrace,” Pittsburgh Post Gazette,
June 30, 2013, https://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2013/06/30/Confederates-slave-hunt-in-North-a-militarydisgrace/stories/201306300221.
9David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, July 27, 1864, in “Demus and Christy Family Letters: The War Years,”
The Valley of the Shadow, University of Virginia Library, https://valley.lib.virginia.edu/VoS/personalpapers/ documents/franklin/p2demusletters.html.
10“David Demus,” US Civil War Soldier Records and Profiles, 1861-1865, Ancestry.com; “David Demus (abt.
1845-aft. 1870),” WikiTree, https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Demus-8.

Black Soldiers During the Civil War

73

brothers-in-law, through a series of correspondence letters.11 These letters detail the experiences
and struggles of the Demus-Christy family, both on the front line and home front. The issues
addressed in these letters, though personal, encompass more universal issues faced by African
Americans at this time. Beyond supporting racial and personal sentiments of pride, the 54th
Massachusetts provided African American men with the opportunity to prove themselves worthy
of equality and worthy of being fought for, subsequently dismantling preexisting paternalistic,
“white savior” ideologies and the belief that free and enslaved blacks were incapable and needed
the white man to sustain them. Furthermore, the allowance of their participation in the war
allowed these men to first-handedly fight to protect their families from slavery, Confederate
violence, and to be able to sustain the family and safeguard property with military compensation.
Enlistment, then, became a compilation of coveted opportunities and status, proving the black
man’s capabilities and allowing for property maintenance and the protection of one’s dependents,
thus achieving the epitome of masculinity and fulfilling gender roles that defined male behavior
and responsibilities in the mid-19th century that had previously only been feasible to white men.12
In essence, black men and their families, such as Demus and his own family, recognized military
participation, particularly in the 54th, as the catalyst for change and for white recognition of worth
and masculinity.
Though the 54th Infantry was an all-black regiment, these men were brigaded with and trained
alongside white regiments, placing the two races in close contact with one another. Both blacks
and whites underwent the same combat training and endured the harsh New England weather
conditions detailed by Mary Jane’s brother, Jacob:
we was just on drill when they come and they was two of the boys was made go and
get their knacksack and they had to wear them to punish them for looking around
while they was in ranks when we are in ranks we are not allowed to look around
or spit or to raise our hand we also got our arms this day they are springfield rifles
which we have they are allowed to kill a great disants. We don’t like the climate at
all for it is very cold out here now we have to wear our overcoats all day it that cold
but i think when we go down south it will be warm.13
The two races essentially performed the same tasks at the same level of danger, although it should
be noted that black soldiers were often additionally forced to perform the more remedial and
undesirable tasks, as delineated within the aforementioned Militia Acts, which stated that African
American men could be enlisted “for the purpose of constructing intrenchments, or performing
camp service or any other labor.”14 Despite this, black and white soldiers were compensated
unequally, an issue also sanctioned within these acts and not addressed until 1864, when pay was
finally equalized by Congress after perpetual black complaints. This disparity in pay between
black soldiers and their white peers quickly became a point of contention once blacks were
allowed to enlist. White soldiers had higher pay, advantageous access to materials and supplies,
better food and equipment, and access to superior medical treatment.15 “Black soldiers were
initially paid $10 per month from which $3 was automatically deducted for clothing, resulting
11“David Demus,” United States Census, 1860, via WikiTree.
12“Home, Sweet Home: Gender in the Antebellum Household,” Civil War Era NC, accessed May 2, 2021,
https://cwnc.omeka.chass.ncsu.edu/exhibits/show/protect/1/men.
13Jacob Christy to Mary Jane Demus, 1864.
14United States Congress, “Act to Amend.”
15Steven Mintz, “Historical Context: Black Soldiers in the Civil War,” Gilder Lehrman Institute of History, accessed
March 14, 2021, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/teaching-resource/historical-context-black-soldierscivil-war.
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in a net pay of $7. In contrast, white soldiers received $13 per month from which no clothing
allowance was drawn.”16 Furthermore, payments that were intended for black soldiers were often
consistently delayed. Colonel Robert Gould Shaw acknowledged this looming issue of payment
inequality among his ranks in a letter to Governor Andrew, noting:
You have probably seen the order from Washington which cuts down the pay for black
troops from $13 to $10. Of course if this affects Massachusetts regiments, it will be
a great piece of injustice to them, as they were enlisted on the express understanding
that they were to be on precisely the same footing as all other Massachusetts troops.17
In an 1863 letter, Jacob Christy, Mary Jane’s brother, addresses the effect of this pay issue on
black soldier’s morale and productivity. “sofar We haveant receive no money yet. . . we all like
soldieren verry well but we dont like the thing of duing without money so long we dont work so
hard now any more.”18 Black soldiers, such as Demus, not only found themselves disheartened
and conned by this pay discrepancy, but continually failing to uphold the coveted masculinity
roles they had hoped to accomplish with enlistment, perpetually sending home empty promises
of payments. Such is evident in an 1863 letter from Demus to his wife, which states, “ i Can
get my Discharge in a short time but the Captain say that they Won’t pay us thirteen Dollars a
month and he say that they Will disband the 54th and 55th and send them home and then try and
[unclear: intes] us [unclear: meney] as he Can for 7 Dollars a month.”19 Furloughs were also
often consistently delayed, a prospect referenced in a separate series of 1863 letters from Demus
to his wife wherein he references the consistent delay of his leave from early January to the end of
July.20 Mary Jane subsequently expressed discontent at the empty promises as well as monetary
concerns and informs Demus that, in order to supplement this missing income, she herself must
abandon her role as a housewife to provide for the family, an evident, yet necessary, subversion of
gender roles. Mary Jane noted the mass exodus of neighbors from the area not only to escape
Confederate raids, but also to find employment and employers who were not too damaged by the
war-torn economy to maintain their residences. Financially struggling and with no consistent pay,
Mary Jane relocated to a Mr. Patterson’s home, a white employer who could not only provide
compensation for work done, but consistent shelter and supplies:
i am living at Mr. patterson i come home when you wrote to me you was come home
then you didn’t come i went back again i am going to stay a month and little better
then i am come home then. . . if you dont come home i will [unclear: har] out this
summer for ever things are so dear i cant stay at home for i must earn mi [unclear:
clos] so many people going a way with21
It should be noted, however, that in cases like this “free labor” was still heavily rooted in
subservience. Therefore, the news of his wife working in the field, and more specifically under
16Elsie Freeman, Wynell Burroughs Schamel, and Jean West, “The Fight for Equal Rights: A Recruiting Poster
for Black Soldiers in the Civil War,” Social Education 56, 2 (February 1992): 118-120, https://www.archives.gov/
education/lessons/blacks-civil-war.
17Quoted in Luis Fenollosa Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment: The History of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment of Massachusetts
Volunteer Infantry, 1863-1865 (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1891).
18Jacob Christy to Mary Jane Demus, November 24, 1863.
19David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, October 17, 1863; November 1863; January 19, 1864; February 4, 1864; March
4, 1864; and June 15, 1864.
20David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, October 17, 1863; November 1863; January 19, 1864; February 4, 1864; March
4, 1864, and June 15, 1864.
21Mary Jane Demus to David Demus, February 4, 1864.
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a white man, was distressing for Demus and other enlisted black men in similar situations for
several reasons. One, the subservience-based labor heavily mirrored Southern slavery practices,
an institution that Demus and other black soldiers had pledged their lives to dismantle. Two, this
concept reiterated the paternalistic and “white savior” thematic elements of the war that these men
devoted themselves to prove untrue. Finally, perhaps most personally, the effort and work done by
these enlisted men did not, in fact, satiate the white-dominated male gender roles that they had gone
off to war to prove themselves capable of—supporting one’s dependents, maintaining property,
and fulfilling the pillars of 19th-century virtuousness—therefore emasculating themselves as
individuals. Instead, women such as Mary Jane had to rely on other men outside of their own
husbands for support. Demus expressed his discontent more superficially, scolding Mary Jane for
engaging in field work, an area he deemed “man’s work.” He states “i doant thig that you ot to
go out in the feald to husk Corn or dow eney such Wark. . . i doant Want to hear of you going
in the feald to eney more and you nead mind Whot you her all the tock that his son Can tock
Wont Hirt you.”22 Demus readdresses his dismay at the prospect of his wife having to support
herself in a later letter, saying, “i am sorry to think how you have to get along i never thought that
you Would have to Work so hard to get along.”23 Better wages, treatment, and access to food
and supplies only improved with higher ranks for black soldiers, though this was evidently an
unattainable goal. Black soldiers had been ineligible for officer ranks, and promotions within
their own regiments proved to be more symbolic rather than functional positions.
On July 18, 1863, David Demus was wounded in action during the battle for Fort Wager in
South Carolina.24 During this battle, the 54th Massachusetts Infantry volunteered to lead the
brigade’s attack on the Confederate beach fort and subsequently sustained the heaviest losses of
all involved regiments with a total of 281 casualties. Of those casualties, fifty-four were killed or
fatally wounded, and another forty-eight soldiers were missing and never accounted for.25 Despite
the high human cost, the fort was never successfully captured by the Union. According to Demus
in a letter dated eight days after the battle, “i am in the hosply i Was in the battle Was sot in the
head But i am Abel to go a boat a gane.”26 Though Demus survived his injuries, he still faced
poor medical treatment, and it is likely that his prolonged injury eventually contributed to his
death sometime after 1870.27 War records denote that Demus’s head injury was the result of a
bullet fragment lodging itself “over the posterior part of the Parietal bone fracturing his skull.”28
On September 4, 1863, Demus detailed in a letter how doctors confirmed his “skull [was] broke”
and would never heal, instead simply instructing him to try to “take care of himself.”29 Over a
month later, on October 18, Demus updated his wife on his head injury, stating that there was
something inside the gash in his skull, which he discovered while washing up: “Was Wasing mi
head and i felt soming in the hole and i put mi hand oup in the hole and i pold out a peace of mi
Cule and it has got sor a gane but i thing it Will get Well a gane.” In one instance, Demus even
writes of his intentions to find a piece of metal to try and cap the hole with, “Why i Can get a piece
22David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, November 1863.
23David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, March 24, 1864.
24“David Demus,” WikiTree.
25Brian C. Pohanka, “Fort Wagner and the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry,” American Battlefield Trust, accessed
February 14, 2021, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/fort-wagner-and-54th-massachusetts-volunteer-infantry.
26David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, July 26, 1863.
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of silver put on the hole Why i think that it Will get Well.”30 Though this injury was evidently
devastating, it served as Demus’s opportunity to elevate his military status. In August of 1864,
Demus was deemed unfit for combat due to his cranial injury, however, his term of enlistment
was far from over. Rather than send the wounded man home, Demus was still of relative use and
needed to be relocated to utilize his services elsewhere. As a result, he began serving a more
permanent position as the chief commissary clerk.31 A letter from David Demus to his wife in
March of 1864 demonstrates notable improvements in pay frequency, food and supplies, and
treatment during this switch from combat to an officer’s assistant:
Could but i am happy to say that i ain’t With the regiment now i am in Jacksonville
Waiting on an offer and all i have to Do is to blacking his boots in the morning and
Clean his sword in getting along very Will and i must tell i had the [unclear: masel]
but i soon got Well again but i ain’t quite as fat as i Was but i soon Will get fat again
and When i fatten up again i Will send my likeness to you.32
In an August letter to his wife, Demus again noted the improvement in clothing and food rations
he was provided.33 It should be noted, however, that the work done under this officer proved to be
remedial and somewhat humiliating considering the catalyst for improvement in his and other
black soldiers’ living and financial conditions was working under a white soldier. This situation
mirrored Mary Jane’s aforementioned ironic position of subservience to a white man while
fighting for black independence, creating a paradoxical fight for rights and black independence
that, within both the household and battlefront, could only be ameliorated with white dependence.
Though this irony was not lost within many of the men’s minds, working closely under a white
officer was often the best position available to a black soldier and the only opportunity for
advancement, and thus had to be stomached.
As noted within Demus’s letters, the Civil War was host to innumerable casualties for both
black and white soldiers, who often faced permanent mutilation, disfigurement, and an omission
of necessary long-term care. On the battlefield, black and white men were of equal merit, facing
exposure to equal dangers and violence. Throughout the war, “an estimated 476,000 soldiers
were wounded by bullets, artillery shrapnel, or sabers and bayonets” and an additional 60,000
amputations were performed to treat said wounds.34 In an 1864 letter, Demus details this violence
of the battlefield and the bravery of the enlisted while describing the death of one of his wife’s
relatives, Bill: “you Want to know all about bill i Can tell you that he Was killed on the field
the first time he Was shot Was in the arm and we told him to go to the rear but he Would
not go and the he Was shot in the brest and Was kill Ded.”35 Men, regardless of color, faced
butchering from overwhelmed medical staff attempting to be efficient, exposing their patients to
unsanitary tools, insufficient aftercare, and almost never any form of anesthetic. Furthermore,
the Civil War is considered the last major war waged without knowledge of the germ theory
of disease, meaning conditions for all enlisted men were unsanitary and riddled with disease.
With a deficient diet, overexhaustion, and more patent threats to be contended with, diseases and
infection spread like wildfire: “Pneumonia, typhoid, diarrhea/dysentery, and malaria were the
predominant illnesses. Altogether, two-thirds of the approximately 660,000 deaths of soldiers
30David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, October 17, 1863.
31David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, August 18, 1864.
32David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, March 4, 1864.
33David Demus to Mary Jane Demus, August 24, 1864.
34Paige G. Backus, “Amputations and the Civil War,” American Battlefield Trust, October 19, 2020, https://www.battle
fields.org/learn/articles/amputations-and-civil-war.
35David Demus to Mary Jane, March 4, 1864.
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were caused by uncontrolled infectious diseases.”36 In that sense, there was no difference between
white regiments and black soldiers such as Demus and his family who served in the “invalid
Corps.” Both black and white soldiers were facing suffering through extensive bodily harm
and fighting through disease and combat to protect their dependents on the home front. While
disease and combat threats served as the great equalizer, paying no mind to their victims’ races,
discernible inconsistencies in medical treatment between black and white units were obvious:
“illnesses took a much heavier proportionate toll on the USCT than they did on white volunteer
units.”37 These deaths can be attributed to a variety of issues, all pertaining to racist ideologies
within the military system. First, most black units were most commonly issued campgrounds or
positions in the most unfavorable areas, such as swamplands, as it was a commonly held idea
that all black soldiers were “immune” to all “tropical illnesses”—a racist and blatantly untrue
assertion. Furthermore, these camps were subject to neglect and ignorance of health dangers,
allowing the already unsanitary conditions to worsen exponentially:
[As a result] nine times as many black troops died of disease as on the battlefield.
Over 29,000 lost their lives from illness, with pneumonia, dysentery, typhoid fever,
and malaria taking the heaviest tolls on the black ranks. . . . A black heavy artillery
regiment lost over eight hundred men to illness, and one infantry regiment, in service
less than one year, suffered 524 deaths, 50 percent of its strength.38
According to a study on Civil War enlistee illness deaths conducted by the College of Physicians
in Philadelphia, black soldiers died at nearly double the rate of white soldiers, with a 5 percent
illness mortality rate as opposed to the white 2.9 percent. Furthermore, scurvy was five times
more prevalent among black units than white, smallpox seven times more, lung diseases and
bronchitis between 2 and 5 percent higher, and black units suffered a higher prevalence of diarrhea
and dysentery.39 Black soldiers often also faced appalling treatment from their white commanders
that subjected them to health issues: “most were employed in menial assignments and kept in
rear-echelon, fatigue jobs. They were punished by whipping or by being tied by their thumbs.”40
The prejudice against black soldiers was systematic not only within the ranks themselves, but also
within the medical system. Most white doctors and volunteer physicians refused to serve black
regiments, and because the amount of qualified black surgeons and doctors was so miniscule,
an entire black regiment often only had access to one or, if lucky, two medical staff members.
Oftentimes, however, soldiers in black regiments defaulted to treating their peers themselves.41
In the case of black medical professionals being employed, they too faced discrimination and
unequal benefits. Susan King Taylor, a black nurse who devoted herself to the treatment of both
black and white soldiers during the war, was “debarred from having [herself] placed on the
rolls of pensioners. . . as a Nurse” through an unspecified “technicality” after thirty-seven years
of applying for post-war benefits.42 The racial bias of the medical system, mistreatment, and
negligence heavily affected black soldiers even beyond the war’s conclusion in 1865. In regards
36Jeffrey S. Sartin, “Infectious Diseases During the Civil War: The Triumph of the ‘Third Army,’” Clinical Infectious
Diseases 16, no. 4 (April 1993): 580-584, https://doi.org/10.1093/clind/16.4.580.
37Joseph Glatthaar, “Medical Care,” in The Civil War’s Black Soldiers (Fort Washington, PA: Eastern National, 2007),
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/civil_war_series/2/sec17.htm.
38Glatthaar, “Medical Care.”
39Ilene Raymond Rush, “How the Sacrifices of Black Civil War Troops Advanced Medicine,” BunkHistory, March 21,
2018, https://www.bunkhistory.org/resources/2192.
40Mintz, “Historical Context.”
41Glatthaar, “Medical Care.”
42Colonel C. T. Trowbridge to Susan King-Taylor, April 7, 1902, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/bindingwounds/
images/taylorOB556.png.
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to post-war life expectancies, only 29 percent of black soldiers who served during the War lived
to 1900, as opposed to the 45 percent of white Civil War veterans who lived to 1900.43
On June 4, 1865, approximately two months after the official surrender of the Confederacy,
David Demus was finally discharged from the Union Army. Still contending with his devastating
head injury, Demus applied for a war-wound pension. After analyzing Demus’s medical records,
the Pension Office did find evidence that Demus’s injury had been sustained during his term of
service, more specifically during the assault on Fort Wagner in the summer of 1863, and that he
had been treated by war medics. Demus was subsequently approved for a war-wound pension,
although he was deemed “unfit for the Veterans’ Reserve Corps because men of color are not
allowed in it.”44 In this context, Demus proved to be somewhat of an outlier among other black
soldiers who had been wounded during the war. Despite the Union victory, the post-war era was
reflective of the mistreatment and inequality of the war years, as evidenced in the pension records
of black veterans. In regards to medical pensions such as that received by Demus, black soldiers
who often were treated unofficially or improperly during the war had a much more difficult time
in providing documentation that the medical issues they suffered from stemmed from injuries
sustained during the war. Unlike Demus, those injuries were often undocumented and, therefore,
provided pensioners with “reasonable doubt” that a wound was not sustained directly from the war
and was, therefore, “not their problem.” During the immediate post-war Reconstruction period,
for instance, only 22 percent of black veteran applicants received pension approvals for wounds
sustained during the war. Black applicants received 23 percent pension approvals for illnesses
and long-term health conditions from the war and 19 percent pension approvals for issues outside
of these two categories. Under those same categories, white veteran applicants had an 83 percent
approval rate for wound pensions, 74 percent for illness pensions, and 73 percent for issues
outside of wounds and illnesses.45 This inequality in pension approval rates for war veterans was
again discouraging for participating black families. From the more direct perspective of veterans,
individuals who had risked their lives and fought for their autonomy and families were still facing
systematic discrimination from the very institution in which they sought relief. Furthermore,
many of these wounded veterans were no longer functional or well enough to continue to find
work. This left women to do the work to support families and their wounded, emasculated
spouses, or allowed for complete financial ruin, calling back and dismantling one of the initial
points of contention for war entry: gender roles and the ability to be a virtuous man capable of
supporting one’s family regardless of being black or white. Though there were most definitely
white soldiers who were denied war-wound pensions, the denials were disproportionately high for
black veterans, thus affecting them more.
In addition to black veterans and black servicepeople, such as Susan King Taylor, many
families of deceased black soldiers faced discrimination when applying for post-war pensions.
Because David had survived the war and received a war pension, Mary Jane herself did not apply
for a pension. Even after David’s death “sometime after 1870,” Mary Jane did not choose to
apply for a widow’s pension, likely under the pretense that she as a single, black woman would be
refused or placed under intense observation and oversight. Instead, Mary Jane remarried another
veteran of the 54th Massachusetts, Wesley Krunkelton—also of K Company, with whom she
would remain married for the remainder of her life.46 Many black widows, however, were not
43Sven E. Wilson, “Prejudice and Policy: Racial Discrimination in the Union Army Disability Pension System,
1865-1906,” AMJ Public Health 100, no. S1 (April 1, 2010): 56-65, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2009.172759.
44Hoptak, “South Central Pennsylvanians.”
45Wilson, “Prejudice and Policy.”
46“Demus and Christy Family Letters,” University of Virginia Library.
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so fortunate. Patience Buck, spouse to Civil War veteran George Buck, applied for a pension
after her husband died in 1871 from long-standing medical issues that stemmed from a war injury.
The injury stemmed from a head wound sustained during the siege on Fort Wagner. A bullet
fragment had been lodged into his brain and permanently damaged it. Following the injury, Buck
suffered from seizures and mental incapabilities and was noted by one of his friends to have
gone “completely insane.” While Buck survived the war, the head injury led to a drowning at his
workplace, convincing Patience to apply. Though a group of Buck’s fellow veterans attested to
this injury and the circumstances behind it, the pension application was denied in 1883 under
claims that the death was solely work-related and unrelated to any war injuries that may have
been sustained by Buck. Patience then reapplied in 1890 and was approved for an eight-dollar
pension. When Patience reapplied and was granted this pension, however, the Bureau of Pensions
scrutinized every aspect of her life in an attempt to prove her ineligible. Rumors were fabricated
of Patience running a “lewd house” of illicit prostitution. Patience was then removed from the
pension payroll, labeled a prostitute, and publicly shamed.47 Instances such as this contributed to
a much lower frequency of black pension applications compared to white.48
For black soldiers and their families in the Civil War, participation was far deeper than
abolishing slavery, although this was a highly potent element. Participation in the war served
as a statement of equality and of validity. Black men, in particular, were affected by the ideals
of republicanism and male virtue established by the mid-19th century. Republicanism itself, an
ideology that was popularized during the early 19th century, addressed manhood and the societal
goals and ideals of man. It emphasized self-autonomy primarily through landownership and
self-sufficiency. The war allowed African Americans the opportunity to prove that they too could
uphold the pillars of manhood: property ownership, masculine strength, and the ability to support
one’s family. The war and the ability to fight to protect their own rights and autonomy opened
the metaphorical door into a previously white-dominated masculinity standard and seemed the
perfect opportunity to further prove that the black man “was no slacker” and was capable and
deserving of equal rights and liberties. Unfortunately, for many participants and their families,
the war did not deliver on many of these coveted ideals. Though equal on the battlefield, black
soldiers found themselves at a steep social and hierarchical disadvantage within the ranks. Despite
proving their worth through remedial labor, black soldiers still faced systematic racism even
within the Union, with inequalities in supplies, compensation, and medical and social treatments.
Often black soldiers found themselves delivering empty promises to their families and feeling
the defeat of an inability to deliver on those male-gendered virtues. Though these men and their
families devoted themselves to fighting for black liberties both on the home front and battlefront,
they often found themselves in a melancholic paradox, fighting for black independence by being
forced to be dependent on whites. While the experiences of every black individual cannot be
all-encompassing, the experiences of the Demus family are symbolic of many of these thematic
and physical impediments of black families during the period. Fears for each other’s lives, the
horrors of war, racism, the deflation of hopes, and the disappointments in promises upheld by
enlistment are all concepts prevalent in the lives of Civil War veterans, particularly those who
happened to be black. The Demus family and the detailing of personal expressions of each of
these concepts create a foundation of study for black soldiers and their families during the war,
despite the lack of unbiased resources on the topic and the general obscuring of those black voices
by white men and the “white savior” trope that, even today, pollutes the study on the conflict.
47Pinheiro, “Black Families Unending Fight.”
48Pinheiro.
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In total, 186,000 black soldiers, such as Demus, served in the Union Army and another
29,000 in the Navy, accounting for nearly 10 percent of all Union forces during the later half of
the war. The dedication and ferocity with which these men fought, propelled by their thirst for
change, justified their role as, what Lincoln would accredit them as, individuals responsible for
“turning the tide of the war.” Yet, of those who served, only twenty-four black soldiers received
the Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery in battle.49 Black soldiers and families during the
Civil War, however, evidently showcased bravery not only on the battlefield, but also on the home
front, in the face of discrimination and inequality, against illness and injustice. Black soldiers
had to fight enemies on the battlefield as well as within their own military, all for lower pay, less
honor, and insufficient supplies. Though the war failed to deliver on many of the hopes black
participants had harbored, the bravery, strength, and sacrifices of black individuals, such as the
Demus family, set into motion the transformation of what it meant to be black in America, and
began the dismantling of racism and oppression of black individuals, a movement that set the
precedent for equality activists for generations to follow.

49Mintz, “Historical Context.”
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